UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA
FACULDADE DE LETRAS

Beethoven's Dolce:
Interpretation, Performance, and Description –
The Case of Music

Sara Ellen Eckerson

Orientador: Professor Doutor Miguel Bénard da Costa Tamen

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor
no Ramo de Estudos de Literatura e Cultura,
na Especialidade de Teoria da Literatura

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BEETHOVEN'S *DOLCE:*

INTERPRETATION, PERFORMANCE AND DESCRIPTION – THE CASE OF MUSIC

SARA ELLEN ECKERSON

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KEYWORDS

Expressive word cue indications; *dolce*; Ludwig van Beethoven; hermeneutics; F. D. E. Schleiermacher; A. B. Marx; aesthetics; philosophy of music

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Indicações musicais de expressão; *dolce*; Ludwig van Beethoven; hermenêutica; F. D. E. Schleiermacher; A. B. Marx; estética; filosofia da música

ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to describe the role of Beethoven's *dolce* indications in the staves of a musical score. We will thus explore Beethoven's *dolce* in contexts of theoretical interpretation, performance, and critical descriptions of meaning in music. We first will examine performance practice and Beethoven's *dolce* indications in a symphonic setting (Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, "Eroica") and in piano sonatas. We will highlight historical and current performance practice to find grounds for the unique way Beethoven uses expressive indications (for example, *dolce*, *cantabile*, and *espressivo*) in the staff. The second part of this dissertation will investigate nineteenth century hermeneutics and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory to show the resonances between the critical activity of interpreting texts and the activity of interpreting and performing music. In the final part of this dissertation, we will discuss a critical method developed by the theorist, pedagogue, and music historian Adolf Bernhard Marx (1795-1866). Marx determines this critical method in the context of how to explicate meaning in instrumental music, which is namely through simile, symbolism, and *psychological coherence*. We will conclude this dissertation by describing the importance of material considerations in A. B. Marx's theory of a musical *Idee*. Furthermore, we will comment on the role of the *Idee* as a bridge between the material considerations required for performance practice and the "spiritual" activity that is needed to explore deeper meaning in music.

RESUMO

O objectivo desta tese é descrever o papel das indicações musicais, em especial de *dolce,* no contexto dos compassos das pautas de Beethoven. Por conseguinte, vamos analisar as indicações de *dolce* de Beethoven em diferentes contextos: interpretações teóricas, musicais [*performance*] e também descrições críticas de significado musical. Na primeira parte da tese fazemos um estudo de interpretação musical no contexto sinfónico, em particular das indicações de *dolce* que podemos encontrar na Sinfonia n.º 3 em Mi Bemol Maior, Op. 55 "Eroica," e ainda nas sonatas para piano de Beethoven. Analisamos as teorias históricas e actuais sobre a interpretação [*performance*] destas peças para desenvolver um fundamento para a tese de que Beethoven compõe usando *dolce,* e ainda outras indicações como *cantabile* e *espressivo*, de uma maneira única e particular. A segunda parte da tese analisa a teoria hermenêutica de Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher para demonstrar a ressonância entre uma actividade crítica textual e a actividade de interpretação musical (*performance* e crítica). Dedicamos a terceira parte da tese a uma explicação da teoria crítica do significado musical desenvolvida pelo historiador da música, pedagogo e teórico Adolf Bernhard Marx (1795-1866). A teoria crítica de Marx indica que o significado de música instrumental pode ser explicado através dos conceitos de símile, simbolismo e *coerência psicológica*. Concluímos esta tese com uma descrição da importância das considerações materiais do conceito de uma ideia musical [*Idee*] de A. B. Marx. No final, discutimos como considerações da matéria musical podem fazer a ponte entre a interpretação musical [*performance*] e a actividade espiritual necessária para estabelecer um significado profundo em música.

SUMMARY

Beethoven's Dolce: *Interpretation, Performance and Description – The Case of Music*

This dissertation addresses the interpretation of expressive word cues within the staff of Ludwig van Beethoven's scores. We study word cues that are generally overlooked in analysis and take the form of instructions for expression (for example, *dolce*, *espressivo*, and *cantabile*). We are specifically interested in instances where Beethoven uses these indications in paradoxical or unintuitive ways. This comes to the forefront when Beethoven writes *dolce* in the staff for a passage that does not look (nor particularly sound) "dolce."

The first part of this dissertation begins with examples of *dolce* indications in Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, "Eroica." We examine expressive word cues in the staff of the first movement of this symphony and illustrate that they have a purpose beyond serving as structural signposts. We compare these passages to Beethoven's use of *dolce* in the "Appassionata" sonata (Op. 57) to show how formal treatises on performance (for example, works by Heinrich Christoph Koch, Johann Georg Sulzer, and Carl Czerny) recommend a generalized *cantabile* technique to play *dolce*, *espressivo*, and *cantabile* indications alike. We suggest that, in certain cases, Beethoven is pointing to meaning beyond performance practice. When Beethoven desires that the piano (or orchestral instruments in the context of a symphony) should *sing* in performance, this ideal sound questions not only the capabilities of musical instruments and the possibilities of interpretation through technique, but also musical meaning on the whole. It seems music must speak to the listener on a level as though a human voice were singing the tune; this subsequently challenges musical interpretation to find *how* and *what* the music might communicate in order to create this otherworldly sound. In the end, this chapter serves as a building block toward a more satisfactory approach to musical meaning, beyond formal and material considerations, which we will achieve through investigations into hermeneutic theory and A. B. Marx's *Idee.*

The topic of the second part of this dissertation is nineteenth century hermeneutics (specifically the writings of F. D. E. Schleiermacher) and musical interpretation, where we find a juncture between musical notation and philosophical criticism. We argue that we can understand Beethoven's music, and Beethoven's innovative use of performance marks, through Schleiermacher's theory of hermeneutics. We address how music can be described using a language-based theory through a "grammatical" (that is, normative) interpretation of music, balanced with considerations of historical interpretation and performance practice. We make these observations based on the premise that to interpret a text is a critical activity that is similar to what is involved in the performance or analysis of a musical work. In the chapter on Schleiermacher's "psychological method," we show how a composer's biography can influence how we view a particular musical work's form and content. Schleiermacher's concepts of thoughts, ideas, and secondary ideas help to provide a platform for us to speak about compositions on a deeper level that goes beyond elaborating meaning through narratives and extramusical descriptions.

The third part of this dissertation is about the music historian, pedagogue, and theorist A. B. Marx (1795-1866) and Marx's concept of a musical *Idee* with relation to Beethoven's music. We include an analysis of A. B. Marx's understanding of musical meaning based on the critical tools of similes, symbolism, and *psychological coherence*. We provide a fresh look at *psychological coherence* and symbolism with a foundation in G. W. F. Hegel's aesthetics and theories about *symbolic art.* The end result illustrates that the way we interpret expressive word cues in the staff of Beethoven's scores shares a great similarity with the interpretation of symbols in literature and art. It is through an adequate evaluation of these word cues that we find deeper meaning in Beethoven's notation, which is beneficial for both performance and critical interpretation.

We conclude this dissertation with a more general discussion of the importance of material considerations in arguments about musical meaning. To accomplish this, we follow a question put forward by the musicologist Scott Burnham: "And what governs the curious contradictions of [A. B. Marx's] notion of the *Idee*, a spiritual essence that seems all too material?" Our answer to this question illuminates the importance of the material of music with respect to a pragmatic approach to interpretation and musical meaning.

RESUMO DOS CAPÍTULOS

O Dolce *de Beethoven: interpretação,* performance *e descrição – o caso da música*

Esta tese elabora uma interpretação das indicações de expressão que Ludwig van Beethoven inclui nas suas pautas (no interior dos compassos). Estas indicações são muitas vezes tidas como irrelevantes para a analise musical. Por exemplo, *dolce*, *espressivo* e *cantabile* são muitas vezes vistas como meras instruções para a interpretação musical [*performance*] de uma determinada peça. O meu interesse incide nas situações em que Beethoven utiliza estas palavras na pauta de uma maneira paradoxal – ou seja, como entender os casos em que Beethoven inclui *dolce* para uma série de compassos que não soam nem parecem particularmente "dolce."

Esta tese tem três partes. A primeira parte oferece vários exemplos de *dolce* na Sinfonia n.º 3 em Mi Bemol Maior, Op. 55, "Eroica." Começamos por examinar as indicações musicais de expressão no contexto sinfónico, e a constatar como estas indicações têm mais do que um uso estrutural na composição. Fazemos depois uma comparação entre as indicações de *dolce* na "Eroica" e as indicações de *dolce* na Sonata em Fá Menor, Op. 57 "Appassionata" para demonstrar como os tratados musicais sobre interpretação musical [*performance*] (por autores como Heinrich Christoph Koch, Johann Georg Sulzer e Carl Czerny) têm muitas vezes uma visão demasiado generalizada, e meramente fundada na técnica chamada *cantabile* para explicar os compassos mais estranhos, que ainda assim, têm uma indicação de *dolce*. Neste contexto, sugerimos que Beethoven está a usar estas indicações de uma maneira particular, chamando à atenção para uma técnica mais complexa, que não se deixa restringir à interpretação musical [*performance*]. Deste modo, Beethoven está a assinalar um aspecto do significado da sonata em geral. Quando Beethoven deseja que o piano (ou a flauta por exemplo, no contexto sinfónico) *canta*, este som idealizado põe em questão não só as capacidades dos instrumentos e a técnica dos músicos, mas também o significado das composições. Parece que a música instrumental devia falar com o público como se fosse cantada por uma voz, em vez de ser tocada por instrumentos; esta formulação obriga à seguinte questão: como oferecer uma expressão fiel ao som ideal de uma peça musical? No final, este capítulo serve como o começo de uma investigação na direcção de uma abordagem mais satisfatória à ideia de significado musical – o significado musical que está para além das considerações materiais e formais. O conceito de significado musical será abordado, no que se segue, a partir de considerações hermenêuticas, assim como, o conceito técnico de *Idee* elaborado por A. B. Marx.

A segunda parte desta tese incide sobre a hermenêutica do século XIX (em particular a teoria hermenêutica de F. D. E. Schleiermacher) e a interpretação musical como uma junção entre notação musical e filosofia crítica. No desenvolvimento do capítulo, argumentamos que podemos perceber a música de Beethoven, e a sua maneira inovadora de usar indicações de expressão (como *dolce*), através da teoria hermenêutica de Schleiermacher. O argumento estabelece que uma peça musical pode ser estudada a partir de uma teoria com base linguística e textual. Para tal, é necessário estabelecer a premissa de que para interpretar música é igualmente

necessário elaborar uma actividade crítica, em muito semelhante à que usamos quando interpretamos um texto. A diferença entre o lado "gramatical" e o lado "psicológico" da teoria hermenêutica de Schleiermacher é destacada no contexto biográfico. De que maneira pode a biografia de um compositor influenciar a interpretação da forma e conteúdo de uma peça musical? Os conceitos de pensamento, ideias, e ideias secundárias da teoria de Schleiermacher são discutidos no contexto de um significado musical mais profundo em contraste com uma explicação narrativa ou descrições extramusicais.

A terceira parte aborda o trabalho do musicólogo, teórico e pedagogo A. B. Marx (1795-1866) e o seu conceito de ideia musical (*Idee*) em relação com a interpretação da música de Beethoven. O fio condutor do capítulo é o significado musical que Marx define no seu trabalho, o qual é baseado em princípios críticos, tais como: símile, simbolismo e *coerência psicológica*. Oferecemos uma perspectiva nova sobre estes princípios no contexto da música de Beethoven, com base na filosofia hegeliana e as teorias estéticas hegelianas (nomeadamente a arte simbólica). No desenvolvimento do capítulo, mostramos ainda que as indicações de expressão na pauta musical partilham uma similaridade com a interpretação de símbolos na literatura e a arte. É através de uma avaliação adequada destes conceitos que encontramos um significado mais profundo na notação de Beethoven, um significado benéfico tanto para a interpretação crítica tal como para a interpretação musical [*performance*].

No final da tese, respondemos directamente à seguinte pergunta elaborado pelo musicólogo Scott Burnham: "O que determina as contradições curiosas da noção de *Idee,* uma essência espiritual que parece muito material?" A nossa resposta a esta pergunta ilumina as questões materiais em face de princípios críticos e estabelece o significado musical de uma forma pragmática.

LIST OF PLATES

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Dolce is an article of musical notation; many composers use it within the staff of a score to express that a passage or melody should be played differently than the music that came before it. Ludwig van Beethoven also uses *dolce* indications in the staff, but oftentimes in a peculiar way that calls our attention to what is going on in the musical work as a whole and not just a singular passage. To understand the dimensions of the meaning of Beethoven's *dolce* indications, we find it is necessary to explore practical questions with relation to notation and musical meaning. Rainer Maria Rilke describes music and, in virtue of this, musical meaning in the following way:

> AN DIE MUSIK[1]
>
> Musik: Atem der Statuen. Vielleicht:
> Stille der Bilder. Du Sprache wo Sprachen
> enden. Du Zeit,
> die senkrecht steht auf der Richtung vergehender Herzen.
>
> Gefühle zu wem? O du der Gefühle
> Wandlung in was? —: in hörbare Landschaft.
> Du Fremde: Musik. Du uns entwachsener
> Herzraum. Innigstes unser,
> das, uns übersteigend, hinausdrängt, —
> heiliger Abschied:
> da uns das Innre umsteht
> als geübteste Ferne, als andre
> Seite der Luft:
> rein,
> riesig,
> nicht mehr bewohnbar.

[1] Rainer Maria Rilke, "AN DIE MUSIK" / "TO MUSIC," *Ahead of All Parting: The Selected Poetry and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke,* ed. and trans. Stephen Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1995), 142-143. The title of Rilke's poem is an allusion to Franz von Schober's poem "An die Musik," which Franz Schubert set in the lied *An die Musik* (D. 547).

TO MUSIC

Music: breathing of statues. Perhaps:
silence of paintings. You language where all language
ends. You time
standing vertically on the motion of mortal hearts.

Feelings for whom? O you the transformation
of feelings into what? —: into audible landscape.
You stranger: music. You heart-space
grown out of us. The deepest space *in* us,
which, rising above us, forces its way out, —
holy departure:
when the innermost point in us stands
outside, as the most practiced distance, as the other
side of the air:
pure,
boundless,
no longer habitable.

When we read the first verse of the poem from the perspective of our present investigation, instead of a statue like Auguste Rodin's "The Age of Bronze" [*L'Âge d'airain*], we see a musical score. We find that this idea is grounded in the notion that we observe a musical score in a similar way as we would observe a statue: the score is stiff and unmoved, as though made out of bronze or marble. We can describe sections of a score using vocabulary from music theory and analysis, but we do not experience a work of music fully unless we are in the presence of a performance (a recording is a poor substitute, but is sometimes our only possibility to hear a work). A statue also is most persuasive when we are in its presence and can look at it from all sides. When Rilke writes "silence of paintings," this seems to address the way in which paintings "say too much;" paintings are often figurative, full of colors, events, and situations, and offer a more literal illustration of what the artist is trying to depict. Music escapes what is literal, and the sophisticated scrutiny of analysis does not get to the bottom of musical meaning – it seems to describe a musical meaning that is different from the one Rilke alludes to in the poem. Normative analytical devices often articulate meaning as though the meaning of a musical work could be equated to the contours of a statue. The "silence of paintings" is what a painting cannot express on its surface despite colors and figures – what is essentially the deeper meaning in a painting – and is akin to deeper meaning in music.

One of the difficulties we encounter in any determination of musical meaning is whether we should discuss it with reference to a score or a performance. This is a particularly thorny topic because we debate the necessity of particulars (a score, a performance) within an implicit context of a universal dimension of musical meaning. A score can be used for analytical purposes, and the score remains relatively unchanged through the ages. (A change in our perception of a score is always possible, for example, if an old draft is found and interferes with the structure of how theory has viewed a particular work.) A performance seems to be the most adequate object to discuss, as it is truly what imparts meaning in music, but the ephemerality of a performance and the discord between witnessing a performance and hearing a recording is so great that meaning becomes difficult to measure. Furthermore, one should ask: "Did the performance really express the score and its meaning?" Thus, we concede that to evaluate musical meaning we need a little of both: the blueprint (the score) and the building (a performance).

From the perspective of a general problem of musical meaning, which we have established here, this dissertation begins with a question that we describe throughout: What does Ludwig van Beethoven's *dolce* indication mean in the exposition of the Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 ("Appassionata")? From here additional questions emerge, for example: What does the *dolce* mean in the "Appassionata" at the start of the second group? And what does the *dolce* mean that appears in the recapitulation (illustrated in Plate 1)? Expressive word cues in the staff of musical scores are unique tools and surprisingly little is written about their persuasive messages. Part I of this dissertation addresses the expressive word cues we are interested in – *dolce*, *cantabile*, *espressivo* – which appear within the staves of a score (thus not as a heading or indication of tempo). These indications only started to become a staple of musical notation within the staff in the late-eighteenth century. We find them with minimal frequency in Franz Joseph Haydn's late keyboard sonatas, and exceedingly more often in the compositions of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Muzio Clementi. The *dolce* indications in the staves of Beethoven's scores, however, tend to be more unique because the music in a *dolce* passage generally looks different than the music Mozart or Clementi would attach a *dolce* to (the "Appassionata" is only one example of many, but it is perhaps the most illustrative). In the staff, a term like *dolce* has an

ambiguous aspect about it. It would seem that the music should be "sweet," and the indication is telling us: "Play this part *sweet!*" But what does that mean? There are many historical music lexicons that offer different kinds of adjectives to enlighten our understanding, but it is difficult to find a source that says anything about a case when the music does not sound particularly *sweet* when it is accompanied by a *dolce* in the score. Surely, we think, the music must mean something beyond *dolce*. Thus, there is no easy answer to the *dolce* question. To tackle the problem seems to require an investigation into performance practice, comparisons with other scores from the time, and discussions of musical meaning. This is precisely what we try to do in this dissertation.

Traditional hermeneutics attempts to explicate meaning in texts. We call upon hermeneutic methods especially when the meaning of a text is obscure. In the early-nineteenth century, F. D. E. Schleiermacher outlined a new hermeneutic method to understand texts and conversations with the belief that texts and conversations contain thoughts and ideas. We dedicate Part II of this dissertation to an elaboration on the strengths of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory in an evaluation of music; this is founded on the premise that to interpret a text is a critical activity that is similar to what is involved in the performance or analysis of a musical work. Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory, which involves thoughts and ideas, takes on a universal aspect when we compare Schleiermacher's theory to A. B. Marx's musical *Idee* in Part III of this dissertation. Not only were these methods commonly used to determine meaning in texts and music in the nineteenth century – as Beethoven's music is from this same era – but these methods seem to explicitly touch on the notion that a score (as a text) is important for understanding meaning; moreover, these methods emphasize that we should deliberate on the details of how we form a description of musical meaning from the standpoint of the material of music and that to understand music is a "spiritual" activity.

We put Schleiermacher's hermeneutics into practice to elaborate on the way in which Schleiermacher's method can enlighten musical meaning and uncover aspects of the score that traditional analysis does not. We attempt a more lengthy hermeneutic

analysis to examine deeper meaning in the three-note motto of Beethoven's Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, *Lebewohl* ("The Farewell," see Part II, chapter 2).

We also consider A. B. Marx's musical *Idee* in the context of a critical method Marx puts forward to facilitate the understanding of musical meaning. As a prominent scholar in the nineteenth century, with interests in music theory, music history, aesthetics, and pedagogy, Marx's approach to musical meaning and pedagogy departs from most other nineteenth century music criticism. In Part III, we highlight one of the extraordinary critical methods Marx elaborates in the context of Beethoven's "Eroica" symphony. Marx's method explicitly promotes a series of tools (that resonate with certain notions in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics), which assist an explication of musical expression and determinate meaning in instrumental music. To demonstrate how Marx's tools can help inform our understanding of music, we explore Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125 ("Choral," see Part III, chapter 2), with respect to how we can elucidate meaning in the symphony through *psychological coherence* in concert with recent criticism.

The concepts we present with relation to Beethoven's works, as the end result of an interpretative effort, seem light-hearted in comparison with the music they address. This conclusion illustrates how difficult it is to bridge the gap between music experienced in the medium of performance, music in a score, and our descriptions of music. The subtitle of this dissertation – *interpretation, performance, and description* – captures the essence of how critical interpretation enters into a dialogue with performance practice, and that both of these sides feed into a general description of musical meaning.

The conclusion of this dissertation is directed principally at a question posed by musicologist Scott Burnham, who famously elaborated on A. B. Marx's concept of a musical *Idee*. In a seminal article, Burnham asks: "And what governs the curious contradictions of [A. B. Marx's] notion of the *Idee*, a spiritual essence that seems all too material?"[2] In our conclusion we attempt to answer this question, at least with relation to the role of the material in a concept that describes something "spiritual."

[2] Scott Burnham, "Criticism, Faith, and the 'Idee': A. B. Marx's Early Reception of Beethoven," *19th-Century* Music, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1990): 183-192, 189.

Our ultimate aim is not just to answer one of Burnham's concerns, but is also to address the questions that the earlier parts of this dissertation bring up. These questions arise, in part, from our attempt to grab hold of meaning in music as Rilke illustrated it in "To Music." First, when we encounter a *dolce* in Beethoven's scores, many times Beethoven is not only instructing us to play the passage "dolce" but offers us a glimpse into the deeper meaning of the work. Rarely does a musical score volunteer signposts of significance, but expressive word cues in the staff are as close as one may get to such a signpost in the late-Classical and early-Romantic periods. This is one of the reasons why the material of music is so important for understanding musical meaning – the score, in this sense, "speaks" (or perhaps "breathes" is a better word). Second, once we have a vague notion that there is meaning, we should uncover it, and try to describe it; and A. B. Marx's critical toolbox (that includes similes, symbolism, and *psychological coherence*) is useful for this task. But the more we say, the more musical meaning seems to escape. When we describe it, we point at something, and we gesture toward it. But much like in Rilke's poem, this meaning continues to move "vertically" away from us in the direction of what is more universal.

In the end, Beethoven's *dolce* is this: an invitation for critical activity into musical meaning and the meaning of a musical passage. It encourages us to question what is local (one measure, or a sequence, that has a *dolce* indication) and compare what is local to what is global (a work as a whole, musical notation in general, and larger questions of musical meaning). Our method to make musical meaning more palpable, more visible or comprehensible is through every tool we have at our disposal – performance, criticism, and analytical apparatuses. These work together in hermeneutic interpretation to form the most elegant solutions possible for elusive problems of musical meaning, which are elaborated in the pages of this dissertation.

Plate 1. Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 ("Appassionata"), mvmt. I, autograph copy.[3]



In the exposition of the Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 ("Appassionata"), Beethoven offsets the dolce *indication to the second note of the accompaniment figure. Beethoven replicates this position of the* dolce *in the first announcement of the second group, and in the recapitulation (shown here in final measure of the fourth system). Notice the low range of the accompaniment figure in this measure (F_1), which reaches to these depths with an awkward F major triad that rocks back-and-forth between F_1 and F_2. Moreover, we differentiate the* dolce *from indications of dynamics (for example,* ff: / p: / ff: *in the first system), which appear flush left with the bar line or are specifically marked for a chord (see* sfp [sforzando piano] *in the second measure of the third system). The placement of* dolce *in this location of the accompaniment has yet to be represented in available printed scores and urtexts.*

[3] Used with kind permission of the Music Department, Bibliothèque nationale de France.

PART I:

Introduction to the Study of Expressive Indications Within the Staves of Beethoven's Compositions

Chapter 1:

Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, "Eroica" and *dolce*

As a way to introduce our problem, we will look at Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55, "Eroica," to observe a few curious instances of *dolce* indications within the staves of the score. We will find that the *dolce* and *espressivo* indications suggest meaning that goes beyond form and are not merely structural signposts. From this study we will also explore how Beethoven uses expressive word cue indications in piano sonatas and compare the unique (and sometimes counterintuitive) use of expressive indications within the staff to Beethoven's indications in the "Eroica." We will address how indications such as *dolce* and *espressivo*, in formal performance treatises on expression, generally suggest a *cantabile* technique to play the passages. Contrariwise, we will scrutinize the presence of expressive word cues in the staff as instances where Beethoven is actually pointing to meaning beyond technical reproductions of sound. When Beethoven desires that the piano *sing* in performance – a comment that inherently integrates an understanding of *cantabile* from performance practice – the composer is describing an ideal sound that not only questions the capabilities of musical instruments and the possibilities for interpretation in virtue of technique, but also the meaning of music. It seems Beethoven describes an ideal expression that connects with the listener on a certain level, as though a human voice were singing the tune; this idea challenges musical interpretation and inspires us to ask: "how does music create this otherworldly sound?" and "what does it communicate to us?" This chapter aims to

address these questions from the perspective of Beethoven's notation and Beethoven's use of expressive word cues in the staff.

A. Introduction to expressive indications in the first movement of the "Eroica"

In the following, we will consider *dolce* indications in the first movement, Allegro con brio, of Beethoven's *Eroica*. We will examine how Beethoven's notation encourages us to question the purpose of these indications, the meaning of the notation, and what these indications might sound like in performance. In the "Eroica," Beethoven often uses *dolce* indications paired with dynamics, with *dolce* only marked for specific instruments. Ultimately what is curious about this is (1) sometimes these instruments are not playing a solo melody, but are merely integrated into a greater conglomerate of instruments that form the accompaniment (oftentimes these other instruments do not have *dolce* written into their parts) and (2) one instrument may play a melody marked *dolce* where a second instrument may echo back that melody but it is not marked *dolce,* which consequently gives the appearance of an expressive superiority of one instrument over the other. With *dolce* notation, Beethoven explores expressive dimension in the accompaniment and expressive melodic variations for themes that are generally considered less important from the perspective of form (i.e. these are *dolce* themes that are neither the first nor second themes of the exposition). We argue that Beethoven is calling our attention to these themes as expressive entities that offer meaning for the symphony beyond formal definitions and concepts.

Miriam Sheer has studied the way Beethoven uses dynamics in the "Eroica" to reinforce aspects of form and structure in the composition. She describes how Beethoven utilizes dynamics to set certain musical ideas apart from others:

> [Beethoven] knew that overuse of too many tension-producing effects would turn out to be ineffective and tiring after a while. Therefore, his aim was to save the strongest impact for crucial points within a movement. The expanded length of many movements as well as the frequent multiplicity of musical ideas within a single movement made this task difficult. These situations made him search for a cohesive means of unification.[4]

[4] Miriam Sheer, "Patterns of Dynamic Organization in Beethoven's Eroica Symphony," *The Journal of Musicology,* Vol. 10, no. 4 (Autumn, 1992): 483-504. Henceforward "Eroica." See Sheer, Eroica, 485.

With this comment, Sheer brings to the forefront the complexity that arises from the "frequent multiplicity of musical ideas within a single movement;" this aspect in Beethoven's compositions is certainly not limited to the "Eroica" symphony. As she points out, Beethoven's "Middle period," ca. 1801-1814,[5] where we find works such as Beethoven's opera *Fidelio* (Op. 72) and the "Eroica" symphony, is marked by compositions that have dramatic shifts in dynamics from unexpected loudness with sudden declines to soft levels. When we examine Sheer's argument in more detail with relation to the score, we begin to see how Beethoven treated different thematic material with varying dynamics depending on whether it was strategic to do so in the composition (i.e. to mark the "crucial" points of a movement).[6] As Sheer's study is driven by dynamics, she refers to Beethoven's indications of *dolce* and *espressivo* as qualifiers of *piano* dynamics. Although Sheer finds that these expressive word cues are subsidiary to dynamic indications, we argue that *dolce* and *espressivo* have crucial roles of their own with respect to meaning – the word cues impel us to locate meaning in another realm that is beyond formal considerations and dynamics.

B. *Dolce, dolce crescendo, espressivo* in the "Eroica"

The first passage we will examine is from the first movement of the "Eroica." It is a passage that is often cited with respect to how the symphony deviates from standard theories of second groups and secondary themes in sonata form.[7] James

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[5] See Miriam Sheer, "Dynamic Organization in Beethoven's Instrumental Works," *The Journal of Musicology,* Volume 16, No. 3, New Perspectives on Beethoven Sources and Style (Summer, 1998): 358-378, 358. She notes that her understanding of Beethoven's "Middle period" is different from Joseph Kerman and Alan Tyson's distinction in *The New Grove Beethoven* (New York and London, 1983), 91. William Kinderman, in his biography *Beethoven* (William Kinderman, *Beethoven*, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009]), divides this vague notion into three stylistic periods in Beethoven's life: Heroic Style I: 1803-1806; Heroic Style II: 1806-1809; Consolidation: 1810-1812. However, generalizations about the years of Beethoven's "middle period" or "heroic period" appear usually based on compositions rather than years, per se, such as the *Leonore* overture and *Fidelio*, Op. 72; Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55, etc., and thus the "heroic" of "heroic period" speaks to heroic ideas or feelings in the works, which problematically can apply to many of Beethoven's other works beyond 1803-1812.

[6] When we consider the first movement of the "Eroica," the main climax section of the development contains a *fortissimo* area for 32 measures (the longest in the movement) and Sheer argues it is the "most intense" section of the first movement. See Sheer, "Eroica," 485. Sheer's understanding of expressive indications such as *dolce* and *espressivo* in function of dynamics is especially present in her Figure 1, 488-9.

[7] This is notably discussed by William Horne in William Horne, "The Hidden Trellis: Where Does the Second Group Begin in the First Movement of Beethoven's Eroica Symphony?" *Beethoven Forum*, Volume 13, No. 2, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (Fall 2006): 95-147. Horne describes Leon

Hepokoski and Warren Darcy describe this passage of the "Eroica" (Figure 1.1, starting at m. 45). They write that it presents an example of a "preparatory module that sets up or otherwise precedes what strikes one as the 'real' initial theme of the zone."[8] At m. 45, we find a "lighter" theme, as opposed to the "real" or proper theme of the section.[9] These types of preparatory S themes "normally feature a drop to *piano* and display 'thematic' S-features (perhaps energetic, perhaps lyrical). As themes they do launch S-space and yet seem also to prepare the way for the arrival of something different that is more stable."[10] When Hepoksoki and Darcy describe this phenomenon in the "Eroica," beginning at m. 45, they illustrate it as:

> a *locus classicus* of a more prolonged, S^0 theme. . . . The *forte*-dynamic V:HC MC[11] is reached with an almost disturbing abruptness at m. 45. A new, "questioning" theme, *piano* is sounded over the dominant of B-flat major with the upbeat to m. 46. This dominant in the bass is prolonged for several measures – with thematic material above – until the moment of its decisive tonic resolution at m. 57, which then launches a new theme, S proper.[12]

Plantinga's thought: "In m. 45 an abrupt shift is made to the dominant B-flat in conjunction with contrasting new material, but we are not yet allowed to rest comfortably in the new key; an active, brilliant modulatory passage beginning at m. 65 sounds exactly like bridge material, and its inexorable conclusion in B-flat (m. 83) established this point as the 'real' beginning of the dominant key area" (Leon Plantinga, *Romantic Music: a History of Musical Style in Nineteenth-Century Europe* [New York: W.W. Norton, 1984]), 38–39. Horne also writes that Thomas Sipe considers the thematic interest at m. 45 to be a "transitional theme," where the dominant area does not begin until the established "'C theme in [the] dominant' at m. 83" (Thomas Sipe, *Beethoven:* Eroica *Symphony* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 97). Richard Taruskin (Richard Taruskin, *The Oxford History of Western Music*, Volume II: *The Seventeenth an Eighteenth Centuries* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], 659-60), Carl Dahlhaus (Carl Dahlhaus, *Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to His Music,* trans. Mary Whittall, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991], 174-5), and James Webster (John Webster, "Sonata Form," in *New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, Stanley Sadie, ed., volume 23 [London: Macmillan, 2001], 678-701), have similar opinions about the official placement of the second group, at least agreeing that it should appear after the transitional material mm. 45-56. See Horne, 96n2, 103n3. Horne supports Hepokoski and Darcy's view that the second group begins at m. 45 (see Horne, 104).

[8] James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, "The Secondary Theme (S) and Essential Expositional Closure (EEC)" in *Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 142.

[9] Hepokoski and Darcy describe these as, e.g. for secondary theme areas: S^0 and $S^{1.0}$.

[10] Hepokoski and Darcy, 142.

[11] The abbreviations of "HC" and "MC" in the above citation stand for "half-cadence" and "medial-caesura." As the authors state in their "Terms and Abbreviations" section, "V: HC MC represents an MC built around V/V… the presence of an MC identifies the exposition-type as two-part – the most common type – and leads directly to an S theme," Hepokoski and Darcy, xxvi.

[12] Hepokoski and Darcy, "The Secondary Theme (S) and Essential Expositional Closure (EEC)" in *Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 143. What Hepokoski and Darcy determine as the "proper secondary theme" of the movement starting at m. 57 (not explored here) is understood to have a crucial role in the composition of the symphony. They describe that the theme, at m. 57, "is now grounded on the tonic: this is one of the few themes of the symphony that Beethoven kept more or less invariant in his multiple continuity drafts, and it is also a theme alluded to in m. 673," 143. They cite Lewis Lockwood's work on the drafts of the "Eroica." The continuity drafts maintain this specific passage (what Lewis Lockwood terms 'Unit C') from early drafts and is roughly determined as such in its final

Figure 1.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, exposition, mm. 45-53.[13]



We see in the exposition of the "Eroica," at this controversial section (Figure 1.1), a *dolce* indication appears in m. 45 after a *fortissimo* section. At m. 45, Beethoven dramatically alters the *fortissimo* dynamic to a *piano* and *dolce* dynamic. The *dolce* indication is placed below the oboe melody, which enters this problematic section with a theme from the secondary key area (F major). This same short theme is echoed with interval variances in the other wind instruments (clarinet in B-flat, flute, then back to the oboe). This exchange between instruments is repeated until the bassoon doubles the clarinet's melody and transitions this *piano* section into another

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form (although the theme did evolve rhythmically). Surrounding this theme, 'Unit C,' "are shaped thematic units that have much further to go before they reach their final linear and harmonic form" Lewis Lockwood, "'Eroica' Perspectives: Strategy and Design in the First Movement" in *Beethoven Studies 3*, ed. Alan Tyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 85-105, 103. Lockwood explains that these four continuity drafts of the exposition are found in Landsberg 6: no. 1, pages 10-11; no. 2, pages 12-13; no. 3, pages 14-15; no. 4, pages 20-21. We assume, thus, with respect to establishing the "proper secondary theme" of the exposition, the strength of 'Unit C' upholds Hepokoski and Darcy's argument from a genetic point of view.

[13] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind permission of Bärenreiter.

sudden *fortissimo* area (m. 55, not pictured in Figure 1.1). As we near the closure of this section (Figure 1.1, mm. 53-54), the first note of the "dolce" theme is marked with a *sforzando*, which destabilizes the subtle *piano* and *dolce* indications in the oboe. We assume the *dolce* indication pertains to the oboe theme, and specifically to the first appearance of the theme. The flattened scale degree of the melody, with a *sforzando* on the flattened note, changes the feel of the theme and aids in the transition to the next *fortissimo* section. This particular section (starting at m. 45) is determined by the *piano* and *dolce* oboe theme, although the other instruments (even when they echo almost identical themes) only have *piano* indications; nevertheless, when *those* instruments play the melodic theme at a *piano* dynamic, the oboe is undoubtedly an influence upon them. We contrast these instruments to the string section and the horns in E-flat that play an accompaniment at an unqualified *piano* dynamic – the accompaniment here is not necessarily influenced by the oboe *dolce*. To complicate matters, nonetheless, the first violin has a variant of the melodic theme with a different slur (Figure 1.1, mm. 48-9): the first two notes are slurred and the final quarter note stands alone, separated from the figure, mimicking the motions of the theme at a distance. The violin I is also in a higher register, two octaves above its sister violin II, which contributes to how the violin I demarcates its brief independence from the string family (Figure 1.1, mm. 48-9; m. 52).

Figure 1.2 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, development, mm. 165-178.[14]



In the development (Figure 1.2), we see *dolce* is applied to each respective instrument when they play the melodic theme during mm. 166-169 (a theme we first discussed in the exposition starting at m. 45 in Figure 1.1).[15] This thematic material is treated differently in the development than in the exposition; in the development, the

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[15] This theme is the same represented in Figure 1.1 (occurring from mm. 45-55), although transposed into the key of G major.

theme is given to the bassoon instead of the clarinet, and the first violin accompaniment doubles the flute melody in a non-*dolce* reiteration (Figure 1.2, m. 169 and m. 173). Furthermore, the first violin accentuates the sustained *sforzando* and marcato rhythmic gestures that it shares with the bassoon (see Figure 1.2 mm. 167-170); it echoes the important melodic and accompaniment moments, but omits any *dolce* sensitivity or melodic superiority. The melodic importance of the strings slowly magnifies in the transitional period of this section, which begins around m. 174, building toward their dominating melodic position in the next system. A feeling of foreshadowing enhances this effect, which is carried out by the cellos and basses with their elongated interpretation of the *sforzando*-marcato figure (Figure 1.2, mm. 175-177). They prepare the way for their truncated *pianissimo* statement of the movement's main theme in C minor at m. 178.

The *szforzando* motif in the second system of Figure 1.2 – shared by the bassoons, oboes, and flutes, in this order– has an insistent quality about it that frequently displaces the strong beat of the respective measures (i.e. m. 172, m. 174, m. 175). Overall, the harmonic variances in the melodic theme (the marcato indications on many of the final notes of the motif in the flutes and bassoons), the new distribution of melodic material to different instruments, and the incorporation of *dolce* for flutes and bassoons demonstrate a heightened complexity in the development (Figure 1.2) versus the earlier appearance of this theme in the exposition at m. 45 (Figure 1.1). The rich blend of rhythmic manifestations of intensity, which is layered with lyrical *dolce* thematic material, substantiates the claim of a structural change and the importance of this theme irrespective of the question of whether it is the "proper" secondary theme of the first movement.

Figure 1.3 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, development, mm. 324-331.[16]



In the second part of the development, Beethoven provides expressive depth for transitional thematic material (Figure 1.3, m. 328). In this example, Beethoven places *dolce* markings alongside crescendo indications, which intensifies the tone of the crescendo in an expressive direction (Figure 1.3, m. 328). This particular device appears after a decrescendo in both the clarinet in B-flat and the bassoon. The string section has a crescendo without a *dolce* indication, which signals that there are two different kinds of crescendos occurring simultaneously in mm. 328-9. The *dolce* crescendo is both in the clarinet and bassoon at the conclusion of their melodic segment (Figure 1.3, m. 328). This device also sets the tone for a transition to the melody, which is taken over by the flutes and first violins at m. 330. The *dolce* crescendo at m. 328 is a texture that should be heard over, and distinct from, the accompanying figure in the string section; we find this device in the sequence of the melodic line, and this enhances our ability to hear the *dolce* crescendo. The *dolce* calls attention to itself in this way, and suggests the figure has a superior role over a non-qualified crescendo. The *dolce* specifically addresses to how this melodic phrase

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should be played, and further highlights the special care that should be taken with how to end the phrase. The *dolce* crescendo forces the theme toward a more intricate conclusion. The *dolce* crescendo adds depth to this theme – a theme that was first stated earlier in the development, mm. 284-299 – as though it has matured. More than just a structural marker, the theme shows that the subtle *dolce* ornamentation is indicative of a heightened sensibility that comes through experience and repetition.

Figure 1.4 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, recapitulation, mm. 408-420.[17]



In the recapitulation (Figure 1.4), the horn in F and the flutes play with a *dolce* modification. The melody (in F), which the first *dolce* applies to, is reminiscent of the primary theme of the exposition (in E-flat). The primary theme is heard in the tonic at the very start of the recapitulation, played on the instrument (cello) that introduced the theme at the beginning of the piece. The primary theme, when taken up by the horn in F, is modified in the fourth measure of the sequence (Figure 1.4, m. 411): after an ascending major triad arpeggio in quarter notes, the final note of the arpeggio is sustained in m. 411 and continues with a pedal figure for several measures, resolving

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on a quarter note played at a *piano* dynamic that is one half-step higher. At this point, the horn in F resounds an artistic fusion of the main theme of the exposition played by the cellos and the first violin accompaniment (see Figure 1.5, mm. 3-6 and mm. 7-10, respectively). This moment in the score recalls Hegel's argument in the *Aesthetics*, where he states that the meaning of a musical theme is "exhausted" in its first announcement.[18] In our view, the first announcement does not "exhaust" meaning; it offers authority and is a reference for all future developments. (We generally describe how much a theme has been modified over the course of a musical work by referring to the first announcement of the theme.) Our understanding of the horn melody mm. 408-415 is greatly enhanced when we look back at the opening of the movement. A glimpse back at the opening measures shows us how much the theme has changed and suggests that there is an evolution of expressive sensitivity throughout the first movement.

[18] This rather obscure passage in Hegel's *Aesthetics* reads as follows: "The meaning to be expressed in a musical theme is already exhausted in the theme; if the theme is repeated or if it goes on to further contrasts and modulations, then the repetitions, modulations, transformations in different keys, etc. readily prove superfluous for an understanding of the work and belong rather to a purely musical elaboration and an assimilation into the manifold realm of harmonic differences etc. which are neither demanded by the subject-matter nor remain carried by it." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts,* trans. T.M. Knox, volume II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 896.

Figure 1.5 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, exposition, mm. 1-12.[19]



The first time we hear the main theme at the very start of the movement (Figure 1.5), it is played by the cellos and marked *piano*. There is no *dolce* in sight until m. 45. When we hear the horn in F interpreting the main theme with a *dolce* ornamentation, on the surface we can conclude that the *dolce* expression gives the impression of a recollection of the first movement's main idea for the sake of the recapitulation (for the sake of the typical form of a recapitulation in sonata form, which also follows a dictionary definition of the term "to restate"). Yet further inspection of the system suggests not only a recollection, but also a change in our overall perception of this

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theme; when the flutes play the theme at m. 416 (Figure 1.4), they illustrate it in a more remote key of D-flat major. The flutes maintain the fused melody-accompaniment variation. This mimics an omnipotent melody because it plays its own accompaniment.

Figure 1.6 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, coda, mm. 614-622.[20]



In the coda, (Figure 1.6), we find examples of *espressivo* and crescendo figures that present us with a curious problem of interpretation with respect to the expressive dimensions of Beethoven's accompaniment figures. There are *espressivo* and crescendo indications in the clarinet and bassoon at m. 614. These instruments are playing the concluding figures of transitional thematic material. When the *espressivo* and crescendo enter, the indication of *espressivo* seems to apply to the last two beats of m. 614, preparing both instruments for the sounding G-flat in m. 615. *Espressivo* indications, when added to crescendo indications, also assert that these instruments

[20] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind permission of Bärenreiter.

serve an expressive role in this section (even when they become subsidiary to the horns in E-flat at m. 615)

When the *espressivo* and crescendo appear in the flutes (Figure 1.6, m. 619), this time the score suggests that the *espressivo* directly affects the crescendo. But it calls our attention to the fact that the *espressivo* may also apply to the decrescendo that directly follows it at m. 621. Moreover, the score hints at something even more interesting: an accompaniment motif (played by the flutes) has an expressive depth that is more complex than the melody, even when this accompaniment is entirely subsidiary to the melodic frame of reference. The oboes and bassoons have the same rhythmic gesture in their parts; however their crescendos are not marked with *espressivo* indications. The horns in E-flat have the most prominent melodic component of this section because they play components of the main theme of the movement. The first, second, and third horns in E-flat seem to be competing with each other considering that their thematic material is dispersed among their respective parts in the fashion of the *dolce* theme in m. 45 (Figure 1). When we turn to the flutes (Figure 1.6, m. 619), their sonority assumes a particular role that is separated from the other accompaniment; the flutes soar over the horns with the highest pitches in these measures to create a euphoric accompanying figure.

What is noteworthy in this section is the sonorous effect created by the layers of dynamics with and without expressive indications. Due to the orchestration and competing crescendos – with commanding horns playing fragments of the main theme and the bass and cellos leap about octaves – we can argue this particular *espressivo* indication in the flutes (Figure 1.6, m. 619), has the appearance of being irrelevant. We come to this conclusion namely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern depth in this *espressivo* when it applies to a sustained note that is relatively high in pitch. Further, the *espressivo* poses complications for understanding unity in the accompaniment; the *espressivo* gives the impression that we should separate the flutes from the other woodwind instruments. In this light, the *espressivo* is as an example of a subtle compositional gesture that pierces through otherwise protected melodic themes. The passage requires that we pay special attention to the flutes, especially with relation to the attack of the note and what an "expressive" crescendo sounds like. When we attempt to determine the appropriate response from the orchestra, and consider the importance of these elements of expression that are not necessarily the

primary matter of the movement, we find that we need to reflect on these expressive word cues themselves. They invite further inquiry as to their purpose and what it is they are calling our attention to.

Chapter 2:

Unpacking word cue indications in Beethoven's piano sonatas:
One study of *cantabile*

A. *Cantabile* as technique

When we reduce our vision from the grandeur of the orchestral scale to the intimate expression of the keyboard, the way we interpret expressive word cue indications will shift in a similar way; but the cues themselves will continue to be often enigmatic. This is the case particularly when we encounter a word cue, such as *espressivo*, in the context of keyboard literature where it seems that *cantabile* or *dolce* could both equally fit the bill to describe the technique needed to play the passage. As we will explore in this chapter, *cantabile* and *dolce* are commonly used interchangeably to describe performance techniques because *dolce, cantabile*, and *espressivo* call for a very similar touch and expression. When we consider Beethoven's word cues in the staves of keyboard works, Beethoven appears to expand our understanding of these terms in performance practice to include meanings beyond normative restrictions. One example of this is in the first movement of Beethoven's Sonata in A Major, Op. 101 where the left hand has an *espressivo e semplice* indication.

Figure 1.7 Beethoven, Sonata in A Major, Opus 101, mvmt. I, *Etwas lebhaft und mit der innigsten Empfindung* / Allegro ma non troppo, mm. 17-28.[21]



[21] *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas*. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

The passage from Op. 101 recalls a *cantabile* style because of the step-wise motion in the second measure, the spacing of the voices in the chord played in the left hand, the slur over the bass notes, and the repetition of the dominant (B) in the harmony of the figure: these elements contribute to a chorale-like texture (Figure 1.7, mm. 25-26). But when we hear this passage performed, the word cues – *espressivo e semplice* – do not tell the whole story behind the expression of the passage. The sound quality of the passage gives the impression of peace because the melodic notes hang together in a slow-paced symmetrical pattern with a slur. The right hand accompaniment is sparse, and so the *espressivo e semplice* indications seem to apply only to the left hand and not equally to both hands. Beethoven's selection of *espressivo e semplice* is not arbitrary; our focus is on how Beethoven uses indications like these to call our attention to meaning in the score we might not notice right off the bat.

One of the most curious instances of expressive word cue indications in Beethoven's piano sonata is Beethoven's use of *dolce* in the first movement of the Sonata in F minor, Op. 57 ("Appassionata," composed 1804-6). Beethoven's *dolce* throughout the first movement is peculiar because *dolce* continually appears in situations that strike us as unintuitive contexts for the term. We will discuss this piece in more detail in Part II of this thesis, but at present we will examine the strangeness of the passage with this indication, and why it invites additional interpretation beyond what we might understand to be a normative *dolce.* This *dolce* calls into question a generalized *cantabile* technique that is used as a recourse to play problematic passages such as the entrance of the second group in the "Appassionata" (Figure 1.8) – we will subsequently reflect on the extent that material considerations can inform our understanding of *dolce* as an indication, *cantabile* as a technique, and the meaning of indications in a larger context.

Figure 1.8 Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata," mvmt. I, Allegro assai, mm. 35-41.[22]



At the introduction to the second group of the exposition, we encounter a low-lying bass accompaniment marked *dolce* (Figure 1.8, m. 35). This accompaniment is heard alone and asserts a prominent position sonorously because it emerges after a pedal point on E-flat (not pictured). The accompaniment sounds deep and muddy due to rocking back and forth between a bass note (low A-flat) and A-flat triad. The "muddiness" can be still heard on current pianos and, importantly, this low register has an indistinct and fuzzy tone on historic keyboards.[23]

Once this accompaniment figure establishes itself without interruption, the melody finally begins at the end of m. 35 (Figure 1.8), in octaves, outlining the same A-flat major triad we heard in the accompaniment; the melody opens up a broad

[22] Ludwig van Beethoven. *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas*. Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

[23] In a historic recording by Paul Badura-Skoda of Op. 57 on a Broadwood pianoforte (1815), the muddiness is present, and made even more pronounced by Badura–Skoda's use of sustain pedal through the passage. See Ludwig van Beethoven, *Les Sonates pour le Pianoforte sur instruments d'époque*: *Sonate en fa mineur, opus 57:* with Paul Badura-Skoda, Fortepiano by John Broadwood, London ca. 1815, Volume 7, E 8697 (Auvidis-Astrée, 1989). As Jonathan Del Mar writes about the difference between current instruments and historic keyboards with respect to the "Appassionata" sonata: "To a certain extent, to perform a keyboard work by Beethoven on a modern piano is to play a transcription of music conceived for a very different type of instrument. It was one whose touch was lighter, whose attack was cleaner, and whose sustaining power was considerably weaker, especially in the upper register. The hammers were covered in leather rather than the felt of modern instruments, and the frame was wooden, not metal," Jonathan Del Mar and Misha Donat "Performance Practice," introduction to *Sonata in F Minor for Pianoforte, Op. 57, "Appassionata,"* by Ludwig van Beethoven, Bärenreiter Urtext, ed. Jonathan Del Mar (Kassel: Bärenreiter-Verlag Karl Vötterle GmbH & Co., 2014), vi-viii.

sonorous space over the clumsy left hand figure – it sounds as though someone has opened the door to a room we have been anxiously waiting to enter. Both the melody and the accompaniment are phrased with slurs, creating a dual *legato* effect in all sounding registers. Two crucial questions emerge in this section with respect to the *dolce*: (1) for how long do we play the passage *dolce* – i.e., cautiously until m. 41; (2) to *what* does this indication apply (the melody, the accompaniment, or both)?

There is no easy answer to either of these issues. Our intuition is to look at context even though this may lead to more questions than answers, i.e. if Beethoven wanted only a *dolce* accompaniment, then this register seems to be an odd choice because of its tessitura. Perhaps the only straight answer for making sense of these indications is to look at performance practice because while the jury is still out on what the role of this *dolce* is, somebody is going to have to play it before any official decision is made.

Barry Cooper comments on the "Appassionata" second group *dolce* saying: "the *dolce* in bar 35 also implies a slight stretching of the time, and these very low notes need to be played as softly and lightly as possible, so that the noble cantabile melody can sing out above them while remaining quite soft."[24] Cooper's comments express that this passage is not limited it one single mood or dynamic; the section is "soft" in the accompaniment and has a "noble cantabile melody," which should have a distinct tone and touch from the accompaniment (moreover the accompaniment should be played "softly and lightly" even though it is a cumbersome figure for the hand.) The tone Beethoven desires for the passage appears to require these two different techniques at the same time, which leaves a lot of room for the performer to choose how to bring out the *dolce* to its full potential and become a "noble cantabile melody." A word cue like *cantabile* challenges our understanding in music, such as the "Appassionata," when the context of the term is complex. *Cantabile,* as a technique, is one thing; *dolce*, when it appears in a score and is supposed to bring out a *cantabile* sensibility in performance, is quite another. And yet the clarity of this distinction deteriorates when we look deeper into the question: "what is a *cantabile* melody versus a *dolce* melody?" In the end, the ambiguity we encounter with relation

[24] Barry Cooper, "Commentaries," In *Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward*, Volume III (London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 2007), 7.

to *cantabile* is a discrepancy between *cantabile* as an article of notation and *cantabile* as a description.

When a *cantabile* indication appears in the staff, does this make the passage more comprehensible because we know it requires a *cantabile* technique, feel, and mood? In fact we find when Beethoven uses *cantabile* in piano scores, he writes the indication for passages that are often just as enigmatic as the "Appassionata" *dolce* irrespective of an assumed *cantabile* technique. In the Sonata in C Major, Op. 2, n. 3, we find a passage written with a *dolce* in the staff, but the passage implicitly demands a *cantabile* technique for its proper performance.

Figure 1.9 Beethoven, Sonata in C Major, Op. 2 no. 3, mvmt. IV, Allegro assai, mm. 99-111.[25]



What we are calling an "assumed *cantabile* technique" is when a *cantabile* technique is implicitly required to play a passage, e.g. the middle subject of the final movement of Beethoven's Sonata in C Major, Op. 2, No. 3 (Figure 1.9). Czerny describes this passage accordingly: "the middle subject (in F) to be played *legatissimo* and *cantabile* and the melody on the upper part to be well brought out. The left hand afterwards in the following way."[26] The hymn-like texture in the right hand and the organ-like octaves in the left hand have the stiff beauty of a Bach chorale. Beethoven then pairs this with a sensibility for a low-lying bass accompaniment that helps the melody shine.

[25] *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas*. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.
[26] Carl Czerny, *On the Proper Performance of all Beethoven's Works for the Piano*, ed. Paul Badura-Skoda ([Vienna]: Universal Edition, 1970) 27.

The first time we find the term *cantabile* explicitly written within the staff of one of Beethoven's piano sonatas is in the second movement of the Sonata in E-flat, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], composed in 1809. When we consider the melody Beethoven has marked *cantabile* (Figure 1.10), it does not look more "cantabile" than the "Appassionata" *dolce* second subject (Figure 1.8, mm. 35-7).

Figure 1.10 Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], mvmt. II, Andante espressivo, mm. 15-18.[27]



In the "Lebewohl" sonata's second movement, the melody marked *cantabile* jumps around anxiously despite that we find it in the slow movement. The chromaticism and delicate ornaments lend the melody a lovely charm. The melody, nevertheless, appears better suited with a *dolce* than a *cantabile* indication. This causes us to ask what this *cantabile* might really mean, as far as the material of the score and formal discussions can tell us.

Generally speaking, conclusions about the interpretation of expressive word cue indications in Beethoven's music are derived from research into historical dictionaries and lexicons dating from the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. However, when we explore many of these sources with respect to our current problem, they do not shed much light on what the term *cantabile* means beyond denoting something that is *song-like* or has a *singing quality* (e.g. a melody that could be easily sung by a voice). One example is from a lexicon by Johann Gottfried

[27] *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas*. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

Walther [1684-1748], who has an entry on the Italian term *cantabile.*[28] Walther determines that a work is considered *cantabile* when all voices and [instrumental] parts can sing or, that a "fine" melody [with this quality] is brought forth. Similar contemporary sources for resolving questions of definitions, compositional use, and performance practice in the late Classical and Romantic period include Johann Abraham Peter Schulz [1747-1800] and Heinrich Christoph Koch [1749-1816], with their *Allgemeiner Theorie der Schönen Künste* [1771-1774], *Musikalisches Lexikon* [1802], respectively. Schulz and Koch's texts impart comparable information with respect to *cantabile*: it is a term that is indicative of a "singable" melody, or a melody with properties that would make it easily carried by the human voice.[29] Koch's lexicon entries for "*cantabile*" and "*singend"* borrow much for Schulz's earlier work,[30] with two noticeable differences (described by Günther Massenkeil in "*Cantabile* bei Beethoven").[31] These are namely (1) *cantabile* is the opposite or antonym of a noisy (*rauschenden*) type of musical writing and (2) the *cantabile* indication, when written at the beginning of a movement, designates a slow movement whose melody sings in such a way that it does not require any additional specific technique for playing it.[32]

Nevertheless, Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach [1714-1788] provides us with a different approach to *cantabile*; rather than addressing the term directly in examples of a score, Bach refers to a type of *cantabile* technique that delves further into practice than traditional lexicons. He writes:

> As a means of learning the essentials of good performance it is advisable to listen to accomplished musicians […] above all, lose no opportunity to hear artistic singing. In so doing, the keyboardist will learn to think in terms of song. Indeed, it is a good practice to sing instrumental melodies in order to reach an understanding of their correct performance. This way of learning is of far greater value than the reading of voluminous tomes or listening to

[28] "Cantabile ital. cantable gall. heisset: wenn eine Composition, sie sey vocaliter oder instrumentaliter gesetzt, in allen Stimmen und Partien sich wohl singen lässet, oder eine feine Melodie in solchen führet," Johann Gottfried Walther, *Musicalisches Lexicon*, Leipzig, 1732 (Facsimile reprint: Kassel and Basel: [n.p.], 1953), 134.
[29] See entry for "Singend" in Heinrich Christoph Koch, *Musikalisches Lexikon*, Frankfurt am Main, 1802, and 1390-1391 also, Massenkeil, 155.
[30] See Günther Massenkeil, "*Cantabile* bei Beethoven" in *Beiträge '76-78: Beethoven-Kolloquium 1977, Dokumentation und Aufführungspraxis*, ed. Rudolf Klein (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978), 154–159, 155.
[31] Günther Massenkeil, "*Cantabile* bei Beethoven" in *Beiträge '76-78: Beethoven-Kolloquium 1977, Dokumentation und Aufführungspraxis*, ed. Rudolf Klein (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978).
[32] See Massenkeil, 155. Also Koch's entries for "Cantabile" and "Singend" in *Musikalisches Lexikon* (Frankfurt am Main: August Hermann, 1802), 299-300 and 1390-1391, respectively.

> learned discourses. In these one meets such terms as Nature, Taste, Song, and Melody, although their authors are often incapable of putting together as many as two natural tasteful, singing, melodic tones for they dispense their alms and endowments with a completely unhappy arbitrariness.[33]

In C. P. E. Bach's discussion, a *cantabile* technique is a requisite for artistic playing, learned directly from experiencing song, and singing, first-hand. In the sequence of C. P. E. Bach's argument, the word cue *cantabile* apparently would not need to be written into the staff because a *cantabile* technique would be an essential characteristic of a good performance of any keyboard music.[34] Bach's theory hinges on an intelligent performer who learns through experience. This is a practical form of education that is earned through thoughtful listening and doing for oneself. This practice is juxtaposed with lexicons that, in Bach's opinion, do not decipher true musical meaning nor explain how to perform the beauty of a piece. For Bach, an instrumentalist should imagine other performances (such as opera or oratorio) where the voice is displayed as a robust instrument of expression, and apply a singer's sensibility for melody to their own playing. We note this rudimentary aspect of musical expression as song, "to think in terms of song," in Beethoven's use of *cantabile*, *dolce*, and *espressivo* – these indications call our attention to musical expression at its most fundamental, as communication from one person to another.

Bach complains of the inadequacies of works on musical aesthetics that utilize a specific kind of vocabulary and "scholarly" understanding of music. In Bach's opinion, "learned discourses" do not help the performer perform melodies better. The "learned discourses" are treatises from an ivory tower that have little to do with the actual practice of music. From this standpoint, it seems the best treatises on musical meaning should come from composers and musicians themselves – persons who have a direct connection with actual scores. Concepts like "Nature" and "Melody" do not offer much advice about how to play a particular melody unless, when reading treatises on these subjects, one thoughtfully integrates these ideas into one's playing. There is no clear answer with respect to how to do this, and for performers who are not charitable toward philosophical ideas the task would be a chimera. Bach does not

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[33] Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, *Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments* [1759-1762], ed. and trans. William J. Mitchell (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1949), 152.

[34] See also Stephanie Frakes, "The Government of *cantabile*: Notes on Eighteenth-Century Musical Meaning," in *The Ohio State Online Music Journal,* Volume 1, Number 2 (Autumn 2008). Frakes describes *cantabile* as a positive characteristic of artistic music of the eighteenth-century and the notion of *cantabile* in theory versus practice. http://osomjournal.org/issues/1-2/frakes/

consider this possibility of "enlightened" playing through the application of philosophical ideas into performance in the context of his treatise. The reason for this is because Bach is looking for unambiguous solutions for performing, and he does not take on larger questions of aesthetics and meaning outside of the scope of performance practice. If a keyboardist were to make all melodies "sing," however, then we would be unable to discern between the delicate differences between a "singing," song-like melody (the "Appassionata" second theme *dolce* melody) and a less "singing" melody (the "Lebewohl" sonata's second movement *cantabile* melody). This difference begets an aesthetic question of its own. To address this, we will continue to explore C. P. E. Bach's pragmatic, practice-oriented advice.

In one of many implied conditional arguments within a general remark about performance practice, Bach notes: if performers execute the simple task of singing the melody of the piece they are studying, then performers will perform the work better (on their instrument). In this case, we can say performers will be "singing" through their playing, imitating the way in which they sang a melody through touch and the articulation of musical phrases. A chasm opens in this hypothetical argument between actual singing (in Bach's terms) and the definitions of historical lexicons; when we read conceptual definitions that elaborate on what is "song-like," or a tune well-adapted for the human voice, these definitions do not seem to draw us closer to understanding the term *cantabile*. Lexicons may even do us a disservice and lead us to believe Beethoven's *cantabile* of the "Lebewohl" sonata (Figure 1.10), is a *singing* or *song-like* melody. Our intuition about this melody – that it would be unintelligible if it were sung by a human voice – would be irrelevant if we were to take the information in lexicons at face value.

When performers come across a *cantabile* indication in the staff of a score, they will most likely associate the passage or melody with the *singability* of the musical phrase. These material considerations of the score, nevertheless, leave us at the doorstep of greater aesthetic questions. Material considerations might not have an immediate implication on how a musical phrase should be played, but reflection on them can lead to deeper meaning (that can also be expressed through performance).

Bach's discussion of a general *cantabile* technique that will inspire a good performance appears in a chapter specifically on performance in his treatise.[35] Bach describes an implicit *cantabile* technique in the following passage:

> Good performance, then, occurs when one hears all notes and their embellishments played in correct time with fitting volume produced by a touch which is related to the true content of a piece. Herein lies the rounded, pure, flowing manner of playing which makes for clarity and expressiveness.[36]

Bach emphasizes technique as what brings out the "true content of a piece." Bach is not interested in the "true content" of the music from a philosophical point of view. Bach's focus is, of course, practice and technique. Ideal technique, nevertheless, is intertwined with the capabilities of the instrument at the player's disposal and the player's ability to produce these sounds on this instrument. This implies that a performer must adjust their attack accordingly to the material of the instrument itself.[37] Despite hindrances, one of Bach's desired ends for his treatise is "to encourage a more musical way of portraying rage, anger, and other passions by means of harmonic and melodic devices rather than by an exaggerated, heavy attack."[38] In this statement, we find Bach alludes to "true content" in music that cannot be expressed merely through a player's attack. Bach insists that "a more musical way" of interpretation, or a more thoughtful expression of the "passions," must exist in performance practice beyond touch. Technique limits the dimensions of expression if our resource for the expression of rage or anger is only "an exaggerated, heavy attack." In this statement, Bach appeals to a critical vision of music that examines harmonic and melodic devices for insight into the "true content" of music, which shows that Bach considers musical interpretation and musical content to be more complex than a distinct equation that determines a specific touch needed to play a designated mood.

The performance of musical meaning was more limited in Bach's time than even in Beethoven's time due to the physical capabilities of keyboards. This leads us to question whether the performer Bach has in mind can really obtain a *cantabile*, "flowing manner of playing." We wonder if descriptive notation, even in Beethoven's

[35] See Bach, "Chapter Three: Performance," *Essay on True Art of Playing Keyboard*, 147-166.
[36] Bach, 148.
[37] See Bach, 148-9.
[38] Bach, 149.

compositions, reflects an ideal sound (one that must be imagined but can never be truly portrayed in performance) and an imaginary technique; does expressive word cue notation have an intrinsic relation to the "true content" of music, which is content that cannot be fully represented in the score?

Bach takes into account the physical limitation of the keyboards at the time of his treatise (ca. 1750):[39]

> The keyboard lacks the power to sustain long notes and to decrease or increase the volume of the tone or, to borrow an apt expression from painting, to shade. These conditions make it no small task to give a singing performance of an adagio without creating too much empty space and a consequent monotony due to a lack of sonority.[40]

"A singing performance" highlights the crucial role a *cantabile* technique has, at least in Adagio movements. In Bach's commentary, the empty space in an adagio, which is created by a slow tempo and lack of melodic movement, can put performance in a precarious situation of monotony. The "empty space" works against a performance to inspire boredom in its listeners. To maintain the audience's interest in a musical work that has a slow tempo because the keyboard performer is unable to "shade" sustained notes through dynamics (like a violin, for example), Bach suggests a technique of adding ornaments to a sustained note: "[the note] must be full and so performed that the listener will believe that he is hearing only the original note. This requires a freedom of performance that rules out everything slavish and mechanical. Play from the soul, not like a trained bird!"[41] Bach puts forward these ideas for techniques that contain an element of improvisation, which should, according to Bach, make music sound as though it came from the soul. (This position supports an argument for an intelligent performer, who interprets music beyond the score and the instrument's capabilities – the score suggests that a note should be embellished because it shows a sustained note in an adagio movement, but the score does not require that the performer embellishes the note.)

What is especially important to take away from C. P. E. Bach's discussion is how the performer should study a piece by singing it, as well as that the performer should take into account the limitations of their own instrument. We can understand Bach's comments as a general approach to learning, performing, and hearing a

[39] The date of the first edition of "Part One" of Bach's work is 1753.
[40] Bach, 150.
[41] Bach, 150.

musical work. For a performer to think of a melody "in terms of song" is crucial for determining the evolution of the *cantabile* indication. From this principle, we grasp the dimensions of *dolce* and *espressivo* indications that embody a *cantabile* aspect without having it written explicitly into the score.

B. What the instrument, as a material means, can tell us about *cantabile*

The importance of the instrument, as a means to convey expression music, is a sentiment that is present in Beethoven's own writings. In a letter to the piano maker Johann Andreas Streicher in 1796, Beethoven describes the performance of one of his works played by one of Johann Streicher's students.[42] Beethoven writes:

> Your little pupil, dear St[reicher], apart from the fact that when playing my Adagio she drew me a few tears from my eyes, has really astonished me. I congratulate you on being so fortunate as to be able to display through such a talent your own understanding of music. . . . I assure you in all sincerity, dear St[reicher], that this was the first time it gave me pleasure to hear my trio performed; and truly this experience will make me decide to compose more for the pianoforte [*Klavier*] than I have done hitherto. Even if only a few people understand me, I shall be satisfied. There is no doubt that so far as the manner of playing it is concerned, the *pianoforte* is still the least studied and developed of all instruments; often one thinks that one is merely listening to a harp. And I am delighted, my dear fellow, that you are one of the few who realize and perceive that, provided one can feel the music, one can also make the pianoforte sing.[43]

In this letter, Beethoven appears to make the case that the pianoforte will be taken more seriously once it has capabilities to express more – to *sing*. The historical limitations of the pianoforte sheds light on Beethoven's innovation with respect to expressive word cues; not only does Beethoven broaden our understanding of notation by writing expressive word cues in passages that find little resonance with the definitions of the terms, but Beethoven's compositions in fact make demands on the performer – and the instrument – to reach incomparable expressive depths. (C. P. E. Bach's keyboard works rarely, if ever, have indications like *dolce* written into the

[42] Anderson conjectures that the student is Fräulein von Kissow, who was 13 years old at the time of the letter.

[43] Anderson, Letter 18, 25; Written from Vienna, 1796. See Emily Anderson, *The Letters of Beethoven: Collected, Translated and Edited with an Introduction, Appendixes, Notes and Indexes,* 3 volumes (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961). Anderson suggests the trio Beethoven heard was his pianoforte trio Op. 1, no. 1 in E-flat, which contains an Adagio Cantabile movement. Anderson comments Artaria published the three Opus 1 trios in 1795. Tilman Skowroneck suggests Elisabeth (Lisette) von Kissow (later Bernhard) was twelve years of age at the time (see Skowroneck's commentary on this letter, Tilman Skowroneck, *Beethoven the Pianist* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 72).

staff. Even if Bach's scores did have these indications, keyboards of the eighteenth century simply did not have the expressive powers of Beethoven's pianos – hence Beethoven's comparison of a pianoforte to a harp.)[44]

Beethoven's comment that a pianoforte should "sing" takes C. P. E. Bach's suggestion, that the instrumentalist should sing a melody, to another level.[45] Beethoven seems to apply Bach's theory of performance to a practical case: Streicher's student played the work magnificently because she was able to skillfully convey her teacher's understanding of music *and* the instrument gave her the sufficient means to do so. (It is fitting that the teacher in this case is, in fact, a piano maker.) We find evidence here to claim that the *cantabile* indication does not merely signal a *song-like* melody, but advises the performer to make the instrument sound as though the instrument were singing. We can apply this argument to the "Lebewohl" sonata pictured in Figure 1.10, where a melody has a *cantabile* indication – the melody, nevertheless, does not look very song-like. To reconcile a *cantabile* notion with this passage, the melody will need to push through the dense accompaniment; consequently, the melody will mimic the entrance of a voice in an operatic setting, when the singer begins an aria and draws in all of the listeners' attention. From a different angle, the *cantabile* passages in Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 must become established very quickly – the *cantabile* melody should glide into the sounding space with the confidence of a hockey player who takes to the ice, replacing a teammate on the fly during a power play situation.

[44] See Skowroneck, 74. With respect to the "harp" comment, Skowroneck suggests Beethoven's letter quoted above gave rise to the interpretation of the pianoforte as a harp. See (Skowroneck, 73n52).

[45] Czerny describes that Beethoven advised his (Czerny's) father to immediately obtain "Emmanuel Bach's book on the true art of clavier-playing," for young Czerny, see Carl Czerny, "Recollections from My Life," trans. Ernest Sanders, *The Musical Quarterly*, Volume. 42, No. 3 (July 1956), 302-317, 207. Barry Cooper writes of C. P. E. Bach's work and influence on Beethoven, "also noteworthy is Beethoven's preference for C. P. E. Bach's keyboard treatise *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, which had appeared as long ago as 1753… he probably used this himself while studying with Neefe, since little else was available," Barry Cooper, *Beethoven* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 111. Lewis Lockwood maintains this idea and describes how Beethoven's instructor Christian Gottlob Neefe introduced Beethoven to C. P. E. Bach's theoretical works while Beethoven was still in Bonn, see Lewis Lockwood, *Beethoven: The Music and the Life* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 16.

Figure 1.11 Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], mvmt. II, Andante espressivo, mm. 29-37.[46]



[46] *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas*. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

In Figure 1.11, we identify the long string of introductory material that ushers in the major tonality of the *cantabile* melody (Figure 1.11, mm. 29-30, which shows the second appearance of the *cantabile* theme in this movement). The contour of the *cantabile* melody is different from the other elements of the movement (such as the introductory material in Figure 1.11, mm. 29-30 and the passages of mm. 35-42). The Andante espressivo before the first announcement of the *cantabile* theme (Figure 1.10) is dominated by the wavering major-minor sound of the movement's main theme; the movement's conclusion also repeats this material with some variation in mm. 37-40 (Figure 1.11). In m. 31 (Figure 1.11), we see how the *cantabile* sets up a relatively stable landscape in major for four bars, without even hinting at the diminished triad sound that dominates the minor sections of the movement. Not only does the calm *cantabile* theme have a calculated and flowing melody, but this passage also sounds as though it were the score of a work for two different instruments rather than one instrument in the context of a piano sonata – the melody is so distinct from its accompaniment that the vocal quality comes through in an astonishing way with independent force.

Johann Andreas Streicher continued to build pianos that favored a "singing tone," the tone Beethoven describes in his letter, and strove to make instruments heard in this way. This is apparent in the booklet Streicher would include for the owner of new Geschwister Stein pianofortes. In this booklet, Streicher writes:

> It is a pity that, even though many play the fortepiano, so few try to treat it according to its true nature. Nothing is more common than to hear this resourceful instrument *ill-treated* in such a way that it can often make no better effect than a tinkling harp or a miserable *Hackbrett* [hammered dulcimer].[47]

There is a similarity between the "true content of piece" in Bach's treatise, and the "true nature" of the pianoforte in Streicher's note. Both comments address a component in a musical work, and in a musical instrument, that only a skilled musician can bring to the fore – a musician who has sympathy for what a composer expresses in a composition, and patience to discover the capabilities and limits of pianofortes.

[47] Streicher, *Kurze Bemerkungen über das Spielen, Stimmen und Erhalten der Fortepiano, welche von den Geschwistern Stein in Wien verfertiget werden.* Wien: mit Albertischen Schriften, 1801, 3-4; I refer to Skowroneck's translation, see Skowroneck, 74.

The capabilities and limitations of keyboards during C. P. E. Bach's time, and even Beethoven's time, shift focus away from the performer alone. The instrument comes to the forefront in many cases of criticism or praise because of the technology of the instrument and its ability to express deeper meaning in music. During the eighteenth century, certain instruments were developed such as fortepianos, *Hammerflügel, harpsichords, clavichords,* and other early pianos or stringed keyboard instruments that had additional pedals, knee-levers, and stops supplying a wide variety of sounds no longer available in present pianos. These pedals afforded different and new options for timbre and layering of tones.[48] These magnificent, innovative, awe-inspiring, and sometimes monstrous instruments seemed to grant performers limitless possibilities for expression.

> Descriptions of stringed keyboard instruments (sometimes with one or more auxiliary sets of organ pipes) which could produce a large variety of timbres by combining a number of stops were not uncommon in German-speaking countries in the second half of the 18th century. The idea of making a single *Clavier* capable of imitating a multitude of different voices – even the sounds of a whole orchestra – can easily be understood in the context of the desire to make expressive keyboard instruments. It seems probable too that in the background there was an idea of creating an effect on the listener that would at least remind him of divine omnipotence.[49]

Michael Latcham describes an interesting phenomenon with respect to keyboard innovation: keyboard instruments were designed in such a monumental way that their sound would remind a listener of God, or at least of "divine omnipotence." When we reflect on instruments that invoke "divine omnipresence," we can think of many technological advancements in our own era of music; current recording techniques are so impressive that the crisp and uncanny digital cleanness, and accuracy of pitch in current popular music also embody qualities of "divine omnipotence" because a lot of current popular music sounds superhuman or otherworldly. And despite the impressive capabilities of these hybrid keyboards,

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[48] Beethoven wrote in one of early sketches from his Bonn period, described by Skowroneck, "On one page of the Kafka sketch miscellany two distinct sets of Beethoven's sketches for a piano accompaniment for Jeremiah's lamentations, to be performed on a Klavier…during Holy Week in one of these years [1790-92] are preserved. These sketches contain an 'oom-pah-pah-pah' bass figure with thick *crescendo–decrescendo* hairpins and the written addition 'mit dem Knie' meaning that the player should lift the dampening during the 'pahs' with his knee" (Skowroneck, 52). Skowroneck refers to Joseph Kerman, ed., *Ludwig van Beethoven Autograph Miscellany from ca. 1786 to 1799 (The "Kafka" Sketchbook*), 2 volumes (London: British Museum, 1970), volume 1, f. 96r.

[49] Michael Latcham, "The Expressive Clavier: Swirling from one level of the affects to another: the expressive *Clavier* in Mozart's time," *Early Music*, Volume XXX, issue 4 (November 2002): 502-521, 505.

C.P.E. Bach still reminds performers to *sing* the compositions they are playing. When we consider, nonetheless, that pianofortes had made technological advancements to the extent that Beethoven felt Streicher's pianofortes could *sing,* there has to be more to a performance than a "singing" pianoforte. As technology changed, it makes sense that notation would also become more descriptive to reflect innovation and what the new instruments could do. In this way, the ideal sound expressed in word cue notation is not imaginary. It requires performers to learn techniques so as not to play like a "trained bird." Intelligent performers will integrate ideas about their instruments to go beyond a *cantabile* technique, and reflect on the true content of the work for a more complete presentation in performance.

Concluding remarks

This chapter initiates an inquiry into the purpose of specific word cues in the staff of Beethoven's scores, and identifies what these indications call our attention to. Dynamics, as well as notions of tempo, which often cloud discussions of expressive indications, present only one facet of a greater scheme of expression and meaning. Expressive word cues help identify intelligible content within the score, provide evidence of thematic relevance and structural purpose, and also reflect deeper meaning in the composition.

With relation to specific indications such as *cantabile* and *dolce*, we have investigated these indications from the perspective of commentary on the musical material in the score. This idea of commentary inspires us to reflect on the normative interpretation of a specific passage in a musical score and how this interpretation at times requires modification due to the context of the expressive indication. Further, by identifying the shortcomings of this type of explanation, we grasp a greater expressive gesture and its relation to the meaning of the work.

When we consider the historical definitions of expressive indications found in Beethoven's scores, which are used in order to potentially illuminate complex passages, we meet another obstacle for interpretation. To strictly follow such definitions, we should acknowledge that these terms assume heavily formatted associations with historical notions. These associations, in turn, obscure certain difficulties in interpretation. Thereby our aim is to show a method where we can establish thematic relevance to the whole of a musical work or movement from a structural and/or expressive standpoint, and forge relations between themes by working up from their expressive identifications. When we approach specific expressive indications in a work beyond normative performance practice, these indications have shown a diverse way to unite and distinguish musical material as well as suggest something of a performance *ideal* or *ideal tone*.

In our reflection on the normative definition of the term *cantabile*, we found that this term suggests more than instrumental music that should imitate vocal songs. To this extent, *cantabile* also refers to a specific type of technique generally applicable for playing *dolce* and *espressivo* word cues alike (as well as other passages that may not have such indications but have slurs or other notation that require a

cantabile technique). What a performer does to push the limits of their instrument, like cultivating a "singing" *cantabile* technique, is evidence that the object of our inquiry is not explicit on the surface of the score or has to do with the instrument itself. These material considerations are important for determining the fittingness of certain expressive indications and how the instrument can produce an ideal sound. Beethoven's piano sonatas, however, require a kind of interpretation that implies understanding the use of the *cantabile* and also the realization that expressive indications like *dolce* are calling our attention to something beyond the immediate: i.e. play the passage *legato*. Expressive word cues address meaning that is only understood through thoughtful reflection on the score beyond the immediate.

We suggest that the interpretation of expressive word cues beyond immediate recognition and response requires both material and psychological considerations of the composition (in the same vein as A. B. Marx's approach to Beethoven's music). This interpretation shows that a hermeneutic understanding of music becomes necessary; when we follow Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, we draw on normative interpretations of notation, form, and composition (something like "musical grammar") and build toward conclusions of deeper content like thoughts and ideas in music (from here we will find a bridge to A. B. Marx's unifying concept of a musical *Idee* that draws together seemingly disparate parts in the same musical work). These terms do not create an expressive, isolated block within the score, but can be integrated coherently into the musical score; we saw this already in the "Eroica," where certain instruments in the same symphonic section, or with similar thematic material, can interact with one another to create a harmonious expression of meaning. It is not only the score and not only the instrument, but a good performance requires reflection on *why* one chooses a particular technique. This suggests a method of interpretation (and performance) where we become accountable for our decision to say it is only the accompaniment of the second group of the "Appassionata" that should be played *dolce.* What does notation, especially when used in a peculiar way, call our attention to? In our answer to this question, we find deeper meaning in music beyond a "singing tone."

PART II:

Schleiermacher's Hermeneutic Theory and the Interpretation of Music: Beethoven and Meaning

INTRODUCTION

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher's theory of hermeneutics is founded on a two-pronged approach to interpretation: a grammatical task and a psychological/technical task. This is achieved in part by studying a text, work, utterance or dialogue from a perspective of rules of language, and the determining powers of these[50] on the one hand, and individuality of the artist, writer or speaker on the other. For Schleiermacher, one of the main goals of hermeneutics is to uncover thoughts or ideas in a work.

Schleiermacher's theory is language-based, and his theory was developed partially in response to the traditional practice of hermeneutics that used specific methods to interpret the Bible and texts from antiquity. We find Schleiermacher's response to the philological and dogmatic focuses of earlier theories of hermeneutics in the grammatical task of his theory. It is precisely within Schleiermacher's wide-ranging discussion of grammar, and how grammar influences interpretation, that we can construct a bridge to apply this manner of interpretation to different mediums like music. At the heart of Schleiermacher's grammatical task is the realization that the principles of grammar influence the interpretation of a text, and this influence can sometimes lead our understanding of meaning astray. In this light, we identify a universal platform for Schleiermacher's grammatical task of hermeneutics. The cornerstone of this universality is in the way that the rules of compositional language can contribute to, at the same time as hinder, our understanding of ideas and meaning in a work. When one constructs meaning only within the scope of the rules of composition, normative interpretation, and traditional analysis, the meaning of a work

[50] See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism*, *and Other Writings,* trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 94.

becomes dependent on the functions of these rules and abnegates the necessity of looking beyond normative functions to establish meaning.

In order to understand a musical composition as something that expresses thoughts or ideas, our project looks beyond the concept of a narrative that accompanies a composition through its progression. We will discuss thoughts and ideas in relation to music in a similar form as Schleiermacher, who speaks of these concepts in literature.[51] We will describe how thoughts and ideas are presented within the medium of music, represented in the structure and form inherent to that medium. In this way, we will study musical works from the position that Gadamer advocates: "we have the ability to open ourselves to the superior claim the text makes and respond to what it has to tell us."[52] It is from this point of view that a *musical thought* or *musical idea* in a composition is not necessarily different from a *literary thought* in a text, or a thought expressed in dialogue; the aim remains the same for uncovering meaning as for understanding the content of a work's *superior claim.* The medium and form is different in an immediate way when we discuss music versus written word, however the understanding of thoughts and ideas essentially require the same tools of interpretation.[53]

As Schleiermacher's theories on grammar, thought, and language are often tangled up with linguistic notions, and linguistic phenomena, it is important to say that we are not making a literal equivalence of grammar in language to "grammar" in music. Therefore, we will show the relevance of Schleiermacher's grammatical task with respect to the direction that task takes us in; additionally we will comment on music as a system that has relationships (sonorous, notational, etc.). These relationships have consequently given way to theories, developed to explicate meaning and normativity, and provide us with a platform to determine compositional traditions.

To contextualize Schleiermacher's theory of hermeneutics in the study of music, we will discuss the passages with *dolce* indications in the first movement of Beethoven's

[51] The concepts of "thought" and "idea" are found in Schleiermacher. We follow the translations of the terms "Gedanke" and "Einfall," respectively.
[52] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London and New York: Continuum, 1989), 310.
[53] See Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 309.

Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata." We will show how both notation and expression pose difficulties (with relation to normative interpretation) for critical analysis and performance. To complicate matters, the expressive cue *dolce* is a word (as opposed to other figures of musical notation); our present study of hermeneutics and music, nevertheless, regards *dolce* not as a word in the traditional sense of language and grammar (viz. as a descriptive predicate), but as an instruction for musical performance (indicative of an imperative phrase "play this *dolce*"). It is in this way that Schleiermacher's grammatical task will be seen in a position to cast light on the rules of composition, normative interpretation, and how these influence meaning (both for analysis and performance) in certain directions.

When we speak about a thought or idea that Beethoven expresses in specific passages that are marked *dolce,* we are not saying we are uncovering Beethoven's *actual* thought through this method of understanding. We attempt to understand the thoughts, ideas, or *superior claims* of a composition via Schleiermacher's hermeneutic method of interpretation. Choices in orchestration and composition, phrasing, the placement of expressive indications and the way in which they appear in a composition can all point to the presence of thought or an idea in music.

The activity of uncovering thought is central to Schleiermacher's psychological task of hermeneutics. Gadamer describes this direction of interpretation as:

> Ultimately a divinatory process, a placing of oneself within the whole framework of the author, an apprehension of the "inner origin" of the composition of a work, a re-creation of the creative act. Thus understanding is a reproduction of an original production…a reconstruction that starts from the vital moment of concept, the "germinal decision" as the composition's organizing center.[54]

When we examine Gadamer's claim, we understand the notion of "the whole framework of the author" is related but not identical to the author. In order to understand a process, a "reconstruction," and a "reproduction," we find the task is not a question of entering into the mind of the author or composer. It is rather an exercise in approximation. With tools to guide interpretation, we uncover what the composition aims at, or expresses, within the "whole framework." Gadamer describes

[54] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 186.

that this "whole framework" is determined by positive knowledge that surrounds a composition, an author's life, and era. Through these notions, we discover a way to ground interpretation by separating it from total speculation.[55]

Chapter 1 of Part II aims to address Schleiermacher's grammatical task of hermeneutics and how this task can be utilized to discuss musical meaning, with a focus on Beethoven's *dolce* as a case in point. By expounding on concepts from Schleiermacher's grammatical task such as *language area*, *whole*, and *general image*, we will find the relevance of these concepts in music by describing how they resonate with arguments in the study of music, musical meaning, and analysis. The discussion of these concepts will be directed toward uncovering thoughts in a composition and the individuality of the composer. In Chapter 2 of Part II, we will discuss techniques for apprehending a composer's genius and individuality, as directed toward understanding thoughts in a composition. These techniques include *divination*, *intuition*, and *comparative* methods that aim to reveal the individuality of the composer from a different angle. We also will support Schleiermacher's notion that a composition illustrates, and emerges from, a particular life-moment in the composer's life. The conclusion of Chapter 2 will reflect on musical meaning in the form of thoughts and ideas. We will ultimately defend that when we express meaning on conceptual and universal levels of thought and ideas, the meaning of a work will not be restricted to a temporal dimension imposed by a narrative and the content necessarily bound to that narrative.

[55] When we consider elaborations on thoughts and ideas in music such as Søren Kierkegaard's discussion of the *daemonic* in Mozart's music, A. B. Marx's elaboration on Beethoven's *hero* in Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major "Eroica," E. T. A. Hoffmann's review of Beethoven's Symphony no. 5 in C minor, and Thomas Mann's description of Beethoven's Sonata in C minor Op. 111 in *Doctor Faustus*, these inevitably reflect on the content of ideas in Beethoven's music (or Mozart's in the case of Kierkegaard) and expresses them through text and description. See Søren Kierkegaard, "The Immediate Erotic Stages," in *Either/Or*, Part I, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 47-135; A. B. Marx "'Ludwig van Beethoven: Life and Works,' selected excerpts," in *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method*, ed. and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 157-188; E. T. A. Hoffmann, "Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony," in *E. T. A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings:* Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, *Musical Criticism*, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 236-251; Thomas Mann, *Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as Told by a Friend*, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Everyman's Library, 1997), 49-54.

Chapter 1: The grammatical task

A. Language area [*Sprachgebiet*]

In Schleiermacher's study of the grammatical task of hermeneutics, he begins his survey with a discussion of language area or the language common to the author and the original audience for whom the work was composed.[56] In music, the language area is understood as the tradition and the compositional era of a musical composition. To establish a language area is something akin to designating a playing field one can draw on to discuss a work; a rudimentary question we can ask to establish a language area in music is: what is common and uncommon to a compositional tradition?

On the one hand, this task is superficially easy as many studies exist on the details of compositional style, theory, and convention; on the other hand, a difficulty emerges that will evolve and become more defined in our hermeneutic study – this problem is namely the way in which a work does not conform to the conventions of its *language area*. This difficulty becomes clear when we attempt to validate discussions about the rules of composition, theory of musical form, and other theoretical devices that are applied to analyze a work, as many of these were unknown to the actual composer. The theoretical tradition, which spawns ever-developing theories on musical form, attempts to account for numerous anomalies or individual innovations that would otherwise render a theory of form mute with respect to a specific problematic piece or composer. William E. Caplin, in *Classical Form* (1998), discusses exceptions to a theoretical rule from a positive perspective by including

[56] See Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 30; F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik und Kritik,* ed. Manfred Frank (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 101. "The individual is determined in his thought by the (common) language and can think only the thoughts which already have their designation in his language. Another, new thought could not be communicated if it were not related to relationships [*Beziehungen*] which already exist in language …. For language is not just a complex of single representations, but also a system of the relatedness of representations." Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 9.

sections in the work titled: "Deviations from the Norm."[57] To catalogue additions and exceptions to theoretical norms is a way to bridge the gap between the grammatical and psychological tasks of hermeneutics by offering insights on specific styles, although these insights are necessarily bound to the norms they endorse. James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy also comprehensively describe the normative functions of sonata form and thematic behavior in *Elements of Sonata Theory* (2006), with appendixes and highly detailed chapter subsections. These efforts attempt to reconcile problematic or innovative compositions with a named exception to a compositional rule. Hepokoski and Darcy record the difficulties in modifying sonata theory in various instances, which is painstakingly revealed in their discussion of "deformation" in sonata theory.[58]

We will address *language* area first through an example of Beethoven's *dolce* in the first movement of Beethoven's Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata." We can determine a compositional *language area* by establishing a loose parameter of the years of Beethoven's life (1770-1827), the years during which this sonata was composed (1805-1806), and the teachers Beethoven had (among other influences). Beethoven was very familiar with Classical and Baroque traditions, counterpoint (which he studied with Johann Georg Albrechtsberger [1735-1809]) and composition (by the time the "Appassionata" was composed, he had studied with Christian Gottlob Neefe [1746-98], Albrechtsberger, Franz Joseph Haydn [1732-1809], Antonio Salieri [1750-1825] and Emanuel Aloys Förster [1748-1823]).[59] Further, we can consider studies on the similarities and imitation of other composers in Beethoven's works.[60]

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[57] One example, of many throughout Caplin's work, can be found in William E. Caplin, *Classical Form: a Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 54.

[58] See Hepokoski and Darcy's account of the "Paradoxes of the 'Normative' and the 'Non-Normative'; the Need for Nuance." James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types*, *Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Appendix I, 614-621.

[59] We can observe Beethoven's understanding of root theory, composition theory, and his use of other composers' works as examples for how to solve compositional problems and difficulties in Richard Kramer, "Notes to Beethoven's Education," *Journal of the American Musicological Society,* Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring, 1975): 72-101, 84. Also discussed in Kramer's article is Beethoven's study of Johann Philipp Kirnberger (1721-1783), through evidence in Beethoven's own works, viz. "Cantata on the Death of Emperor Joseph II" WoO 87 (1790), see Kramer, 74-6. See also Alfred Mann, "Beethoven's Contrapuntal Studies with Haydn," *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct. 1970): 711-726, for a more detailed discussion of Beethoven's teachers.

[60] See Jeremy Yudkin, "Beethoven's 'Mozart' Quartet," *Journal of the American Musicological Society,* Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 1992): 30-74. Many studies have documented Beethoven's familiarity with particular works through their appearances as copied passages or fragments in Beethoven's

In an essay on the similarities and differences between Beethoven's String Quartet in A Major, Op. 18, no. 5, and Mozart's String Quartet in A Major, K. 464, Jeremy Yudkin describes a notion of convention in the compositional style of the time that incorporates a similar concept of "language area." He writes:

> Convention ruled everything in Classic music, from large-scale form and harmonic motion to close-range period structure to the tiniest rhythmic or melodic gesture. In this context of a prevailing *lingua franca* of music, it is not easy to distinguish those elements that suggest significant points of similarity between two works from those that belong to the prevailing language of the time and thus might be found in a large number of works from the same genre (especially if they are written in the same key).[61]

Yudkin goes on to point out moments in Beethoven's string quartet that imitate Mozart's K. 464, and this conclusion regarding imitation already presumes fluency in an implicit *language area*. Yudkin's discussion of the "prevailing language of the time" and a *lingua franca* provides us with a *language area.* From this perspective, we consider the following: (1) if a composition was composed within the boundaries of convention; (2) if the composition is a direct imitation of another composer's work; (3) if the composition contains an anomaly and the composer's innovation has gone beyond the confines of the *language area* itself.

B. The notion of whole and general image

Schleiermacher's hermeneutics moves beyond a general task of establishing *language area* and focuses on a particular work. Through the evaluation of a singular composition, we bring a composition into a pseudo-dialogue with itself in the evaluation of a dichotomy between part and whole, and the integration of a part into the whole of a work. However, the concept of whole that one adopts, which is

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sketchbooks, see Douglas Porter Johnson, Alan Tyson, and Robert Winter, *The Beethoven Sketchbooks: History, Reconstruction, Inventory*, California Studies in 19th-Century Music 4 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 598. This study cites a number of works that Beethoven was familiar with, including: C. P. E. Bach's *Zwei Litaneyen* W. 204; J. S. Bach *The Art of Fugue,* Contrapunctus 4, *Chromatic Fantasy*, *Well Tempered Clavier*, Book I, Fugue in B minor, Fugue in B-flat minor; G.F. Handel *Messiah*, *Solomon* overture; F.J. Haydn, *Schöpfungsmesse*; W. A. Mozart *Don Giovanni*, String Quartet in G, K. 387; D.G. Türk *Kurze Anweisung zum Generalbasspielen*; additionally the Boldrini sketchbook shows Beethoven copied excepts from F.W. Marpurg's theoretical text *Abhandlung von der Fuge*, see *The Beethoven Sketchbooks,* 350.

[61] Yudkin, 33.

decidedly the basis of an interpretation, should remain flexible. The reasoning behind maintaining this flexibility is twofold. The first element is what is detailed in our initial conception of a work as a whole. The second addresses a feeling of strangeness we may experience with respect to a particular composition, which will inspire us to challenge our initial conception of whole. We will describe the first by stating we begin with a general notion of whole in order to build an elementary foundation that can be used in any evaluation of the work. Schleiermacher describes this as follows: "A correct overall view must always be the basis if the individual aspect is to be understood correctly."[62] Notice that "correct" as an adjective and adverb is present with reference to an "overall view," as well as with reference to the understanding of a particular. The insistence on "correctness" in both cases suggests a balanced viewpoint where understanding the whole is just as important as understanding a particular. This conviction combats the inclination to assume that the most complex particular of a work is what grants meaning to the whole;[63] rather, all parts should be understood to function with each other to create this "overall view" of the whole.

Schleiermacher presents this notion with relation to language, and with relation to the works that pertain to that language, which further expands the notion of whole. Thereby the *whole* pertains to a manifold perspective, including but not limited to: (1) conclusions about a language and particular word, or genre, as these conclusions normally reside in the background of the explication of a work; (2) understanding the individual parts of a work and the whole of the work (this is the generally utilized view of the hermeneutic circle, where parts are integrated into the whole); (3) determining how the work in question integrates into the whole of the author, composer, or artist's complete *oeuvre*; and (4) judgments about how the author, composer or artist's work(s) compare to contemporary works of the time. In all cases, we relate a part to a larger context and then return to the localized vision of the part in order to modify and improve our understanding of the work at hand. Schleiermacher describes this movement from a localized view of the particular to the global view of the whole, which is demonstrated in the hermeneutic circle, with the following example:

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[62] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 33.

[63] It is often the case that once one has unlocked the meaning of one (or several) difficult particular(s), the meaning of the whole seems to disproportionally reflect the meaning of the difficult passage(s). However, it would be fallacious to build an interpretation of the whole of a work on the evidence of one particular passage or aspect.

> The vocabulary and the history of the era of an author relate as the whole from which his writings must be understood as the part, and the whole must, in turn, be understood from the part. Complete knowledge is always in this apparent circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general, of which it is a part, and vice versa.[64]

In the end, this "apparent circle" will be present at the different steps and stages of interpretation; it is also an exercise that will enable us to defend our understanding of a work. In other words, a work's meaning should not follow from an apparently isolated unit; the intelligibility of a particular – or of a single passage – utilizes understanding drawn from the whole, and conclusions related to the various *wholes* are necessary for understanding a particular word and its context.

Once we have established this initial, flexible, overall view of whole, we should then address the very aspect in a work that subsequently challenges this notion: a feeling of strangeness that a work inspires in us, which challenges our understanding of a work and serves as the second element of reasoning behind a flexible view of whole. This intuition arises when we are unable to reconcile one aspect of a work with an earlier notion we once believed to be fundamental to our understanding of a tradition, work, or particular. Our initial thought or prediction about the meaning of the whole is generally the backdrop for an intuition of strangeness. Schleiermacher designates this initial thought or prediction about the whole as a *general image* of the whole. A particular part is compared to, or against, this *general image* in such a way that our interpretation evolves:

> After the general overview explication can often quietly proceed for a long time without actually being free of art, because everything is oriented to the general image. But as soon as a particular difficulty arises the doubt arises as to whether the fault lies with the author or with us. The former can only be presupposed in terms of how much he already showed himself in the overview to be careless and imprecise or also talentless and confused.[65]

Schleiermacher's insight speaks primarily to the malleability of the notion of whole, as our understanding of the whole should be able to change when new material presents a new direction for interpretation. When Schleiermacher describes the "general overview explication" is "free of art" in the moments before a particular

[64] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 24.
[65] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 33.

difficulty makes itself known, we understand hermeneutic interpretation (or the hermeneutic method) is a kind of "art" where one has a skill and perfects that skill through the act of interpretation; one practices the art of hermeneutics by way of following a specific method.[66] From this argument, we understand that the *general image* is a notion or inchoate idea present in our mind at the outset of investigation. The first attempts to understand a work and to analyze the whole thereby follow along the coherency of the *general image*. When we come across a difficulty that challenges our *general image*, we are forced to make a decision about whether the author has made a mistake in the composition, or whether we must find fault in our own *general image* because it no longer aligns with the meaning of the whole.

We will explore this idea with relation to Beethoven's *dolce* in the first movement of Beethoven's "Appassionata" sonata. When we consider the following passage, we ask whether Beethoven is at fault for utilizing the indication of *dolce* in such a perplexing manner when the secondary theme returns in the recapitulation (Figure 2.1).

[66] Schleiermacher determines hermeneutics as "the art of understanding particularly the written discourse of another person correctly" (Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 3). Andrew Bowie elaborates on Schleiermacher's notion of "art" where hermeneutics is the art of understanding [*Kunst des Verstehens*], "For Schleiermacher 'art' is any activity that relies on rules, for which there can be no rules for the applying of those rules. Schleiermacher uses 'art' (*Kunst*) both in the sense of the Greek '*techne*' meaning ability, capacity, and in a sense related to the new aesthetic notion, primarily associated with Kant, that something cannot be understood as *art* merely via the rules of the particular form of articulation" (Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, "Translator's note," 3).

Figure 2.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata," mvmt. I, Allegro assai, recapitulation, mm. 173-178.[67]



This passage from the recapitulation inspires a feeling of strangeness specifically with respect to a normative understanding of *dolce.* Beethoven's indication in this sonata, with its tessitura, the triad rocking back and forth to a low F_1 in the accompaniment, and a low-lying melody played in octaves, challenge the normative interpretation of *dolce* in musical notation. The strangeness of the passage comes to the forefront when we compare it to a more standard use of *dolce* in Mozart's keyboard sonata in F Major, K. 332 (Figure 2.2 and Plate 2).

[67] *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas.* Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced with kind permission of ABRSM.

Plate 2 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in F major (K. 332), mvmt. III, Allegro assai, mm. 12-21. Autograph score.[68]



[68] Quoted, with kind permission from the Scheide holdings, Scheide M134, K332-4r. Courtesy of William H. Scheide, Princeton, N.J.

Figure 2.2 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in F major, K. 332, mvmt. III, Allegro assai, mm. 12-21.[69]



For clarity of interpretation, Mozart has indicated *dolce* for both the melody and accompaniment (see in the first system of Plate 2; Figure 2.2, m. 15). Rather than compose a sweet, joyful melody over static, unmoved accompaniment, Mozart exemplifies a "*dolce* package" in this passage where the melody and accompaniment operate within the same expressive paradigm. (Beethoven's *dolce* in the "Appassionata," pictured in Figure 2.1, is less clear regarding what elements should be played *dolce*.) Mozart's five-measure sequence suggests a smooth, unified front that cleanly defines itself before the *fortepiano* interruptions misplace the strong beats of the measure –this results in the *dolce* oasis being wiped away (Figures 2.2, mm. 20-1). Also noteworthy about this passage is the "naturalness" with which we regard this *dolce*; it is as though the *dolce* were inherent, and wholly intuitive, to the performance of the accompaniment and the exquisite melodic and harmonic tensions delicately positioned above. Mozart's *dolce* sequence, furthermore, exemplifies the intimacy expressed in Koch's entry on *dolce* in the *Lexikon* [1802]; we find Mozart to

[69] Quoted from W. A. Mozart, *Klaviersonaten*, volume 2, Wiener Urtext Edition UT 50227, Vienna, 2003 – with kind permission. The use of this example from Mozart is to say little about the complexity of expressive word cues in the staves of Mozart's compositions. See, for example, Minuet in D Major, K. 576b and Mozart's utilization of a *dolce* indication in the first measure and measure 29. Scott Burnham discusses the complexity in the dissonant sonority of this movement. Burnham, however, does not mention that the *dolce* indication poses potential difficulty, or complexity, for interpretation. See Scott Burnham, *Mozart's Grace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 92-5.

be calling for (as well as compositionally illustrating) the "soft tone" (*schwachen Ton*) appropriate for saying something sweetly into the ear of another.[70]

We consider Mozart's passage (Figure 2.2) as an element that contributes to an inchoate *general image* of the whole with respect to how we understand *dolce* as an article of notation. (This is to say that Mozart's *dolce* in Figure 2.2 fits nicely into a "catalogue" in our mind, a *general image,* of *dolce* indications.) Contrary to our Mozart example, Beethoven's *dolce* in the "Appassionata" (Figure 2.1) strikes us as extraordinary and helps to point the direction of understanding toward how we form our interpretation. The strangeness of the *dolce* in Figure 2.1 is consistent throughout the first movement and is not altogether different from many other *dolce* passages in Beethoven's music.[71] We find that Beethoven's *dolce* in the "Appassionata" is not part of a larger group of systematic tics in compositional practice. Beethoven's use of *dolce* in many perplexing passages actually indicates innovation and builds on the compositional tradition he inherited.

We look first to Muzio Clementi (1752-1832) for evidence to support this argument, as well as to show additional examples of expressive indications within the staves of a score that do not challenge a *general image*. Although Clementi's keyboard works (which are more or less contemporary with Beethoven's piano sonatas) are saturated with expressive word cues in the staff, these all follow an intuitive method of application; this is to say that Clementi's *dolce* indications in the staff are generally systematic throughout his keyboard works. Due to the prevalence of *dolce* indications in Clementi's works*,* almost any *dolce* we encounter will fuel an assumption about Clementi's habits in composition. Sandra Rosenblum has commented on this, stating that oftentimes *dolce* actually indicates a particular *piano* dynamic in Clementi's compositions.[72] Although Clementi's *dolce* indications do not offer as much depth of content as those in Beethoven's compositions, Clementi's

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[70] Koch describes *dolce* as follows: *Süß, sanft, oder mit Zärtlichkeit. Es gilt bei diesem Kunstworte das nemliche, was bei* amorevole *bemerkt worden ist, und zeigt einen sanften und lieblichen Vortrag an. Es erfordert aber auch zugleich einen etwas schwachen Ton, weil, wenn man jemanden etwas süßes . . . sagt, man mit sanftem und gezogenem Tone der Stimme spricht.* Heinrich Christoph Koch, *Musikalisches Lexikon* (Frankfurt am Main: August Hermann, 1802), f. 444.

[71] These cases include those we discussed in Part I: the first movement of the "Eroica" symphony (Op. 55), and the Allegro assai of Op. 2, no. 3.

[72] She writes: "some dynamic marks of the Classic period may be unfamiliar…*dolce* and *espressivo* were sometimes used instead of *p* to indicate a particularly expressive soft execution. When Clementi published the first English edition of Op. 7 in the early 1790s, he substituted *espressivo* several times, and *dolce* once, where *piano* had been in the Viennese edition of 1782." Sandra P. Rosenblum, *Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 60.

dolce indications are still useful for comparison. Clementi's keyboard works provide us with an interesting balance between expression, a *piano* dynamic and contrast that is, in part, achieved through the performance of the *dolce* indications. We can study this in Clementi's Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2,[73] where we find four different instances of *dolce* throughout the composition.

Figure 2.3 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, exposition, mm. 24-28.[74]



Figure 2.4 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, exposition, mm. 50-55.[75]



Figure 2.3 illustrates the secondary theme of the exposition, immediately after the medial caesura, entering at measure 26. The *dolce* most readily speaks to the pedal point on the new tonic exhibited in the melody, which is reminiscent of the first measures of the piece (it echoes a continuation of the principal theme).[76] The *dolce* also provides an additional expressive dimension for the theme and the slurred

[73] This sonata was composed prior to 1781, thus before the competition between Mozart and Clementi that was presided over by Emperor Joseph II in Vienna.
[74] Quoted from Muzio Clementi, *Klaviersonaten*, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission.
[75] Quoted from Muzio Clementi, *Klaviersonaten*, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission.
[76] The principal theme of the exposition bears a striking resemblance to the main theme of the Allegro from Mozart's *Die Zauberflöte* overture. Leon Plantinga discusses this, and the infamous encounter between Mozart and Clementi at the competition Emperor Joseph II staged in Vienna. Tyson draws on epistolary accounts from both Mozart and Clementi. Clementi insisted on printing an inscription for the sonata, "*a été jouée par l'Auteur devant S.M.I. L'Empereur Joseph II en 1781 Mozart étant présent"* in 1804 publications. See Leon Plantinga, *Clementi: his Life and Music* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 61-66.

accompaniment figure. *Dolce* often appears in this movement with repeated notes (see m. 4 with the continuation of the basic idea of the principal theme), and at other instances where we encounter the secondary theme.[77] *Dolce,* however, is not exclusive to the secondary theme or the continuation of the principal theme; we find it also attached to one of the "accessory ideas"[78] in the coda of the exposition, prior to the development (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.5 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. III, Rondo, Allegro assai, mm. 38-44.[79]



Figure 2.6 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. III, Rondo, Allegro assai, mm. 70-78.[80]



The first movement of Clementi's Op. 24, no. 2 is not the only movement with prevalent expressive word cues in the staff. In fact, we find *dolce* indications recurrent in all movements of the sonata. In the third movement, Rondo, Allegro assai, *dolce* is used less thematically than in the first movement. In the third movement, we consider the *dolce* indications as tools to sometimes introduce the main theme of the movement, as well the themes of subsidiary sections. In this way, *dolce* indications in the staff in the third movement offer expressive features in

[77] *Dolce* indications accompany the secondary theme at m. 37, m. 96, and m. 107. A *dolce* indication that relates to the continuation of the principal theme appears in the recapitulation at m. 82 (in the Henle edition [1978]).
[78] This is one of Hepokoski and Darcy's designations, see *Elements of Sonata* Theory, 17. *Dolce* can also be found in m. 128 with this figure.
[79] Quoted from Muzio Clementi, *Klaviersonaten*, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission.
[80] Quoted from Muzio Clementi, *Klaviersonaten*, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission.

virtuosic passages that would be otherwise static (e.g., Figure 2.5) or alert the interpreter to a consideration of contrast in order to oppose the stiff, rapid figures that predominate the Rondo sections (Figure 2.6).

Other examples of *dolce* indications in Clementi's keyboard works can be found in the following: Op. 25, no. 5 [1790], Piùttosto allegro con espressione (first movement)*;* Op. 34, no. 2 [1795], Largo e sostenuto (first movement); Op. 37, no. 2 [1798], *Allegro* (all movements); Op. 40, no. 1 [1802], all movements, with the exception of Allegro: Canone I^{mo} perpetuo; per moto retto.[81] On the one hand, this list is by no means exhaustive. On the other hand, this list does not aim to prove that Clementi's expressive word cues in the staff are restricted to pre-determined molds of application and practice. The examples from Clementi's compositions serve to oppose unintuitive applications of *dolce* in contrast to Beethoven's *dolce* indications that often challenge a *general image* or tradition in notation.

As a final contextual element of the *general image* we associate with *dolce* indications in the staff, and which helps to sustain the argument for Beethoven's innovation, we will examine a passage from the first movement of Franz Joseph Haydn's keyboard sonata in C-sharp Minor, Hob. XVI: 36 (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7 [Franz] Joseph Haydn, Sonata in C-sharp Minor, Hob. XVI: 36, mvmt. I, Moderato*,* exposition, mm. 18-24.[82]



[81] First editions of Clementi's sonatas appear in brackets, as stated by G. Henle Verlag.
[82] Quoted from Joseph Haydn, *Sämtliche Klaviersonaten,* Band 3, edited from the sources by Christa Landon, revised by Ulrich Leisinger, notes by Robert D. Levin, fingerings by Oswald Jonas, Wiener Urtext Edition, Schott / Universal Edition, UT 50258, Vienna, 2011 – with kind permission.

The *dolce* of interest is anticipated in the final figure of Figure 2.7, m. 21. The *dolce* indication in m. 22 highlights a warm and magnificent secondary theme motif that introduces the closing section of the exposition. It is not the primary secondary theme, but it is a lyrical theme that marks the beginning of the transition into the closing group of the exposition; it also momentarily holds the harmonic progression in the relative major before the darker *piano* passage at m. 24. The *dolce* of m. 22 appears to extend through to the next measure and should also apply to the rests at m. 23. The rests are infused with the *dolce* fragrance. The phrase is briefly interrupted by an exchange between the accompaniment and the melody; a short melodic tone rings out through the gaping rests in the accompaniment of m. 23. We contrast this effect to the sustained E_4 in m. 22 – the tonic of the relative major in the tenor voice. The sustained E_4 creates a sonorous soapbox wherefrom the lyrical *dolce* melody can speak its ideas and have them be heard. The chromaticism of the passage is not the most conducive to a *cantabile* direction and technique that is often associated with *dolce* indications. This *dolce,* moreover, grabs our attention; it seems counterintuitive that this theme is marked *dolce* in the first place, because this passage demands a thoughtful interpretation that takes into account the fact that the meaning of this theme is more opaque than that of the principal secondary theme. (Haydn may have wanted to call attention to this passage and for this reason added the *dolce* indication in m. 22.)

We should also give some thought to the technique that is needed to play this passage: the outer voices should match up – where the bass voice provides a pleasant, but distant parallel harmony – and should not sound as though they were divided by the tenor voice. Furthermore, of the examples we have explored, this *dolce* passage finds itself at home with Beethoven's more complex *dolce* passages; the depth of Haydn's passage is counterintuitive in a unique way as this theme is a motif (thus not of great [normative] structural importance to the sonata) and seems to come out of nowhere – the smooth phrase and rich harmonization is not reminiscent of earlier themes (and the parallel movement of the accompaniment, modeled after the melody, is unique to this motif). Whereas our earlier examples highlight Koch's sweet and soft tone (Mozart's K. 332 and Clementi's Op. 24, no. 2), Haydn's *dolce* is a different breed. Not only are *dolce* indications in the staff rare in Haydn's compositions, but this passage also calls for a depth of expression that juxtaposes a characteristic

brightness in the organization of the harmonized parts, with the memory of the dark first theme that looms large in our expectation for the resolution of the *dolce* figure. (The melancholic resolution of the *dolce* section is separated from the *dolce* passage by a *piano* indication [see Figure 2.7, m. 23]). Although it only applies to a short motif, Haydn's *dolce* is more akin to Beethoven's "Appassionata" *dolce*, even if Beethoven's indication (Figure 2.1) calls attention to other kinds of considerations (e.g., tessitura and accompaniment figures) and questions our very understanding of *dolce* as an instruction for performance and interpretation.

The *general image*, as associated with the understanding of a work as a whole, or the *general image* as understood as a vision of the "whole" of a compositional tradition, provides a springboard for interpretation. There is a strong subjective element involved in the construction of a *general image*, which is determined by contingencies (Gadamer suggests these contingencies are conditioned by individual prejudices). This information informs our perception of a composer, artist or author's work and the tradition they pertain to. As our experience with particular works becomes more elaborate in virtue of continued study, we are able to correct and enhance our previous judgments with relation to context, language area, and the work as a whole.

Particular aspects of a composition have the ability to change the way we evaluate certain composers, their works, and the rules of style that we may have thought to be stable or unchanging. According to Schleiermacher, rules of style pertain to the *formal element* of grammatical interpretation, which are rules about clauses, punctuation, and definitions. (In music we can determine these rules in a general way as *notation* and also *syntax*). To test this theory, Schleiermacher applies his hermeneutic theory to the New Testament. With reference to the New Testament, Schleiermacher argues that our difficulty in understanding a particular passage partially has to do with our *general image* of the whole. To complicate matters, if one of the fundamental formal elements of the text (e.g., punctuation) does not follow the rules of our general image, it will be difficult to reconcile one's general image with the work itself. Schleiermacher writes:

> As the punctuation was not originally there among the ancients, we must imagine the texts of antiquity completely without it, otherwise one is greatly influenced by the person who put in the punctuation as an explicator, and one

> becomes dependent on him and prejudiced. Systems of punctuation fluctuate anyway and are incomplete.[83]

The difficulty Schleiermacher describes refers to a problem directly related to textual interpretation (and not necessarily a problem for the interpretation of a musical score); nevertheless, the idea that a rule we take for granted (e.g., punctuation) has, in fact, changed over time reflects on how our interpretation of a passage may be erroneous. Many times our mistakes are a result of fluctuations of grammatical (or compositional) rules we previously thought to be static. This argument thereby presents a relevant aspect applicable to the idea of the whole: grammatical elements, or rules that seem insignificant to the overall notion of whole, can actually have a great deal of influence on the interpretation of the whole and a particular passage.

C. Grammar on the whole:
Seeing where the grammatical task of hermeneutics resonates with musical analysis

To make claims regarding the "grammar" of music presupposes that music is a language, and consequently a number of problematic debates follow this assertion. Notwithstanding, we argue that much of Schleiermacher's grammatical task of hermeneutics has resonance with the way we interpret music: on the one hand, this connection has to do with the interpretation of passages based on the established rules of a tradition; on the other hand, it is related to our identification of a particularly difficult passage that challenges established rules of analysis. Gadamer rightly points out with respect to "interpretation" (which is one of Gadamer's three defining elements of hermeneutics, along with "understanding" and "application"),[84] that

[83] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 49 (the editor notes this passage pertains to Schleiermacher's lecture from 1826).

[84] Gadamer's division of hermeneutics into understanding, interpretation, and application derives from the early subdivisions of hermeneutics previous to Schleiermacher's conception of it, "subtilitas intelligendi (understanding) and subtilitas explicandi (interpretation); pietism added a third element, subtilitas applicandi (application), as in J.J. Rambach." Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 306. Gadamer continues: "The hermeneutic problem acquired systematic importance because the romantics recognized the inner unity of intelligere and explicare. Interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation and hence interpretation is the explicit form of understanding. In accordance with this insight, interpretive language and concepts were recognized as belonging to the inner structure of understanding." Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 306. According to Gadamer, the marrying of interpretation and understanding led to the exclusion of "application" from romantic hermeneutics because it did not fall into the unity of understanding and interpretation. The notion of "application" is reinstated in understanding and the general activity of

musical interpretation utilizes hermeneutics in much the same fashion as legal, theological, and philosophical interpretation:

> But even the kind of interpretation that seems furthest from the kinds we have been considering, namely performative interpretation, as in the cases of music and drama – and they acquire their real existence only in being played – is scarcely an independent mode of interpretation. In it too there is a split between the cognitive and the normative function. No one can stage a play, read a poem, or perform a piece of music without understanding the original meaning of the text and presenting it in his reproduction and interpretation. But, similarly, no one will be able to make a performative interpretation without taking account of that other normative element – the stylistic values of one's own day – which, whenever a text is brought to sensory appearance, sets limits to the demand of a stylistically correct reproduction.[85]

In this passage, Gadamer touches on an element of musical analysis that is crucial to our current investigation of expressive word cues like *dolce*: performance and sounding quality of music have a critical role in the elaboration of meaning in music, and is the basis of musical expression. It is apropos of the cognitive-normative function in musical interpretation that we make the greatest progress regarding our understanding of a musical work and locating the difficulties in the grammatical task of hermeneutics.

Gadamer's division between cognitive and normative function in musical interpretation is one of the ways we are able to find similarity between musical interpretation and activities, such as reading, that also require interpretation. The "cognitive" element in Gadamer's passage reflects on the meaning we grasp in a musical work that is not easily rendered into a normative description. This is namely a conclusion (or conclusions) that we draw from a more "sensory" appreciation of a work, and touches on deeper meaning beyond technical, normative, and analytical devices. Gadamer illustrates the complexity of the cognitive component in understanding art, which builds on a classical theory that determines that art is an imitation of the divine and involves the recognition of meaning. To facilitate this argument in the context of *Truth and Method,* Gadamer elaborates on an example that involves a child who plays dress-up and wears a disguise. This child certainly does not want to be recognized as the person they are, but rather the thing or person they

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hermeneutics in Gadamer's theory; it also has an active role in Gadamer's thesis that performative interpretation (i.e., music and drama) also involves hermeneutic interpretation, see *Truth and Method*, 307ff.

[85] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 309.

are portraying in a dress-up game. As Gadamer writes, the child intends to represent something that "should exist, and if something is to be guessed, then this is it. We are supposed to recognize what it 'is.'"[86] But what is crucial for our understanding of the cognitive element is what comes next in Gadamer's argument. Gadamer continues:

> We have established that the cognitive import of imitation lies in recognition. But what is recognition? A more exact analysis of the phenomenon will make quite clear to us the ontological import of representation. . . . What we experience in a work of art and what invites our attention is how true it is – i.e. to what extent one knows and recognizes something and oneself.
>
> But we do not understand what recognition is in its profoundest nature if we only regard it as knowing something again that we know already – i.e., what is familiar is recognized again. The joy of recognition is rather the joy of knowing *more* than is already familiar. In recognition what we know emerges as if illuminated from all contingent and variable circumstances that condition it; it is grasped in its essence. It is known as something.[87]

In spite of the fact that Gadamer's conclusion is rooted in Platonism, which seems far from musical interpretation as we have been treating it here, the central topic circles back to find meaning beyond contingencies. This is to say that the meaning of the musical work, when we hear it, may inspire us to feel and understand something beyond the contingencies of the performance itself. Furthermore, this meaning will most likely point us beyond analytical rules that steer our understanding of meaning in a specific direction. This "cognitive recognition," in the case of music, comes from the feeling of strangeness that a certain passage inspires that cannot be answered or understood on the basis of normative rules or analysis. This feeling of strangeness may be the first step on the ladder of recognition of that passage and work's truth as *something* (the child who plays dress-up wishes to illustrate *something,* much in the same way a musical passage imparts meaning – *something* – for us to discover).

We certainly do not dismiss normative analysis in this context, which is constructed on a foundation of scholarship on analytical rules[88] as well as "the stylistic values of one's own day" (current scholarship on performance practice that elaborates on a general performance aesthetic or listener expectation). To exemplify

[86] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 113. Gadamer is inferring this conclusion from Aristotle's *Poetics* 4, 1448b16; see Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 113n18.
[87] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 113.
[88] This is seen most readily (and discussed earlier in this chapter) in the recent theoretical treatises on sonata form by Hepokoski and Darcy, and Caplin, respectively. Both works make space for discussions of innovations (and "deformations") with respect to form, harmony and thematic progress. These, albeit relevant and helpful documentations are, nevertheless, normatively bound to the particular works analyzed.

the dynamic between cognitive and normative interpretation, we shall reflect on how certain rules of composition dictate particular norms of interpretation and understanding, how to recognize that a particular work may challenge those norms, and how a performance or interpretation may be compromised due to a certain kind of blindness that often occurs in the study of a historical tradition.

The current aim is thereby not to equate music, or the "grammar" of music, with the grammar of language in order to find ways to apply Schleiermacher's grammatical task of hermeneutics to music. Furthermore, in the present discussion, we do not equate linguistic syntax and other specifically *linguistic* principles to music (as in "*musical syntax*") in order to assimilate musical syntax to linguistic syntax. Our aim is not to forge a theory on musical hermeneutics that requires an identification of parallel linguistic-like phenomena in music, which would implicitly defend that music is a language in a strict sense. The usefulness, however, of speaking of Schleiermacher's theory with relation to music lies precisely in the similarities Schleiermacher's theory has with methods and procedures musical analysis. When we refer to the concept of the *grammar of music*, this concept more or less single-handedly prompts a particular vision of syntax and inspires the idea that music is "a defective language that somehow had only a syntactic dimension and not a semantic one."[89] Kofi Agawu, who has written extensively on semiotics and the linguistic dimensions of music, elucidates this position: "while words have a more or less fixed lexical meaning, music's units… do not. Unlike verbal composition, therefore, musical composition cannot be translated."[90] We unearth the difficulty involved in determining the importance of musical syntax as a tool of theoretical analysis once we discover that musical syntax is, by and large, what much of musical analysis is built upon.[91] Scott Burnham addresses this problem by describing what musical syntax does for musical analysis, and also where it falls short:

> It is difficult to deny that musical syntax *is* to a large degree musical significance. This is not the same as insinuating that music is entirely self-referential and culturally isolated. It is rather to say that music's potential for

[89] Scott Burnham, "The Criticism of Analysis and the Analysis of Criticism" in *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer, 1992): 70-76, 71.
[90] Kofi Agawu, *Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26.
[91] Scott Burnham writes: "the emphasis on underlying voice-leading as the sinew of musical coherence is by now an inbred part of the way we talk about tonal music; few beginning level theory textbooks remain innocent to this fundamental supposition," Burnham, "The Criticism of Analysis," 71.

> signification is largely bound up with the space between a tacit, internalized sense of general style (what David Lewin has called the "sound universe") and the claims of an individual work. Prior to speculation about extramusical meanings, we as listeners put into play any number of (often subliminal) assumptions about musical syntax without which interpretative claims could not be made, assumptions which allow us to read a piece's "body language." These include the nature of musical closure, articulation, and motivic coherence. . . . But almost any hearing also engages aspects that register so immediately and obviously as to be beneath the notice of many analysts – things like scoring, dynamics, and tessitura. Clearly analysis needs a broader definition of what constitutes musical significance.[92]

Burnham's juxtaposition of an "internalized sense of general style" and "the claims of an individual work" recalls the formulation of Schleiermacher's *general image* of whole, *language area,* and the confrontation between *language area* and *general image* in the setting of a particular work. Burnham touches on meaning in music that is contingent upon certain rules of style versus Gadamer's cognitive recognition of meaning. It is important to maintain that Burnham is not in the business of discrediting an oppressive sense of musical syntax, but rather Burnham calls our attention to what our "(often subliminal) assumptions" (arguably the foundations of interpretation) rely upon. As Burnham outlines, this kind of understanding speaks to even the simplest components of music, e.g.: "the nature of musical closure, articulation and motivic coherence … scoring, dynamics and tessitura." Notwithstanding that some of these elements may lay outside the traditional parameters of musical analysis, our starting point is to look at what makes up the fundamental arguments of the "grammar" or "syntax" of music; we will then position these arguments before Schleiermacher's thoughts on the fundamental components of the grammatical task of hermeneutics, which will inform and deepen our understanding of a "musical syntax."

One of the most pertinent elements of Schleiermacher's discussion of language is the notion of fundamental rules that can be worked with to determine elucidatory conclusions about language and meaning; we consider these conclusions, when we relate them to the interpretation of music, as the building blocks for the generation of a musical work (i.e., notation, the rules of composition that are imposed on a creative impulse). When we explore Schleiermacher's discussion of definitions, cases, and other traditional elements of grammar, we find Schleiermacher generally strives to examine three avenues of thought: (1) what a rule or convention is *about*,

[92] Burnham, "The Criticism of Analysis," 72.

(2) how we can understand a specific issue in question by investigating the foundations of that rule, and (3) what a particular rule implies for understanding.

From this outline, we observe that Schleiermacher attempts to determine how understanding is a composite of insights; we can cite the different insights that constitute this composite to structure our understanding of meaning in a work. At the same time, the rules that are implied in this composite exhibit a deficiency with respect to determining musical significance because theories or pedagogical methods often lose sight of other critical tools such as a composer's style and unique use (or misuse) of compositional tools or conventions. (*Scoring*, *dynamics*, and *tessitura* contribute to the "immediate" and "obvious" perceptions and help form judgments about a work.)

In the end, Schleiermacher is no different in procedure from theoretical or pedagogical "rule-books" when he outlines the grammatical task of hermeneutics; in Schleiermacher's discussion of language, he limits most ideas to debates about rules that rely heavily on the relationships in language. He writes: "The language is a leading principle for every utterer, not only negatively, because he cannot get out of the domain of the thinking contained within it, but also positively, because it guides his combination via the relationships which lie in it."[93] The central idea behind Schleiermacher's notion of language materializes in this passage: language, in Schleiermacher's theory, reveals itself as a medium of expression for the individual who uses it, and draws intelligible *combinations* within that medium. Thus the "rules" in language are not only understood as definitions and delimiters of linguistic phenomena, but also address "the relationships which lie within [language]." The far-reaching concept of *rules in language* can be understood in the same light as the "formal rules" of music, theoretical-pedagogical norms in music, and the relationships between elements of music that theory seeks to name and organize.

In Schleiermacher's consideration of language, rules play a fundamental role in grammar and language as a whole. Importantly, we recognize these rules fall short of a deeper understanding of a passage when they are used on their own to explicate meaning:

> Every single language could perhaps be learned via rules, and what can be learned in this way is mechanism. Art is that for which there admittedly are

[93] Schleiermacher, "General Hermeneutics," in *Hermeneutics*, 227-268, 229, point 15.1.

> rules, but the combinatory application of these rules cannot in turn be rule-bound. This is how it is with this double construction [of grammatical and technical interpretation] and with the interpenetration of both tasks.[94]

In this discussion, we recognize that Schleiermacher sets *art* against a general notion of *language*. This accentuates the position that art, and in our case music, has rules in the same sense as (spoken or written) language; only with art, its rules are unable to account for the way these rules are applied. In the juxtaposition of art and mechanism, we realize that works of art in any medium require reflection beyond the formal rules applied in their creation. Schleiermacher's "mechanism" inspires us to imagine a machine that can analyze a musical wok, or a painting, or a poem, and single out meaning through comparisons to a programmed set of rules. Art demands a human factor, an individual who can create a work of music, following some rules and breaking others, in an effort to put forward a message. This message, or deeper content, may be a commentary on these formal rules, or express an idea beyond the confines of that medium. For this reason, an analysis of formal properties and rules is helpful to determine a basic vocabulary and style. But to reflect on the deeper questions of a composition, our consideration of the material should go beyond the formal attributes, and style, of that material.

[94] Schleiermacher, "General Hermeneutics," *Hermeneutics*, 229, point 16.

Concluding remarks on the grammatical task of hermeneutics

To conclude this discussion of Schleiermacher's grammatical task of hermeneutics, we will consider the relation between rules in musical analysis and musical significance from the standpoint of limitation and consequence. This limitation is namely the restraint rule-based vocabulary in critical discourse about meaning imposes on thinking in a critical way "outside of the box." Scott Burnham describes this problem in the following way:

> Critical engagement with the materiality of music is mediated by a number of standard pedagogical generalizations about musical components and their behavior: dominants go to tonics, first themes go to second themes, etc. The names themselves of these components often suggest interpretive directions – think of the "half" cadence or the "deceptive" cadence.[95]

Burnham's depiction of this problem of musical interpretation illustrates an affinity to Schleiermacher's opinion that understanding of language must go beyond the study of rules (as is particularly evident in certain activities, e.g. philology). In the case of musical analysis, relationships within a particular work of music are generally bound to vocabulary (e.g. deceptive cadence), and this vocabulary already implies a normative analytical apparatus (where the definitions of certain critical terms are more restrictive than others). There is a consequence to relying wholly on these terms (and structures) of composition to elucidate meaning: we are restricted, in our interpretation, to the "interpretative direction" that the terms themselves inherently dictate (e.g. the "deceptive" of "deceptive cadence"), which may not fully or correctly grasp the meaning of a passage.[96] Importantly, the "obvious" or "immediate" elements that present themselves as fundamental to a work's significance (e.g. *tessitura*, *scoring*) may fall by the wayside as the structure and interpretation implied by critical vocabulary often takes precedence. We find Burnham makes an appeal for

[95] Burnham, "The Criticism of Analysis," 75.

[96] This process recalls an example in Schleiermacher's discussion of the New Testament regarding dictionaries and the translation of words, where a commentator may suggest a specific definition for a particular word when we encounter it in the context of a specific text. This is the case of figurative expressions as in Schleiermacher's example of the word "swarm" [*Schwarm*]. In Greek, "swarm," when used figuratively, also has additional implications related to bees ["the desire to attack and to sting"] (Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 252). Further, the understanding of a phrase must take into account literal and metaphorical meanings. Schleiermacher exemplifies this with the phrase "king of the beasts = lion." He writes: "the lion does not rule, but 'king' does not therefore mean one who tears others apart according to the law of the stronger," *Hermeneutics,* 34.

an understanding of musical meaning that refutes the precedence of critical and analytical interpretation. As Burnham states (cited at length above): "clearly analysis needs a broader definition of what constitutes musical significance."[97]

To combat the analytical directions, and flesh out the "broader definition" as Burnham suggests, we should look precisely at the elements considered "obvious" and "immediate" in the context of a larger notion of whole and *language area*. This task will attempt to reverse a process of interpretation that recognizes certain sonorous aspects, but catalogues them as insignificant details of larger analytical or historical claims. Our investigation, with the help of hermeneutics, aims to take these components out of the woodwork and show how they grant the possibility of understanding a composition as an object of art with deeper meaning. In our next step, we will reconcile these elements with an understanding of music as a medium through which a composer expresses ideas. This will lead to a discussion of the way in which particulars (e.g. a musical passage, or an article of notation), and a work as a whole, can contribute toward the expression of thoughts and ideas through lens of Schleiermacher's psychological/technical task of hermeneutics.

[97] Burnham, "The Criticism of Analysis," 71.

Chapter 2:

The psychological/technical task

The psychological/technical task of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is designed to interact and inform the grammatical task. These two tasks are dependent upon one another, although each task has certain characteristic components. As the grammatical task is distinguished by rules and traditions in composition, the psychological/technical task focuses more heavily on the individual who created the work. In Chapter 2, we will address the psychological/technical task through a discussion of the following: (A) genius, individuality, and talent as the general focus of the psychological/technical task; (B) the methods Schleiermacher suggests for pinning down a description and finding evidence of genius and individuality – these are namely the divinatory method, comparative method, and *intuition* – which we will examine with relation to Beethoven's Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 ("Appassionata") and the *dolce* indication for the exposition's second group; (C) the consideration of a composition as a representation of a "life-moment," which encompasses the composer's decision to create, and we will describe this by way of external and internal reflections using Beethoven's Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, "Das Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" (The Farewell) as a case study; (D) the thoughts and ideas that a composition expresses as the principal goal of the psychological/technical task; (E) a more detailed consideration of secondary thoughts and ideas in a composition through an examination of Beethoven's Sonata in C Minor, Op. 13, "Grande Sonata *Pathétique.*" These two final points, on the thoughts and ideas, elaborate on the way we can look beyond narrative descriptions as a source of meaning in music. We will defend Schleiermacher's psychological/technical task of hermeneutics as a method to propel understanding a musical work toward universals and deeper meaning, rather than resort to temporal-bound descriptions for elucidation.

A. Genius

> The real philologists and connoisseurs of the art of discourse did not work on hermeneutics, but were satisfied with praxis.

> They seek to reduce the area of hermeneutics via more precise determination of the use of language and by the production of historical apparatuses. What is left is genius, which is not helped by analysis.[98]

With this statement, Schleiermacher defends his theory of hermeneutics against what he determines to be the method of philologists. He does not discredit philology altogether, but recognizes that it serves the part of the hermeneutics that does not treat "genius" and "talent."[99] The method of philology in question comes from a tradition of grammatical rules, structure, practical instruction, and historical study. The "praxis" of their method is one that reduces obscurities, complexities, or opaque passages to a pragmatic system of rules in grammar; this subsequently nullifies the originality and innovation of a work with the imposition of certain norms and catalogued exceptions. Schleiermacher believes that *genius* escapes this kind of "praxis."[100] The concept of *genius* in this case amalgamates different examples of originality and talent in a work of art. One example of this is the way an author or composer applies rules (and also breaks them) in order to create a work of art that exhibits a deeper level of meaning.

The *genius* that escapes grammatical interpretation is one of the fundamental constituents of the psychological/technical task of hermeneutics: it is a driving force behind the elaboration and expression of thoughts in an artwork. A great musical work (or a complex passage) can inspire a sense of awe in the interpreter. This sense of awe can elicit an *intuition*[101] that leads the interpreter to the element of *genius*. In

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[98] Schleiermacher, "General Hermeneutics," *Hermeneutics,* 228. Schleiermacher ends this sentence with a parenthetical remark, "(See Wolf)," referring to his predecessor Fr. August Wolf.

[99] Cf. Schleiermacher, "General Hermeneutics," *Hermeneutics*, 228.

[100] It is presumed that Schleiermacher understands "genius" much in the same way as Immanuel Kant. See Kant's determination of genius: "First, that it is a talent for art, not for science, in which rules that are distinctly cognized must come first and determine the procedure in it; second, that, as a talent for art, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product, as an end, hence understanding, but also representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the presentation of this concept, hence a relation of the imagination to the understanding; third, that it displays itself not so much in the execution of the proposed end in the presentation of a determinate concept as in the exposition or the expression of aesthetic ideas, which contain a rich material for that aim, hence the imagination, in its freedom from all guidance by rules, is nevertheless represented as purposive for the presentation of the given concept; finally, fourth, that the unsought and unintentional subjective purposiveness in the free correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding presupposes a proportion and disposition of this faculty that cannot be produced by any following of rules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, but that only the nature of the subject can produce," Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 195, cf. §46-49.

[101] *Intuition* in this context follows Schleiermacher's conception of it, as outlined in *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers* [*Über die Religion: reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*], 1799. This concept will be explored in detail in Chapter 2, section B: Methods.

order to bridge the gap between *genius* and the stringency of philological praxis, Schleiermacher develops exercises and determinations within the psychological/technical task that have a specific aim: to determine thoughts in a composition or conversation.

Schleiermacher's psychological/technical task as such speaks to the way he finds thought and *genius* represented in different mediums. For example, Schleiermacher describes a conversation as a "free play of thoughts," an exchange of ideas that are improvised in the moment of discussion. According to Schleiermacher's theory, only a *purely psychological* task is required to understand the thoughts and ideas in a conversation. The *purely psychological* applies to this context because the interlocutors engaged in conversation put their respective thoughts forward without an explicit aim to satisfy the creation of an artistic object (e.g. a poem). In our current study of music, we are more interested in the *technical* component of the psychological/technical task. We apply Schleiermacher's specifically *technical* task when we evaluate works that have a "completed structure of thoughts… a determinate aim to which everything relates, one thought determines the other with necessity… consciousness of a specific progress towards a goal predominates, the result is intentional, methodical, technical."[102] Our study of the methodology of the psychological/technical task of hermeneutics will be directed at what constitutes a "completed structure of thoughts" and a "determinate aim to which everything relates."[103]

B. Methods

B1. Divinatory versus comparative methods; *intuition*

The divinatory method of the psychological task is characteristic of Schleiermacher's philosophy; it is also one of the factors, however, that skeptics use to cast doubt on Schleiermacher's hermeneutics as a whole. Schleiermacher presents

[102] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics* 102, cf. 101-2. This text is from Schleiermacher's lecture of 1832. This difference between "purely psychological" and "technical" activities will be addressed in more detail below, in the subsection D1 on meditation and composition.
[103] The psychological/technical task of hermeneutics will be shortened to "psychological task" for brevity, unless otherwise noted.

the divinatory method, alongside the comparative method, as complementary activities that are utilized to understand the individual whose work is being studied:

> The *divinatory* method is the one in which one, so to speak, transforms oneself into the other person and tries to understand the individual element directly. The *comparative* method first of all posits the person to be understood as something universal and then finds the individual aspect by comparison with other things included under the same universal. . . . Both may not be separated from each other. For divination only receives its certainty via confirmatory comparison, because without this it can always be incredible [*fantastisch*]. But the comparative method does not provide any unity. The universal and the particular must penetrate each other and this always only happens via divination.[104]

The primary difficulty of the divinatory method is to understand what Schleiermacher means when he says that one should "transform oneself into the other person" (where the "other person" is the creator of the work in question). Schleiermacher held this notion close to his theory; we find that, despite our current reservations about such a practice, this method undoubtedly reflects a spirit of investigation and understanding characteristic of Schleiermacher's time.[105] In the philosophy of early Romanticism, there is a trend of self-reflection and congeniality with respect to how we understand what is outside ourselves, and the I that has an inclination toward mysticism and speculation.[106] Friedrich Schlegel describes this in the "Athenaeum Fragments":

> To transport oneself arbitrarily now into this, now into that sphere, as if into another world, not merely with one's reason and imagination, but with one's whole soul; to freely relinquish first one and then another part of one's being, and confine oneself entirely to a third; to seek and find now in this, now in that individual the be-all and end-all of existence, and intentionally forget everyone else: of this only a mind is capable that contains within itself simultaneously a plurality of minds and a whole system of persons, and in whose inner being the universe which, as they say, should germinate in every monad, has grown to fullness and maturity.[107]

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[104] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 92.

[105] Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher [1768-1834].

[106] Frederick Beiser discusses the romantic poets' attempt to "revive" a "lost unity with ourselves, with nature and with others" that led to a *remystification* of the world and the early Romantics' identification with mysticism. Beiser argues that this can be found in Novalis, Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schlegel, and Schelling. See Frederick C. Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative: the Concept of Early German Romanticism* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), 102.

[107] Friedrich Schlegel, "Athenaeum Fragments," fragment 121, in *Friedrich Schlegel's* Lucinde *and the Fragments,* trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), 161-240, 177. We observe a similar thought in Novalis and the notion of *magical idealism.* Novalis writes: "The principle of the *I* is, *as it were*, the genuine and communal principle, the *liberal* and universal principle—it is a unity that is without *boundary* or determination. On the contrary, it makes all determinations possible and fixed—and gives them absolute coherence and meaning. Selfhood, as the ground of constancy in change, is the ground of all *cognition*—also the principle of greatest *multiplicity*—(You). (Instead of Non-I–You.) Commonality and particularity. Everything can be I and is I or should be I" (*The*

This supreme function of an individual's mind – to "travel" into the mind of another, to have the complexity of the universe within one's own mind that is a "plurality of minds" – is specular to Schleiermacher's divinatory method where one "transforms into the other person" without leaving one's own body and mind. Schlegel also describes understanding from a basic standpoint as a highly reflective activity, where understanding, in the end, is a highly subjective activity: "the mind understands something only insofar as it absorbs it like a seed into itself, nurtures it, and lets it grow into blossom and fruit."[108] This fragment outlines how knowledge from the outside (of the Other) is translated into our mind, which we subsequently reflect on in a highly subjective way; we let ideas from the outside grow within our mind, as though the mind were the soil of the earth.

Many scholars object to the highly subjective and speculative nature of the divinatory method in Schleiermacher's theory. Hermeneutics since Schleiermacher has attempted to overcome the divination problem. In order to maintain many of Schleiermacher's other hermeneutic principles, scholars (namely Wilhelm Dilthey and Gadamer[109]) refine general concepts that lay behind the divinatory method, e.g. empathy, congeniality, and what it is to understand something outside ourselves.[110]

Universal Brouillon, §820). See Novalis, "The Universal Brouillon" in *Theory as Practice: a Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings*, ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 226-240, 238.

[108] "Ideas," fragment 5, in *Friedrich Schlegel's* Lucinde *and the Fragments,* trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), 241-256, 241.

[109] Gadamer brings to our attention what he believes to be certain limitations of Schleiermacher's method. Gadamer describes how we understand the past and a historical individual via *horizons* where we enter into an exchange between ourselves, our understanding of the composer or author's tradition, and back to ourselves again to substantiate meaning; we imagine the Other by comparison with our understanding of ourselves, our way of thinking, our beliefs, and education; however, the information we have regarding the period we are studying and the ideas present in culture at that time, as well as historical artifacts that have been left behind (journal entries, letters, etc.) inform our understanding of a specific tradition and help us to locate a general idea of the direction of thought in a composition. In this way we do not understand or create within ourselves an identical copy of the composer's mind via mysticism, but in a methodical exercise of empathy, and congeniality, through our own perceptions and experiences we find what is of value within the context of tradition and historical knowledge in a practice of guesswork and speculation.

[110] In the evolution of hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey [1833-1911] addresses the problem found in Schleiermacher's *divination* method by describing what it is that we call "knowing" another person. Dilthey finds that our understanding of other people comes from our sense perception of isolated events, actions, and other outside happenings and the meaningful reconstruction [*Nachbildung*] of these based on "our own sense of life." He writes that "the problem is: how can one quite individually structured consciousness bring an alien individuality of a completely different type to objective knowledge through such a construction?" Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics [1900]," trans. Frederic Jameson, *New Literary History*, Vol. 3, No. 2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972): 229-244, 231. This calls into question what we want to call "objective knowledge," or knowing another person. Following Dilthey's construct, "to know" a composer from a completely different historical era cannot

Schleiermacher recognized potential shortcomings of the divinatory method and stated early on that it could produce "incredible" or "fantastic" interpretations. Schleiermacher, in fact, makes it quite clear that statements solely founded on this method are not accurate.[111] For Schleiermacher, interpretation must be built upon a synthesis of critical speculation and considerations of positive knowledge[112] related to the work in question.

We are able to grasp something fundamental about this process when we consider Schleiermacher's notion of the "individuality of the composition."[113] The "individuality of the composition" is ambiguous in Schleiermacher's text and seems to point to the individuality of the author as represented in the text. We see this "individuality" as a series of characteristics an artist brings to the object they created, which is something like thumbprints impressed on the fabric of the work.[114] The study of "individuality" in this context imposes a slight dissimilarity between (1) the author as an individual and (2) the individuality of the composition where the composition exposes, reveals, and exemplifies the individuality of the author but does not address it as a whole. When we apply this idea to our study of the *dolce* passages in Beethoven's Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata," we try to understand (1) the "individual element" or *genius* that defines Beethoven as an individual; (2) what of the "genius of Beethoven" can be found in Beethoven's "Appassionata" sonata; and (3) what is "individual" of that work (that necessarily accentuates Beethoven's individuality).

Schleiermacher considers that the notion of *intuition* as a faculty is important for hermeneutics as a whole, specifically in the task of identifying individuality. Although presented in opposition to the comparative method, *intuition* is not

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be understood as objective knowledge, but as a hypothesis based on a hybrid of objective (historical) and subjective (e.g. personal experience) knowledge.

[111] See Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 92. An interpretation only based on the divinatory method would be seen as *fantastich.*

[112] Often times the evidence, or artifacts, which constitute positive knowledge also require hermeneutic interpretation. The kinds of material included are historical objects or contemporary commentaries about the author or composer's life: e.g., diaries, memoirs, contemporary works by those in the author or composer's circle, historical information about the time period, etc.

[113] The text we refer to is most likely derived from lecture notes of 1805, which the editor includes in Schleiermacher's explanation of the psychological method. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 100.

[114] The "individuality" is how the final products of two different artists, who create separate works based on the same idea or content, can exhibit wholly different individualities. This is decidedly based on the differences between the ways in which the content is represented – and these differences will hint at the artists' individuality.

understood as having the same constitution as the *divinatory* method. Schleiermacher presents *intuition*, in this case *immediate intuition*, in the following way:

> Immediate intuition and comparison with others…immediate intuition does not get to what is mediated; comparison never gets to true individuality. One must unite them with each other via the relationship to the totality of the possible…seek this totality of the possible, which can only result from intelligent comparison of the particulars.[115]

According to Schleiermacher's instructions, we find that we need both *intuition* and comparison in order to accurately grasp the individuality of the author or individuality of the composition. In *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (*Über die Religion: reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* [1799]), Schleiermacher describes the concept of *intuition* in more detail: "Intuition is and always remains something individual, set apart, the immediate perception."[116] Schleiermacher's addition of the term "immediate" to "immediate intuition" in the discussion of accentuates the connection *intuition* has with "immediate perception" in *On Religion*. The immediate is one of the integral features of *intuition*, which detaches *intuition* from reflection; the immediate is thus the cornerstone of the identity of *intuition* as a faculty. And the common denominator for *intuition* and *divination* is subjectivity. *Divination* works from a position within the individual and operates with reference to the individual. (This sets it apart from comparison, which operates in our reflection on positive knowledge such as objects, events, and facts that are "outside" the individual.) For the purpose of hermeneutics, *divination* also draws on content from "outside" the individual to understand the individual who created a particular work. Schleiermacher resolves the paradoxical notion of understanding another person, what is "outside," with an internal comparison characteristic of *divination* that calls comparison and reflection into play. Schleiermacher contends that each person "has a receptivity for all other people. But this itself seems only to rest on the fact that everyone carries a minimum of everyone else within themselves, and *divination* is consequently excited by comparison with oneself."[117] The comparison that occurs within the divinatory method is what sets it apart from *intuition*. This divinatory

[115] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 100.
[116] Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultural Despisers,* trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 105; also, by way of highlighting a division between reflection and intuition, Schleiermacher states: "Religion's essence is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling," *On Religion,* 102.
[117] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, 93. We locate a similar idea in F. Schlegel, "Athenaeum Fragments," fragment 121, and Novalis, *The Universal Brouillon*, §820.

comparison balances the seemingly endless possibilities within interpretation of this kind, as any ground gained via the divinatory method must be recognized as derived from an imprecise science akin to empathy. What we grasp by this method is not void of value, but rather suggests directions for interpretation. On the one hand, *divination* occupies a unique position of hierarchy with respect to *intuition* and perception; it incorporates a complex undertaking that involves empathy and comparison. On the other hand, *intuition*, elemental for one to identify what is strange or unique in a work, serves a foundational purpose in hermeneutic activity; it is a brute, unmediated feeling that suggests a direction for interpretation. *Intuition* sets the divinatory and comparative methods in motion.

B2. *Intuition* and similarity that leads to approximation

Much like intuition, another crucial element of the psychological task (and hermeneutics as a whole) is approximation. When describing both grammatical and technical interpretation,[118] Schleiermacher writes:

> Grammatically, one cannot summarise individuality in a concept, it wants rather to be intuited. In the same way technically. There can be no concept of style. Grammatically, the complete understanding of the language would only be the understanding of the centre. Technically the style is, in the same way, only understood by the most complete understanding of the character. But in both cases this is inaccessible and can only be reached by approximation.[119]

In this sense we see how the grammatical and technical tasks of hermeneutics are very similar in their methods; they assist each other. In the passage cited above, Schleiermacher reflects on *intuition* in the elaboration of the grammatical task of hermeneutics – individuality should become apparent through the way a work is constructed and presented (through an artistic application of rules of composition), and this appearance should become known to us by our *intuition*. Schleiermacher depicts this in more detail:

> There are more simple isolated expressions (more simple, i.e., for which one does not first need a technical interpretation, but which are just

[118] In this context, Schleiermacher explores the technical component of the psychological/technical task of hermeneutics and differentiates it from the grammatical task.
[119] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 96.

> grammatically comprehensible), via these one obtains the first general intuition of individuality. This makes more difficult expressions comprehensible which in turn complete the intuition.[120]

Schleiermacher describes two different kinds of expressions (that we can also understand as musical passages, phrases, etc.): (1) simple, isolated expressions and (2) more difficult expressions. According to Schleiermacher, even simple, isolated expressions will exhibit some degree of individuality irrespective of its simplicity (because we understand the passage almost entirely through the grammatical task and our *general image* of the whole). These simple passages will offer our "first general intuition of individuality." The "first general intuition of individuality" will be a useful for understanding more difficult passages because the more difficult passage will confirm, or "complete," this intuition.[121]

We will examine the dichotomy between simple, isolated passages and more difficult passages with reference to Beethoven's "Appassionata" sonata. Like most musical compositions, there are elements in this sonata that are readily accessible and create no apparent problems for interpretation. One example of this is in the first measures of the main theme (Figure 2.8). We will call this a "simple, isolated passage," in Schleiermacher's vocabulary. The difficulty to understanding (and determine the meaning of) the *dolce* passages in the first movement can be felt when we compare one *dolce* passage to a "simple" isolated passage in the first bars of the ascending main theme. We appreciate the slur that expands over main theme that presents it as a unit; we grasp the *pianissimo* dynamic, which proposes a subtle ascending triad in the minor mode.[122] A deep, calculated rhythmic pulse gives this theme the impression of a balanced phrase.[123]

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[120] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 96.

[121] See also where Schleiermacher describes the circumstances where grammatical interpretation requires technical interpretation: "if one says: grammatical interpretation itself needs technical interpretation, this is only for the first temporary grasping of the context in the mind, which precedes all understanding of something individual and particular as such," Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 96.

[122] Czerny notes the difficulty involved in performing this theme because Beethoven, it would seem, neglected to write in an E-natural (in the third full measure), which establishes the shift in tonality to C major; the theme's initial ascension (mm. 0-2), nevertheless, is what is of interest to us. See Barry Cooper, "Commentaries," in *Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward*, Volume III (London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 2007), 6; and Czerny, *On the Proper Performance of all Beethoven's Works for the Piano*, ed. Paul Badura-Skoda ([Vienna]: Universal Edition, 1970), 14.

[123] András Schiff speaks about how he counts the rhythmic parts of this passage by acknowledging the divisions of each beat, which grants the theme a structured sound. The kind of counting Schiff suggests restrains the theme from becoming a freely moving gesture with tempo rubato. Schiff addresses this

Figure 2.8 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata," mvmt. I, Allegro assai, exposition, mm. 0-3.[124]



Figure 2.9 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata," mvmt. I, Allegro assai, recapitulation, mm. 173-178.[125]



When we follow Schleiermacher's method, we compare this "simple, isolated passage" (Figure 2.8) to a more difficult passage (Figure 2.9) in the recapitulation of the "Appassionata." These two passages have a sonorous similarity, between the first

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sonata from the perspective of a performer, in his lecture on the same, see "Part Six: from 'Appassionata' and 'Les Adieux' / Part 2. Sonata in F minor, opus 57, no. 23 ('Appassionata')." http://audio.theguardian.tv/sys-audio/Arts/Culture/2006/12/05/02_23fminop57.mp3 (accessed February 19, 2016).

[124] Ludwig van Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

[125] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

theme and the second theme that comes especially to the fore in the recapitulation. This similarity is most prominently displayed in the sounding quality (principally the low register), rhythmic organization, and melodic contour. The uniqueness of the *dolce* passage (Figure 2.9) stands out in comparison with its relatively transparent neighbor (Figure 2.8), as the strangeness of the *dolce* second theme does not fade when we make the comparison. The similarity between these themes suggests their affinity with one another, even when one has a problematic *dolce* applied to it.

Figure 2.10 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata," mvmt. I, Allegro assai, recapitulation, mm. 134-139.[126]



In this part of the recapitulation (Figure 2.10), the passage combines the main theme (Figure 2.8) with the least problematic aspect of the second theme – a pedal point (see Figure 2.9). Although the pedal point does not serve a melodic purpose, it remains an integral aspect of the second theme; the pedal point is the device that introduces the content of the second group. Importantly, this passage (Figure 2.10) leaves out the *dolce* indication, or the characteristic triad figure of the second group accompaniment. This passage in the recapitulation demonstrates a consonance between elements of the first group (the main theme) and the second group (the pedal point), but is avoids the most complex element of the second group – its accompaniment. The tri-fold comparison of a simple isolated passage (Figure 2.8), a complex passage (Figure 2.9), and a passage that combines elements of the two (Figure 2.10) highlights the difficulty of one (Figure 2.9), and the transparency of the other (Figure 2.8).

[126] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

This exercise of determining similarities built on *intuition* is an effort of approximation. We systematically follow *intuition,* and similarities between passages, to crystallize certain aspects of our *intuition* about a work. The merit of the exercise is that it leads to intelligible interpretation and insight by drawing on what is both familiar and unfamiliar. We find it is in this direction that we determine individuality via approximation. In this case, we have briefly described the unique *dolce* of the second group accompaniment and the similarity between the first and second themes of the "Appassionata." Our *intuition* that this *dolce* is difficult to understand, versus the simplicity of the lucid first theme, is strengthened through comparison and approximation of content from one passage to another.

B3. Necessity and the identification of individuality

To say whether a certain hermeneutic exercise is relevant for understanding a particular artwork is a subjective decision; for this reason we see hermeneutics not as a science, but as an art (as Schleiermacher himself asserts).

The art of hermeneutics comes into play when we consider that the key to understanding lies in the cognitive import of recognition.[127] There is no rule that says why a certain aspect of a composition shows individuality; there is no rule about the necessity of this very individuality. We have to recognize these conditions on our own. Schleiermacher describes an aspect of identifying necessity in the following manner: "One might say that what can be understood grammatically could not be good at also making individuality visible. But it [individuality] can be understood grammatically, though its necessity cannot be comprehended."[128] In this way, we see the importance of psychological interpretation for hermeneutic interpretation and how content, which speaks to individuality, does not have specific rules that govern how we understand it. When we refer to Figure 2.9 from the "Appassionata" sonata, we recognize the individuality that is contained in the strangeness of the second theme and accompaniment marked *dolce*. However, to determine what this passage means as part of Beethoven's creation, as something that illustrates Beethoven's individuality

[127] This is a variation of one of Gadamer's points (discussed in Part II, Chapter 1 of this thesis). See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 113.
[128] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 96.

as a composer, and the product of a decision or thought, we should speak of the necessity of these aspects for understanding the work as a whole.

C. External circumstances, experience, and a composer's *life-moment* as expressed in compositions

Biography often goes hand-in-hand with the study of an artist's work as an authoritative source of meaning. Schleiermacher's hermeneutics took into account the idea of biography with the notion that a work of art represents a decision or *life-moment*. In order to understand a particular *life-moment,* Schleiermacher contended that we should consider both "external circumstances" and "internal circumstances."[129] In the following section, we will argue for a modified version of the concept of *life-moment* through the lens of Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of experience [*Erlebnis*]. From this platform, we will investigate how Ludwig van Beethoven's Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, "*Lebewohl"* or "*Les Adieux*" [The Farewell], exemplifies both "external" and "internal" aspects of experience. We will conclude this section by outlining four distinct points related to meaning in the sonata, and how this meaning can offer insight into current experiences of alienation, expectation, and the expression of thought through music.

C1. Hermeneutics – *Life-moment* and Experience [*Erlebnis*]

According to Schleiermacher's theory, a work will reflect ideas and thoughts that are relevant to a *life-moment*. Schleiermacher asks: "In what circumstances did the author come to their decision, from the question what does this decision mean in them, or what particular value does it have in relation to the totality of their life?"[130] From this statement, we should be able to observe the material representation of the composer's internalization of circumstances and the decisions behind a particular work. Knowledge of a composer's biography, where a particular work is placed in a biographical continuum, is part of what enables us to articulate "external

[129] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 108.
[130] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 108. Translation slightly modified.

circumstances." The internalization of "external circumstances" is at the heart of experience; it will lead interpretation toward uncovering meaning that is less transparent and will articulate Gadamer's concept of experience [*Erlebnis*].

The musical example we will be commenting on specifically in this section is Beethoven's Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, "*Lebewohl"* or "*Les Adieux*" [The Farewell]. The "external circumstances" behind this sonata are infamous through anecdotes compiled in biographies about Beethoven. These accounts relate that Beethoven was inspired to compose the sonata upon being informed that his close friend, the Archduke Rudolph [1788-1831], would be leaving Vienna due to the fact that the French invaded Austria in April 1809. Barry Cooper recounts: "Beethoven was deeply affected by Rudolph's imminent departure, and to mark the occasion he quickly wrote a personal farewell in the form of a sonata movement, towards the end of April."[131] These sketches, found in the *Landsberg 5* sketchbook,[132] soon became what we now know as the *Lebewohl* sonata. The "external circumstances" of the French invasion and the Archduke's departure are extremely insightful for certain aspects of the sonata, such as the movement headings: *Das Lebe Wohl* [The Farewell]: Vienna, 4 May 1809 on the departure of His Imperial Highness the esteemed Archduke Rudolph; *Abwesenheit* [Absence]; *Das Wiedersehn* [The Return]: The arrival of His Imperial Highness the esteemed Archduke Rudolph, 30 January 1810). These are uncommonly descriptive for Beethoven's finished compositions and provide a first step for interpretation as they support what biographers have written regarding events surrounding Beethoven's life, as well as the departure and return of the Archduke Rudolph. To move beyond "external circumstances" as the only indicators of meaning, we should consider the internalization of these circumstances and how Beethoven expressed his understanding of these experiences in the sonata. Gadamer provides a steppingstone to this goal by articulating the concept of *Erlebnis* [experience] in the context of hermeneutics.

When considering aesthetics in the context of hermeneutic theory, Gadamer writes how the concept of *Erlebnis* – that incorporates the importance of biography from Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory – only became common in discourse about

[131] Barry Cooper, "Commentaries," in *Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward*, Volume III (London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 2007), 19.
[132] See Douglas Johnson, Alan Tyson, and Robert Winter, *The Beethoven Sketchbooks: History, Reconstruction, Inventory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 188-93.

meaning in the 1870's.[133] *Erlebnis* fuses both the notion of external circumstances and the internalization of those circumstances into one concept. As Gadamer describes, *Erlebnis* is derived from the verb *erleben*, which means "to be alive while something happens. Thus the word suggests the immediacy with which something real is grasped."[134] This verb capitalizes on the immediacy of one's personal experiences: "what is experienced is always what one has experienced oneself."[135] This also resonates with Schleiermacher's concept of a *life-moment*, where an artist makes a decision to create in the space of the immediate. The second meaning that we find behind the word *Erlebnis* is when we consider *erleben* in the form "*das Erlebte,*" which means "the permanent content of what is experienced."[136] This notion expresses how what is experienced has an effect on the person who experiences it, and this permanent content in the mind can be the source for future works of art. For Gadamer, biography is where these two meanings collide to form the term *Erlebnis*:

> The essence of biography, especially nineteenth-century biographies of artists and poets, is to understand the works from the life. Their achievement consists precisely in mediating between the two meanings that we have distinguished in the word "Erlebnis" and in seeing these meanings as a productive union: something becomes an "experience" not only insofar as it is experienced, but insofar as its being experienced makes a special impression that gives it lasting importance. An "experience" of this kind acquires a wholly new status when it is expressed in art.[137]

From Gadamer's perspective on the essence of biography, we can find meaning in works of music that can be traced back to a composer's experience: external circumstances that are felt in an immediate way (e.g. the French invasion of Austria), and the composer's reflection on the "special impression" of those external circumstances through their internalization in the composer's memory. At this point, it would appear that musical meaning follows a narrative derived from historical fact and psychological conjecture. Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics, however, restricts such a limited view of meaning; the essence of meaning in art is the way in which it represents something absolute and infinite: "every act, as an element of life, remains connected with the infinity of life that manifests itself in it. Everything finite is an

[133] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd revised edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 53.
[134] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 53.
[135] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 53.
[136] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 53.
[137] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 53.

expression, a representation of the infinite."[138] From this perspective, we will address the way Beethoven's *Lebewohl* sonata expresses not only the composer's experience, but also a universal meaning that captures elements of our current experience.

C2. *Das Lebewohl*

Beethoven's *Lebewohl* sonata is often at the center of debates on musical meaning, e.g. whether the meaning of the sonata can be derived from a narrative of extramusical information, or whether meaning in the sonata is only accurate if drawn from structural and analytical conclusions. Carl Dahlhaus argues the sonata's meaning should be determined through the score itself and avoid "social-cum-psychological descriptions" as these are unable to find evidence for their conclusions in the material of the score.[139] In our investigation, we will show a depth of meaning in the *Lebewohl* by overcoming the restrictions of formal analysis, and consider the meaning of the work through the score and Gadamer's concept of *Erlebnis*. We will examine how the sonata not only delves into Beethoven's own experience, but also how aspects of the composition – as a product of experience – resonate with our own experience.

We will first consider the movement headings Beethoven provides for this sonata. It seems that Beethoven wishes to express an aspect of meaning that goes beneath the surface of the work. These headings and word cues highlight the importance of performance interpretation, as Beethoven explicitly hints that within this sonata there is content that cannot be expressed solely through material means: the score is unable to express the entirety of meaning because comprehension resides in performance interpretation. To achieve this, Beethoven writes both Italian tempo indications and lengthier descriptions in German. The fact that these descriptions are written in German suggests a language barrier or linguistic conflict. When Beethoven puts forward ideas about the movement's tempo and expression in his native tongue, this gives the impression that these descriptions are closer to Beethoven's inspiration

[138] Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 55.
[139] Carl Dahlhaus, *Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to his Music*, trans. Mary Whittall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 35. In this section, we indirectly challenge Dahlhaus's disparaging comments about what he considers to be *Erlebnismusik.* Dahlhaus questions "whether, and to what extent, real emotions form part of the conditions for the composition and interpretation of a piece of music." Dahlhaus, *Beethoven*, 33. *Erlebnis* in the context of this section relates to Gadamer's concept in the ambit of hermeneutic interpretation, and does not attempt to exhibit evidence beyond what the material of the score can present.

and feelings about the work.[140] In this unique mash-up of languages, Beethoven writes for the second movement: *Abwesenheit: Andante espressivo,* the heading: "*In gehender Bewegung, doch mit viel Ausdruck"* ["In a walking motion, but with much expression"].[141] For the final movement, *Das Wiedersehn: Vivacissimamente,* Beethoven writes the heading: "*Im lebhaftesten Zeitmasse*" ["in the liveliest tempo"].[142] These descriptions are deceptively simple, but offer insight into the question of translation of musical terms and expressive word cues into different languages. With these headings, Beethoven offers both listeners and performers food for thought. As a result, we begin each movement of the sonata immersed in reflection – we imagine how to interpret this information within the movement. This meditation consequently spills into the way we play (and experience) the work as a whole.

The first movement, *Das Lebe Wohl* ("The Farewell"), begins with an Adagio introduction. It presents us with instructions for performance interpretation, much like the later movements described above. In the case of the first movement, there are additional indications within the staff (see Figure 2.11). These instructions do not form a heading for the movement, but have another dimension of meaning: they are directly applicable to a specific passage in the score and not necessarily the movement as a whole. Beethoven writes *piano* and *espressivo* within the staff of the first measure, and the word "Lebewohl" appears above the first three notes of the piece (see Figure 2.11). Each syllable of the word corresponds to one note in the sequence. Although the movement title is also "Das Lebe wohl" ("The Farewell"), when we see the word "Lebewohl," written directly above the staff, several different possibilities

[140] William Kinderman elaborates on the importance of German headings and German descriptions for Beethoven, writing that Beethoven was "irritated by the use, in the first edition, of French instead of German titles, probably not only because of the difference in meaning between 'Les adieux' and 'Das Lebewohl,' but also because of the relationship between the falling horn motif (G–F–E-flat), with E-flat–B-flat–G in the lower voice) at the outset of the slow introduction and the syllables 'Le-be-wohl,' which are written above these chords," William Kinderman, *Beethoven*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 160.

[141] Barry Cooper argues this is a description of "Andante espressivo" in different words. See Cooper, Commentaries, Volume III, 21. As mentioned above, *Abwesenheit* is generally translated into English as: "Absence."

[142] Barry Cooper suggests this should not mean "the fastest possible." See Cooper, Commentaries, Volume III, 22. According to the Harvard Dictionary of Music, "Vivace" means "lively, brisk. In isolation, the term may indicate a tempo equivalent to *allegro* or faster. It has also been used to modify various terms (e.g. *allegro vivace*), usually, but not always, implying a faster tempo than the term modified. The intensifiers *vivacissimo* and *vivacissimamente* are also used." *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, 4th edition, ed. Don Michael Randel (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 962. The movement title *Das Wiedersehn,* is generally rendered into English as: "The Return."

for interpretation arise: this three-note motto is the namesake of the movement; the key to understanding the movement as a whole can be derived from these three notes; the word "Lebewohl" is the remainder of the lyrics of a song that was never finished or merely dissolves; the three-note motto seems to be the representation of Beethoven saying "farewell" to his friend the Archduke Rudolph.

Figure 2.11 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], mvmt. I, Adagio–Allegro, introduction, mm. 1-4.[143]



The "Lebewohl" tag transforms this motto into a calling card with an added depth of meaning – when this theme appears in different incarnations it is still the "Lebewohl" theme.

Through our heightened awareness of this motto, it becomes one of the most recognizable components of this sonata – and Beethoven hints that this will be the case when he displays the motto in this clean, unadulterated setting (much like the first announcement of the subject of a fugue). We should distinguish the motto, nevertheless, from the role of a first theme in sonata form. Barry Cooper calls it a "motivic argument,"[144] which is essentially a musical statement that we find throughout the exposition with melodic content that defines the work. Many Beethoven scholars, including William Kinderman,[145] Charles Rosen,[146] and Elaine Sisman,[147] identify this motto with a horn call (notably because the alto harmony in

[143] *Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.
[144] Cooper, Commentaries, Volume III, 20.
[145] Kinderman, *Beethoven*, 159-160.
[146] The idea that this motto is a horn call determines much of what Rosen writes about this sonata with respect to its expression. See Charles Rosen, *Beethoven's Piano Sonatas: A Short Companion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 202.
[147] Elaine Sisman defends that "only the original version of the *Lebewohl*-motive in whole notes retains the force of its verbal meaning." Elaine B. Sisman, "After the Heroic Style: *Fantasia* and the

Figure 2.11, m. 1, outlines "horn fifths").[148] In fact, Rosen initiates a treatment on the proper performance of the *Lebewohl* sonata with a mention that the sonata begins "with a horn call, a symbol in poetry well established by 1810 of distance, isolation, and memory."[149] One of the difficulties we find when we associate this motto with a horn call is the following: if we grant superiority to the symbol of a horn call in critical interpretation, then the symbol closes the door on understanding the sonata from a hermeneutic perspective related to experience. This is the result of a thorny problem of coherence of meaning because one must reconcile a stagnant historical trope with current sensibilities.[150] A horn call as an independent symbol, or as an allegory for the departure of the Archduke Rudolph, implicitly or explicitly affects how we perceive the *Lebewohl* motto because we construct an allegorical relation between the motto and a symbolic horn call. To reach a depth of meaning beyond this symbol, we advocate a position of understanding via aesthetic experience. More specifically, we will explore the first movement of the sonata as an artwork that is a product of experience. We understand the sonata as an aesthetic object that produces an aesthetic experience where meaning "belongs not only to this particular content or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life."[151] From this perspective we will investigate the *Lebewohl* sonata, and specifically the "*Lebewohl"* motto.

1. The first announcement of the "*Lebewohl"* motto has a disjointed aspect because it has no slurs (see Figure 2.11, m. 1). The motto does not look very song-like, although it invites us to sing this word as we play the first three notes of the sonata. It offers us, instead, a picture of someone learning how to drive a car with a manual transmission, coming around the bend in a road, and shifting from third gear, to second gear, to first gear. We start the motto in a rough third gear because the first

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'Characteristic' Sonata of 1809" in *Beethoven Forum*, volume 6 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press), 1998, 67-96, 87.

[148] See Sisman, After the Heroic Style, 87-8.

[149] Rosen, *Beethoven's Piano Sonatas,* 202.

[150] A similar problem arises when current audiences listen to Joseph Haydn's Symphony No. 31 in D major "Hornsignal." The historical connotations of the horn signal in the first movement of Haydn's symphony are difficult for us to understand from our own experience because of our distance from the historical time period when horns were used for purposes such as the delivery of the mail and in war. We imagine certain ideas relative to meaning in the symphony, such as feelings of excitement, joy, and expectation, when we read the title of the work. From a hermeneutic sense of *Erlebnis*, we remain at a distance from the horn signal itself because we can fathom this meaning but have not experienced it in an authentic way.

[151] This notion follows Gadamer's concept of *Erlebniskunst* (art based on experience), see *Truth and Method*, 61.

note of the motto sounds as though it is arriving from someplace else. The word "Lebewohl" contributes to the impression that we begin the piece *in medias res*, and already engaged in reflection. Our meditation, moreover, seems to stop or even stall on the "*wohl*" in C minor because the C octave in the bass is somewhat surprising (it has a comparatively low register and is telling of the unexpected minor key), and the third note of the sequence is held for a longer value than the other notes of the motto.

When we associate the motto with a horn call, it is difficult to appreciate the "*Lebewohl"* as part of a train of thought that is in progress. Notice the difference when we compare the *Lebewohl* sonata introduction to Figure 2.12, the second movement from Mozart's Sonata in B-flat Major, K. 281, Andante amoroso: both Beethoven and Mozart's themes move in a descending, step-wise motion but m. 1 in Mozart's composition clearly gives the impression that he is starting a thought from the beginning:

Figure 2.12 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in B-flat Major, K. 281, mvmt. II, Andante amoroso, mm. 1-7.[152]



Mozart commences the second movement of K. 281 with a *forte* E-flat played in an octave (Figure 2.12, m. 1), which confidently confirms the tonality of the movement. The "*Lebewohl"* motto floats into Beethoven's musical space (Figure 2.11, m. 1) without any introduction and only a vague suggestion of key. Beethoven does not start his movement with a chord that stabilizes the key of the movement, or even offer an octave tone that would sway the tonality in a specific direction until m. 2 (see Figure 2.11). Much like how a farewell [*Lebewohl*] is said to someone or something, when encounter this word here we necessarily meditate on its meaning. A "farewell" is loaded with thoughts about places, people, and material things; it seems difficult for

[152] Quoted from W. A. Mozart, *Klaviersonaten,* volume 1, Wiener Urtext Edition UT 50226, Vienna, 2004 – with kind permission.

one to say (or play) "farewell" without reflecting on what one is saying "farewell" to.[153] For this reason the *Lebewohl* motto begins within a space of reflection, a space that is not yet decidedly happy or sad (at least until m. 2).

2. The *Lebewohl* motto challenges all other themes in the first movement, as this three-note gesture is extremely memorable and catches our eye in the score like someone dressed inappropriately for the season. It strikes us that it turns up fragmented, or in other variations, throughout the first movement. Furthermore, as Elaine Sisman defends, the first theme of the Allegro section of first movement blends together different elements of the *Lebewohl* motto section, such as the chromatic bass theme (Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4), and the short, uneven motifs in the soprano voice (Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4); the second theme of the Allegro is also based on the *Le-be-wohl* motto. Sisman continues this argument by saying at times it is difficult to distinguish between the *Lebewohl* motto and the first and second themes because "transitional or developmental passages may change the rhythm of the three-note Lebewohl-motive… or begin with three notes but then maintain only the descent."[154]

[153] Elaine Sisman remarks: "Beethoven changed the name of the Sonata from 'Der Abschied' – farewell in the sense of departure, leave-taking, an *observed* phenomenon – to 'Das Lebewohl' – the actual word of farewell spoken to the departing person, a *participatory* phenomenon," Sisman, "After the Heroic Style," 88. This is notable because Sisman claims the "Lebewohl-motive embodies a striking *image* . . . . The speaker or composer uses an image to make an absent thing appear to be present, to call an experience vividly to mind, to bring the audience along into the world of the speaker or composer in order to sway them, move their passions, feel the desired feelings. . . . It serves as an image of the *composer's* experience for his or her own use, it becomes a *locator* in memory, helping to retrieve both this and other experiences for use as thematic material," Sisman, "After the Heroic Style," 88.

[154] Sisman, "After the Heroic Style," 87.

Figure 2.13 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], mvmt. I, Adagio–Allegro, coda, mm. 197-208.[155]



Nevertheless, when we encounter the *Lebewohl* motto intact in the Allegro section of the first movement, or even when we find it fragmented in pieces, there is something about the motto that brings to mind the original sentiment of the first two measures of the sonata. In the coda of the first movement, the *Lebewohl* motto (in the right hand) is sufficiently hidden behind a lyrical, *dolce* cello-like theme in the left hand (see Figure 2.13, mm. 197-200). The *dolce* word cue suggests that it applies to the figure in the left hand as its elegant endurance takes it far through the sounding range of a cello. *Dolce* indications in the staff of Beethoven's compositions often apply to melodic content that returns later in the composition, which consequently invokes a feeling of nostalgia. In this case, with this particular *dolce*, Beethoven calls our attention to the importance of a melodic fragment that embodies the content of the *"Lebewohl*" motto and contrasts this with the beauty of a cello figuration written for the keyboard. In this passage of the coda, we experience both the lightness of the *dolce* accompaniment and the complex expression of the "*Lebewohl*" motto.

3. Despite its simplicity, the motto harbors a dark and almost sinister feeling of regret and sorrow. This is enhanced by the *piano* and *espressivo* indications in the staff (Figure 2.11, m. 1). The motto is also exceedingly easy to play, although the

[155] *Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

intervals feel a little awkward in the right hand.[156] The odd combination of *piano* and *espressivo* descending intervals that are as calm as they are eerie, and a deceptive C octave in the bass in m. 2 (Figure 2.11), trickles into our perception of the *Lebewohl* motto. When we examine the motto from a listener's aesthetic perspective, it is difficult to place the motto within a structural framework of major or minor modes. The fundamental difference between major and minor necessarily influences how we experience a work from an immediate perspective, and also our expectation for the movement as a whole. The C minor chord, which concludes the motto, is a structural indicator that casts a shadow over the motto. But the ear, and our experience with intervals, makes it difficult to hear the first interval played in the sonata as minor because it is a major third (E-flat–G). It is less difficult to hear the second interval of the motto as minor (a perfect fifth: B-flat–F), but it has an uncertain quality about it because the consonance of a perfect fifth recalls the major mode. The third chord of the motto is clearly in minor – it is difficult to hear it as anything else but a big, and rather empty, C minor triad (the C is reflected twice, C_2–C_3 and this provides an ominous feature to the chord).

Through a consideration of the sounding quality of these intervals of the motto, Beethoven surprises us by calling our attention to the fact that we set store by the first few tones of a piece to determine the rest of the movement. The *Lebewohl* motto challenges how we hear a major third and the stability of a perfect fifth. There are many works in the canon of Western classical music that are difficult to place within a major – minor structure because they may be written in the major mode but sound undoubtedly minor, and vice versa. This is also common in many works of popular music. From this perspective, the *Lebewohl* motto in the brief moments of measure 1 shares a similarity with the Beatles' "In My Life" (1965). Although the lyrics of the Beatles' song do not refer to saying "good-bye" to anything in particular, they speak of a time past that has been left behind. "In My Life" is composed in A major, but the *pathos* of the melody, and the whole of the song, has something weepy about it in the same vein as the *Lebewohl* motto. This suggests that there is more

[156] I find a fingering of 3-5 – 2-4 – 1-3 gives a smooth effect. Schnabel's edition suggests 3-5 – 2-5 – 1-4, Schnabel, 217. See *Beethoven: Complete Piano Sonatas in Two Volumes: Historic Edition with Preface in English, Spanish, Italian, German, and French*, ed. Artur Schnabel, Volume II (Milan: Edizioni Curci, S.R.L., 1949, reprinted by Alfred USA – Van Nuys: Alfred Publishing Co, n.d. USA), 217.

going on in the song than the lyrics let on. The *Lebewohl* motto thus shares a depth of meaning that is beyond a major-minor framework – namely, it is meaning found in our aesthetic experience of the object and not in the analytical suggestion of key.

4. The motto seems alienated from the rest of the sonata because it does not serve a hallowed role in sonata form. The motto may be the basis of the first and second themes of the Allegro section of the first movement, but when the motto itself appears in the first movement it portrays thematic alienation. This initial feeling of alienation is derived from the fact that we first hear the motto in a solo setting. And the motto is remarkably different from the measures that follow (see Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4). Beethoven obliquely asks us to consider this tragic figure, the "Lebewohl," at the same time as appear to be saying "farewell" in a fashion where the motto becomes an individual and aesthetic object. The composition lures us to recognize this individual, and take pride in recognizing its appearances, throughout the first movement (e.g. Figure 2.13, mm. 197-9).[157] On the one hand, Beethoven gives the impression that he uses the *Lebewohl* motto as a model to construct the first and second themes of the exposition. The motto appears to show up everywhere, in the guise of a structural function in sonata form. On the other hand, the *Lebewohl* motto is comprised of intervals and rhythms that are common and fundamental to diatonic music (its intervals: major third, perfect fifth, major sixth [in the context of a minor triad]; its rhythms: two quarter-notes and one dotted quarter-note). To a certain extent, it is the prevalence of these elements that make it difficult to discern the motto from fragments of the first and second theme, or from other thematic material. Not only is the identity of the motto in the exposition somewhat confused from this perspective, but it also offers a glimpse into a feeling of alienation where individuals can find themselves in the middle of a crowd but feel alone at the same time; the motto, as thematic material, desires to belong to a greater whole, but an aspect of its expression alienates it or separates it from the rest.

[157] Although not nearly as complex as a fugue, Beethoven seems to challenge analysis and listeners in a similar way to find the subject (in this case it is a motto that is neither the first nor second theme of the exposition). Analysis frequently points to the instances of the motto as a significant source of meaning. See, for example, how Charles Rosen describes where to find the motto in *Beethoven's Piano Sonatas,* 202-204. The other side of this argument, championed by Carl Dahlhaus, is that the motto is so intimately related to the first and second themes of the exposition that identifying precise instances of the motto has little effect on the overall meaning. See Dahlhaus, *Beethoven,* 36-40.

The alienation we recognize in the *Lebewohl* motto reflects a phenomenon present in studies of sociology. For example, David Riesman, whose comments are telling of the prejudices of society and the feeling of alienation due to one's culture and values, describes a similar phenomenon. The principle Riesman outlines is when an individual is either forced to conform to a certain social group's expectations or else remain alienated from society: "[inner-directed types in the urban American environment] may refuse to adapt because of moral disapproval of what signals convey, or they may be discouraged by the fact that the signals, though inviting enough, do not seem meant for them."[158] The notion of alienation in society, and a parallel phenomenon of thematic alienation or dislocation, is an interesting one and Beethoven's *Lebewohl* motto touches on a fundamental aspect of it. This particular passage from *The Lonely Crowd* [1961] describes the dichotomy between inner-directed and other-directed types, where individuals feel alienated in society because they are unwilling to conform or are unable to relate to their environment. The "signals" that confront them are external stimuli, which draw attention to this feeling, e.g. events, communication, and conflict. These lead us to respond and act, in accordance with expectations of society or our own character (if these are at a variance with one another). One of the parallels we find with the *Lebewohl* motto is that we have difficulty when naming the structural significance of the motto; scholars call it a "motive," "motto," or "motivic argument," but the formal labels that are applied to the motto do not grasp its two-fold significance as the inspiration of the first and second themes of the exposition, and importantly that it has a strong identity of its own. The feeling of alienation in the *Lebewohl* motto is taken even further when we reflect on its first announcement (Figure 2.11): Beethoven dictates the key of C minor in the second measure, but this key does not seem to fit the tone of the motto – it does not feel like the motto's home key. The motto sounds unsettled in C minor, and gives the impression that even here, in its first announcement, it is not desired or where it is supposed to be. In this case, even the structure of the work dictates that the motto is an extraordinary exception: it echoes a sentiment of alienation in current society and of Beethoven's own "farewell" to a friend who gave him a sense of belonging and financial security. The motto, in this way, foreshadows conflict and distress.

[158] David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denny, *The Lonely Crowd* [1961] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 33.

C3. Concluding remarks on external circumstances, experience, a *life-moment*, and the *Lebewohl*

Beethoven's *Lebewohl* sonata is a work often used to discuss the relevance of biographical information with respect to meaning in a musical work. Through "external circumstances," internalization, and experience [*Erlebnis*], we have outlined that these aspects from the composer's perspective are important for an initial step in interpretation and understanding meaning in the sonata. First, we grasp this from the notion that Beethoven composed the sonata under the pretext that he was going to bid farewell to a friend, the Archduke Rudolph. Second, we turn interpretation toward an expression of experience that not only reflects aspects of Beethoven's experience but also elements of meaningful content that we can perceive through reflection on our own experience. The *Lebewohl* sonata, and specifically the *Lebewohl* motto in the first movement, is meaningful for current audiences because it treats ideas that we can identify with; the sonata does not only represent meaning that is restricted to the historical time period when Beethoven composed the sonata and when the French army invaded Austria.

Through the notion of experience, we have outlined four distinct components of meaning in the first movement of the *Lebewohl*: (1) the sonata begins as though we were already immersed in thought; the sonata starts *in medias res*; (2) the *Lebewohl* motto expresses individuality through its ability to challenge the authority of traditionally "stronger" themes (such as the first and second themes of the exposition); (3) the confused and eerie characteristic of the *Lebewohl* motto sheds light on our expectation of specific musical material that follows our identification of music composed in a major or minor mode; (4) the *Lebewohl* motto expresses thematic alienation or dislocation because the motto appears to be alienated from the rest of the composition. This is due to its determined identity as a theme, its lack of an association with a major or minor key and thus seems not to have a home key. Furthermore, it is a theme that carries with it a history of reflection on the word "Lebewohl" and its significance for the performer as well as the listener. When we take into account Beethoven's *life-moment,* the internalization of external circumstances, and experience, we find a greater relevance of meaning in the

Lebewohl sonata for current critical and performance interpretation as a vision of discord and alienation.

*

After considering these four points that are internal to the first movement of the *Lebewohl* sonata, we argue that the feeling of the *Le-be-wohl* motto permeates the work as a whole. Even in the final movement *Das Wiedersehn*: Vivacissimamente, although in E-flat major, the main theme recalls the triad that is voiced in the *Lebewohl* theme (in the alto accompanying voice see Figure 2.11, mm. 1–2). It is precisely because of the sound of a major third and a triad chord (both major and minor), in inversions, is characteristic of the motto. Further, the *Le-be-wohl* motto is by no means bound to a minor tonality (although the odd minor-sounding character, instigated by the C octave in m. 2, haunts the motto throughout) as we hear it voiced in B-flat major in the second group of the exposition. It is, in part, because the *Le-be-wohl* motto is composed of certain building blocks of Western diatonic music (discussed in point 3 above) that we can even hear it (as though in variations) in the final movement of the sonata. The main theme of the final movement, which sounds at a vivacissimamente tempo, is understood to be in major from the start (see Figure 2.14), even if it is clothed in a cautious *piano* dynamic.

Figure 2.14 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], mvmt. III, Vivacissimamente, [main theme], mm. 11-20.[159]



[159] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

The initial triad of the motif is the focal point of the vivacissimamente theme (Figure 2.14, m. 11). The only literal similarity between this theme and the *Le-be-wohl* motto is the *piano* dynamic. But the vibrant intonation of the major triad in the last movement (Figure 2.14, m. 11) echoes the major third, perfect fifth, and major sixth intervals of the *Le-be-wohl* motto (Figure 2.11, mm. 1-2). The left hand behaves almost autonomously in the opening of the sonata's introduction, coming across as though it arbitrarily chooses C minor (Figure 2.11, m. 2, beat 1) and moving chromatically thereafter (Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4); thus one of the strange moments of affinity between the last movement theme and the *Le-be-wohl* motto can be attributed to the "desired" key of the motto itself – the motto sounds as though it should be in major.

When we reach the coda of the final movement (Figure 2.15, mm. 176-7) marked Poco Andante, we are reminded again of the *Le-be-wohl* motto when Beethoven recalls the vivacissimamente theme. But this time the theme sounds even more like the *Le-be-wohl* motto because the theme is played poco andante and *piano* (in the first movement introduction the *Le-be-wohl* motto is played *adagio*, *piano*, and *espressivo*). It seems that here the coda taps into the fundamentally major sounding tonality of the *Le-be-wohl* motto. In the Poco Andante section, the theme is able to settle into a firm, and stable, major mode as a resting place; it gives the impression of being ultimately optimistic without the ambiguity of not knowing its home key or feeling alienated from the other musical parts. This is not a literal transportation of the *Le-be-wohl* motto into the coda, as the theme in Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15 is not the same nor does it have identical rhythmic values or intervals. But it is a general similarity in the tonal gesture that pulls the languid and forlorn *Le-be-wohl* motto out of a haze of isolation and into the spotlight of the final movement's coda. The doubt the *Le-be-wohl* motto inspires, with respect to the unknown (e.g. we do not really know if the theme is correctly heard as major or minor), is dissolved in the stability of E-flat major in the final movement (even if played at poco andante).

Figure 2.15 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, "Lebewohl" or "Les Adieux" [The Farewell], mvmt III, Vivacissimamente, coda, mm. 176-178.[160]



The *Le-be-wohl* motto, as an entity that expresses a deeper meaning within the sonata, is a characteristic tool in Beethoven's compositional style. Yet the depth in Beethoven's compositions is not consistently marked with explicit notation (i.e. the word "Lebewohl") nor is deeper meaning found in accordance with analytical, thematic, and harmonic norms. When we reflect on our present example, on the surface what is most memorable is the simple *Le-be-wohl* motto that introduces itself with a humble and common word: *Lebewohl* [Farewell]. We find that this word, as a description of something, does not get at the deeper meaning, and for this reason we shift our interpretation toward what Schleiermacher identifies as *internal circumstances*. We recognize a myriad of characteristics in Beethoven's *Le-be-wohl* motto: such as the melancholy that pervades the theme and the unstable harmonic progression when it is first introduced (Figure 2.11, mm. 1-2); the tender and intimate expression that emerges on one occasion when the motto ventures out, lonely at the top of the staff while the accompaniment slides through a soothing cello register[161] (see Figure 2.12); and the bittersweet Poco Andante theme that suggests the *Le-be-wohl* motto's initial anguish in such a deliberate way that it demands reflection on a synthesis of alienation and joyfulness while it throws off the chains of hyperactivity that is characteristic of a vivacissimamente tempo (Figure 2.14).

These particular considerations do not render the determination of external circumstances fruitless. In fact, it is in the consideration of the departure of Archduke Rudolph that we recognize certain traits of Beethoven's "inner being" in the composition. Individuality becomes apparent through the process of thinking and the

[160] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.
[161] In Figure 2.12, the final note of the second measure – B-flat$_1$ – is one tone lower than the cello compositional register. The warmness of the theme's register is so pronounced that it provides a successful illusion of a cello, despite this irregularity.

execution of ideas in the material medium of the score. This subsequently gives us the ability to discuss the "internal" component through our consideration of passages in the sonata.

Schleiermacher offers another perspective for understanding "internal considerations," which comes from a position of interpretation. We may know the "external circumstances" related to a specific event (e.g. the Archduke's departure from Vienna), but we should try to understand the composer or author's reflection on those events – or their interpretation of those events – in what we observe in the work. Schleiermacher depicts individuality through an example of two authors who write on the same subject (e.g., a journey taken together). These authors will necessarily represent the topic of the journey in different ways; the variances will depend on their individuality and "inner being," their personal outlook, and other less tangible qualities that cannot be explained through the identification of external events or circumstances.[162] From Schleiermacher's example, we imagine that the evidence in a composition will range from more obvious aspects (e.g. a composition is written in a minor key, and so the composer is most likely portraying content that is sorrowful) to nuances in the details (e.g. Beethoven's idiosyncrasies in notation). Czerny writes about a similar kind of phenomenon as Schleiermacher, but this time it is individuality in performance. Czerny's example is an anecdote about interpretation, where Czerny compares the interpretation of a dramatic role to the interpretation of one of Beethoven's sonatas. He writes:

> If several good actors had to represent the same character (as, for instance, *Hamlet*) each would differ from another in his conception of it, in many of the details. Thus, one would chiefly characterize melancholy, another irony, a third dissembled madness… and yet each of these representations may be perfectly satisfactory in its way, provided the general view be correct. So, in the performance of classical compositions, and especially in those of Beethoven, much depends on the individuality of the player; (who is presupposed to possess a certain degree of virtuosity; for, a stumbler cannot think of intellectual conception.) – Hence, one may principally cause humor to predominate, another earnestness, a third feeling, a fourth bravura, and so on; but he who is able to unite all these, is evidently the most talented.[163]

[162] See Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 102 and 108 for a more detailed account. In this case I have fused two of Schleiermacher's examples into one for the sake of clarity.

[163] Czerny, 118. This appears in a section within Czerny's treatise on the proper performance of Beethoven's sonatas entitled: "Concluding remarks: on the intellectual conception of Beethoven's works."

In the kind of interpretation Czerny describes, different pianists bring out divergent aspects of the composer's individuality (as well as the performer's own individuality) in performance. Czerny's commentary alludes to the fact that a composition will contain a variety of musical gestures because a performance would be incomprehensible if a performer brought out humor, for instance, and there were no elements of humor in the composition. The performer then chooses what aspects to highlight in performance, or chooses not to highlight one aspect over another and thus present a balanced performance as a unified expression of disparate ideas (humor, earnestness, feeling, etc.).

Within the framework of a composer's internal and external circumstances, Schleiermacher asks: "What does the true, inner seed of the work, the decision in the life of the author mean?"[164] With the *Lebewohl* sonata, we recognize that the external circumstances have a great deal of importance for the interpretation of the sonata as a whole[165] as well as for theoretical and analytical considerations of the sonata. Even in Beethoven's sketch of the sonata, where he clearly identifies the Archduke leaving Vienna,[166] we deem the *Lebewohl* sonata illustrates a specific farewell, directed to one of the composer's very close friends. The complexity of expression in the sonata (with detailed movement names, subtitles, and the *Le-be-wohl* motto) points to conceptual ideas contained in the music. These ideas do not necessarily need the identification of external circumstances (such as the departure of Beethoven's friend Archduke Rudolph) for intelligibility. Knowledge of the external circumstances, however, does stabilize a direction in the expression and meaning of the whole. Unlike a song (e.g., the *An die ferne Geliebte* cycle, Op. 98), where the voice (with lyrics) usually has the role of articulating meaning in music, the *Lebewohl* sonata must convey meaning on its own (without additional lyrics). The *Lebewohl* sonata presents us with a case where external circumstances were clearly important to the composer; they occupy an uncommon presence in the sonata because of the movement titles and descriptions of those circumstances at the top of the page. Beethoven's aesthetic decision to include descriptions of external circumstances for the movements' headings injects an explicit notion of friendship throughout the

[164] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 108.
[165] One example is to consider how to integrate the subtitles for each movement into performance.
[166] See Susan Kagen, *Archduke Rudolph, Beethoven's Patron, Pupil and Friend: His Life and Music* (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988), 15 and Cooper, Commentaries*,* Volume III, 9.

sonata. The headings do not fully convey what is meaningful in the music,[167] and thus the listener and performer should contemplate additional dimensions of meaning in the work. Beethoven's *Lebewohl* sonata becomes a reflection on a main idea of the *Le-be-wohl* motto – on isolation and alienation. The sonata expresses a secondary idea about Platonic friendship. It is with this method of interpretation of meaning that the work can speak beyond the confines of a narrative structure bound to Vienna, April 1809, related to an event between Beethoven and the Archduke, and illustrate meaning that we can understand and has meaning for us in our everyday lives.

D. Introduction to the notion that a composition contains thoughts

To grasp Schleiermacher's understanding of thoughts, as found in a composition, we return to the dichotomy between Schleiermacher's psychological and technical tasks of hermeneutics. Upon considering a free play of thoughts (as we find in conversation), which characterizes Schleiermacher's "purely psychological" interpretation, versus the methodical and intentional approach that characterizes "technical" interpretation, Schleiermacher states:

> The relative opposition of the purely psychological and the technical can be grasped more distinctly in terms of the first being more concerned with the emergence of thoughts from the totality of the life-moments of the individual, the second being more a leading-back to a determinate wish to think and present, from which sequences develop.[168]

Schleiermacher presents, on the one side, the "purely psychological," which as interpretation that has an affiliation with the immediate, and thought arises almost spontaneously as a result of external circumstances or feelings. On the other side, the "technical," Schleiermacher describes "a leading-back to a determinate wish to think and present." With the "technical" kind of interpretation, we consider reflection or

[167] As Tovey writes of this sonata: "In the lower orders of sentimental journalism persons may be found to whom the true circumstances of this sonata are not romantic enough. But sane and manly friendships formed in schooldays and in the full of stress of life are fine subjects for Beethoven's music," Donald Francis Tovey, *A Companion to Beethoven's Pianoforte Sonatas (Bar-by-bar Analysis),* revised edition (London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 1998), 188.
[168] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 104.

thoughts that have developed through time. Schleiermacher clarifies this in the following way:

> The difference lies in the fact that the technical is the understanding of the meditation and of the composition, the psychological is the understanding of the ideas [*Einfälle*], among which the basic thoughts are also to be included, from which whole sequences develop, and is the understanding of secondary thoughts.[169]

As is the case with many of Schleiermacher's notions, we find that one definition often interferes with, or spills into, what is considered its complement. In the end, ideas [*Einfälle*] and basic thoughts are associated with the spontaneous and immediate. These "ideas" [*Einfälle*] are less formulated and consist of generalized notions that point to a thought, or multiple thoughts. We find that Schleiermacher aims at describing a process in the "psychological" task with a goal to find the genesis, the source, and the beginning of an idea and its general outline. This way of thinking incorporates a vision of the creative process where rough, fragmentary, and cursory thoughts are seen as content; this content is then worked out and put on display in a finished work. The end result is (previously disparate) content in the form of a determined thought that we render intelligible linguistically in our description of a work and its meaning.

D1. Meditation – Composition; *Boundness*

The creative process – exemplified through the working out of ideas (or "meditation") on the one hand, and the composition as the end result on the other – is at the heart of the "technical" component within the psychological task of hermeneutics. Schleiermacher discusses the moment that precedes the transition from meditation to a "final" composition in the following way:

> As soon as someone wants to bring something to consciousness with a free decision, a free deed, which are here the same then he is immediately compelled to follow a method. But this will differ depending on whether the person asks himself in his self-determination: how can I manage thoroughly to research the object, or asks: how do I move what I have thought through in a certain direction and how do I represent it for certain people?[170]

[169] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 104.
[170] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 105.

The artist's thought process, as imagined by Schleiermacher, might be an inaccurate picture of an individual's creative process. Schleiermacher, nevertheless, manages to portray a principle of that is often present in current aesthetic theories: in great art there is generally a higher idea that fuels the creation and imagination behind that artwork. According to Schleiermacher, the artist (author or composer) knows to follow a method in order to intelligibly represent thought. The artist also considers an audience for whom the object is made for. (From the perspective of Schleiermacher's grammatical task, we assume "certain people" is an audience comprised of the artist's contemporaries and, importantly, these individuals should be able to understand the work.) If we examine the artist's process, as described by Schleiermacher, meditation and reflection is only the beginning of the method. Meditation and reflection give way to a composition; meditation thereby "can only from time to time hold onto the decision in a passive manner, so that it is only occasionally effective, and then the composition, the linking of the particulars into a whole, is postulated as a second act."[171] On the one hand, the creative process has a particular shape for Schleiermacher – the creative process includes stages that incorporate artists' answers to questions they may pose before their artwork at different moments during the composition of a given work. (This might be evident in a physical form, if there are drafts of the work in question, and/or other documentation related to the creation of a work, for example, letters or diary entries that treat aspects of that unfinished work.) These stages reflect a sequence in meditation, with the fine-tuning of an idea, concept, or thought that should arise[172] from the finished work.[173] On the other hand, Schleiermacher defines meditation as an "invisible territory" where "it is difficult to say what and how the author thought about this or that object for every object can be pursued in differing ways. Here we are in the invisible territory of meditation, where it is also a question of knowing what the writer also rejected even though it emerged

[171] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 105.
[172] The notion that a thought should "arise" from a work means to say that an idea or thought may not be immediately understood, or obvious. Through time and study, the thought or idea will become perceptible as though *arising* from the work with clarity. This is related to the concept of intuition, where we may sense strangeness in a work, however we may not necessarily understand the work's meaning immediately. The thought that arises should answer, at least in part, some of the timeless questions of hermeneutics: What is the meaning of the work? What does the work "say?"
[173] Schleiermacher writes: "it is true that the task of understanding the meditation is dependent on the understanding of the composition. But we have put the former first for a good reason, because we only understand the composition genetically via the knowledge of the whole meditation. The opposite only occurs in relation to the secondary thoughts, for these only emerge in the composition."

from the basic thought."[174] The notion behind Schleiermacher's determination of an "invisible territory" stands on the premise that all of the author's thoughts about a topic, or a series of thoughts that gave rise to the finalized thought found in a work, have importance for interpretation. The thoughts are invisible in the sense that one might not be able to locate them within the work in its final state, nor in the drafts or other supplementary material used to understand a work from a genetic approach.

The "invisible territory" is only perceptible in sketches and drafts, where we can locate traces of thoughts contemporary with the principal thought of the work. The fundamental constraints of form on the creative impulse can be understood as a force; Schleiermacher determines that constraints of form, and how these constraints inspire an artist's creativity, is the origin of an individual artist's creative "boundness" [*Gebundenheit*] to the form they utilize for their composition. *Boundness* presents certain limits and normative expectations for content. According to this idea, an individual must trim away excesses of thought in order to accommodate form. As Schleiermacher determines, each form has "its own laws" that restrict a free flow of thought and creation to a particular shape and presentation. In the case of music, these are "laws" such as the characteristics of sonata form, definitions of an instrument's capabilities, and other rules of composition that fit more appropriately in a "grammatical" interpretation.[175] Bu with respect to the psychological task of hermeneutics, Schleiermacher finds that form can give rise to specific determinations of content:

> The more firmly and vividly the form is imprinted in the original impulse, the less those elements will develop which admittedly belong to the content. The content is determined by the form in its unity and fullness. . . . If the form is imprinted with a certain vividness in the impulse, then inappropriate thoughts cannot occur at all to the writer either. If they occur to him, so that he has to eliminate them, then he has not reached the highest degree of completion.[176]

Schleiermacher's position inspires us to imagine that a finished work actually reflects truncated content. This presupposes that inappropriate thoughts (that are

[174] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 132.
[175] It is in moments like this that we understand that the "grammatical" and "psychological" tasks of hermeneutic explication are not divorced from one another, but wholly relate and aid in the activities of the other. For the sake of clarity, I have outlined specific activities that pertain more to one task than the other, as certain directions in interpretation speak more to one task than the other.
[176] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 140.

misleading or irrelevant to the subject) are important to set a work's "highest degree of completion." In appropriate thoughts are necessary for the formulation of one coherent thought, which is expressed in the final composition. The notion of "inappropriate thoughts," or thoughts that stray from the overall meaning of the work, is a way to name the thoughts that were put into a composition in the process of composing it. These "inappropriate" thoughts contribute to an organic "fullness" in the finished content; the "inappropriate" or superfluous thoughts, apparently contradictory to the dominant tenor of the whole, actually contribute to a unique vision and may even offer insight into perplexing passages.

When we consider a great work of art, its form often looks effortless; the form will give the impression that it functions seamlessly with the content. Thereby the *boundness* of form on thought, and creativity, should not necessarily be considered an imposition or hindrance that restricts a composition. The form of a work may actually reveal the genius or individuality of the composer because of the way the composer defies form, or composes within the confines of form in such a skillful way that the form does not call attention to itself as what inhibits a creative angle. In the case of Beethoven, we recognize innovations with respect to form like the elongation of classical-era sonata form. One assumes that the new shape Beethoven gives to form is able to express more fully the entire content and ideas of a work.[177] The challenges Beethoven imposed on the "rules" of form contributed to many ideas and thoughts that are illustrated in his music and notation. We can observe this most readily in works that present great difficulty for interpreters (e.g. Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, "Hammerklavier," and the *Große Fuge*, Op. 133). From the perspective of a flexible form in art, which yields to the fancy of the creative impulse, we now turn to the notion of thoughts and ideas and how they can be presented in a work.

[177] The "Hammerklavier" sonata, Op. 106, is only one example of many where Beethoven altered a relatively standard compositional form. Beethoven also looked to expand the compositional range of the instruments he composed for. Notice, for example in the Sonata in A Major, Op. 101, where Beethoven has written a low E (E_1) in the last movement of the piano sonata, and marks it by writing "contra E" in the score.

E. Thoughts and Ideas

As mentioned above, when we consider the final version of a composition, we should also reflect on the meditation that gave rise to the work. Schleiermacher's concept of meditation in hermeneutics inevitably points to the "psychological," or thoughts and ideas, as a point of departure. Schleiermacher reveals this when he states two crucial components of the "psychological" task:

> The one aspect is the understanding of the whole basic thought of the work, the other is the comprehension of the individual parts of the work via the life of the author. . . . The first task is therefore the unity of the work as a fact in the life of its author. The question is how the author arrived at the thought from which the whole developed.[178]

Schleiermacher's "whole basic thought" outwardly determines a direction in understanding and explication, while its definition is partially a result of external and internal circumstances. Schleiermacher's hermeneutics proposes an investigation into how these circumstances operate together, and how these circumstances form the pieces of a coherent background picture that is complementary to the main thought or principal meaning of a given work. We can imagine this with relation to our earlier example of the *Lebewohl* sonata, where the meaning or "main thought" of the sonata can be easily traced to events that took place in Beethoven's life. (This is, for example, what provides support for interpretations like Charles Rosen's "horn call" – the three-note *Le-be-wohl* motto – in the introduction and its presence in the movement; Rosen describes this in the following way: "The motto is present throughout the exposition in all forms and all rhythms: it is the tissue out of which the cloth is woven. The nervous rhythm, the growing dissonance, and the constantly changing texture represent the agitation of the departure and the anxiety of the coming absence."[179])

Meditation in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics provides another crucial perspective in the genesis and crystallization of thoughts; and it alternatively sheds light on how we can understand thoughts in a composition. We return again to the "invisible territory of meditation":

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[178] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 107.
[179] Charles Rosen, *Beethoven's Piano Sonatas: A Short Companion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 203.

> It is difficult to say what and how the author thought about this or that object, for every object can be pursued in differing ways. Here we are in the invisible territory of meditation, where it is also a question of knowing what the writer also rejected even though it emerged from the basic thought. Each text has its particular genetic sequence and what is original in it is the order in which the individual thoughts are thought. But the order can perhaps be a different one when they are communicated.

In most cases, even with extant drafts of works, it is difficult to determine a development in thought; furthermore, to recover "rejected" thoughts also seems like an unrealistic goal. Not only does Schleiermacher's hermeneutics want us to locate one basic thought that unites a composition, but it also instructs us to find the process of thought. To do this, we should piece together of what clues the author or composer has left behind; this task inherently involves a certain degree of one's own speculation regarding the original sequence of thought behind a particular work. We recognize the fragility of this task, as we begin to question how faithful our speculation is to the actual work.

By the same token, a great deal of supplementary information might exist around a particular composition that we can use for a discussion of meditation. There may even be cases where the meditation is explicit in the final work. A case in point of an explicit rejection of a thought, and a genetic sequence of thought, is located on the title of page of Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"). Barry Cooper relates the infamous story of the idea, or concept, behind the symphony. (In Schleiermacher's vocabulary, this is a re-telling of external and internal circumstances around Beethoven's decision to compose the symphony):

> From an early stage Beethoven intended to dedicate the work to Napoleon Bonaparte, whom he perceived as a champion of freedom, supreme leader, and latter-day hero – perhaps even a modern Prometheus. The work may even have been inspired by Napoleon from the outset. . . . Beethoven's pupil Ferdinand Ries, however, was a generally reliable witness, and his account of Beethoven's early intentions for the symphony rings true. He reports seeing a score of the symphony (probably the autograph score, now lost), in which the title page had the name Buonaparte (the Italian form of Bonaparte's name) at the very top and "Luigi van Beethoven" at the foot, with a huge blank space between. Ries himself then brought Beethoven the news that Napoleon had proclaimed himself emperor, at which Beethoven flew into a rage and shouted: "Is he then, too, nothing more than an ordinary human being? Now he, too, will trample on all human rights and indulge only his ambition. He will exalt himself above all others, become a tyrant!". . . . Beethoven then tore up the title page of the symphony and flung it to the floor. Although this score does not survive, a manuscript copy supervised by Beethoven and with his annotations is preserved in Vienna; originally it bore the heading "Grand

> Symphony entitled Buonaparte," but the name "Buonaparte" has been so vigorously deleted that there is a hole in the paper.[180]

The crossing out of Napoleon's name shows, in a visual way, a progression in Beethoven's thought with respect to the meaning of the symphony. By removing "Buonaparte," the symphony is no longer restricted to an interpretation that would inevitably mention Napoleon. Instead, the symphony is opened up to wide-ranging explanations related to its description "Eroica." The symphony is able to illustrate characteristics of a hero, or heroic virtue; the symphony can represent an appeal an ideal, rather than only illustrate a specific moment in history. Beethoven's previous belief about Napoleon, that he was a "champion of freedom, supreme leader and latter-day hero," helps to qualify some of the content of the work. When we encounter perplexing passages in the symphony, Beethoven's previously held belief about Napoleon might offer an explanation. Despite the evidence that the idea of Napoleon is present in an initial way (as "original" to the sequence of thought), the decision Beethoven made to eliminate one specific element of the original thought, and replace it with a less-specified notion of "hero," grants the work a seminal quality. The work is thereby not necessarily bound to the age it was created in, but stands on its own as the expression of an ideal.

The argument that Napoleon was the "original" main thought in Beethoven's "Eroica" symphony leads us to contemplate the characteristics of the main thought: freedom, a hero, and the myth of Prometheus.[181] When we investigate the "Eroica" symphony in depth, nevertheless, we notice additional elements that suggest another thought or aim toward a particular expression. These elements are ones such as those discussed in Part I of this thesis, where Beethoven uses *dolce* indications in a curious

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[180] Ludwig van Beethoven, *Symphonie Nr. 3 in Es / Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major "Eroica," Op. 55*, Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1999), iii. Cooper continues to tell the story, "When [Beethoven] offered the symphony to Breitkopf & Härtel in August 1804, he stated that its title was really Bonaparte, adding with masterly understatement, 'I think it will interest the musical public'…. Eventually, however, Beethoven's misgivings about Napoleon's ambitions led him to call the work simply 'Sinfonia eroica,'" iv. Embedded citations are from Elliot Forbes, *Thayer's Life of Beethoven* [1967], 349 and Emily Anderson, *The Letters of Beethoven* [1961], no. 96, respectively.

[181] This corresponds with Barry Cooper's reading, and is supported by the fact that the "Eroica" symphony was composed during the same period as Beethoven's *Creatures of Prometheus,* Op. 43 (composed 1801), and the presence of the Prometheus theme in the "Eroica." Kinderman writes of the "Eroica" Finale (Fourth movement), Allegro molto: "In the finale, the association with Prometheus becomes clear through the reuse of the theme from the ballet" Kinderman, *Beethoven,*102. Scholars also argue that there is other symbolism that supports connections with the Prometheus myth in the symphony, see Kinderman, 101-106.

way in the exposition at the beginning of the second group of the "Eroica."[182] These elements, as expressed in the notation and sounding quality, give rise to an intuition that within those passages there is meaning, and thought, beyond an original main thought related to Napoleon.

E1. Secondary ideas

Schleiermacher's *secondary ideas* come into play when we identify different kinds of thoughts within the same work. *Secondary ideas* facilitate understanding when we have the intuition that a passage contains meaning, but that meaning is incongruous with the *main idea* or thought of the work. To identify *secondary ideas* is just as vigorous a task as recognizing a main idea. This is the case all the more so because we cannot automatically assume that a work contains secondary aims or ideas:

> Purely artistic production is altered by every other kind of direction, the task arises of finding it if it is present. In general the question is: how does one find the subjective secondary aims in the various genres and areas of composition? One may never directly presuppose such a secondary aim, for a hint of it would have already to arise from the text itself.[183]

Schleiermacher's uses of the word "altered" with respect to "purely artistic production," as though a work becomes damaged and compromised when faced with additional (potentially superfluous) thoughts and influences. The "direction" secondary ideas provide for a composition is one of depth and complexity, and it is not one of incoherence and detour. Secondary ideas show another side of the author or composer in the sense that a composition will present multiple ideas, and contain a lot of information, which will offer more insight into meaning. There is one characteristic difficulty involved with secondary ideas, which is simply to figure out whether two ideas function independently in a work or whether one idea is subordinate and dependent on the other. (This is the case when a secondary idea is a refraction of the main idea and does not present an entirely different kind of thought.) Schleiermacher writes that "the main thoughts are connected in a precise manner to the penetration of material and form, the secondary thoughts are not. . . . The determinacy of the

[182] One of the secondary themes of the movement, as discussed by Hepokoski and Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory*, 143-145.
[183] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 115.

relationship [between main and secondary thoughts] essentially belongs to the unity of the work and determines its character."[184] From Schleiermacher's statements, we can conclude that a main thought will appear as though its message is intimately bound up with the medium, form, and content. Secondary ideas are not as closely related to the creative impulse and the imposition of form – they reside in the details and development of a work's content. Secondary thoughts may even "take up relatively equal space"[185] in a work as a main thought.

When we examine this dichotomy in Schleiermacher's theory, we notice, on the one hand, that a main thought imprints a certain identity on a work and represents a concrete moment or thought. On the other hand, secondary ideas have a greater freedom to appear in a series of works without exhausting their meaning. This is partially a result of their meaning, which may not being wholly formed in the first place. Consequently we can consider a series of works, which have a similar thread of meaning that stays in the background, as continuity in thought.

When we analyze different passages where Schleiermacher discusses secondary ideas, we are able to conclude the following arguments: (1) secondary ideas are not more prominent in a work than a main idea or thought; (2) secondary ideas are generally intelligible from the perspective that an author or composer is not trying to trick or deceive their audience, but rather present secondary ideas intelligibly by utilizing a common ground of experience or knowledge to do so;[186] (3) secondary ideas or thoughts are seen principally to pertain to the meditation and not the composition of a work – these ideas may have occurred to the composer but were deemed not to pertain to the principal reason or thought behind the work, where "the real value of secondary thoughts must be recognized from the characteristic by which they are also distinguished from what resulted from the act of will" (we understand "the act of will" to refer namely to the main thought and the composer's decision to compose the work in question);[187] (4) secondary thoughts or ideas arise from the author's life (which is to say from within a progression) and generally occur

[184] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 116.
[185] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 116.
[186] This notion is taken primarily from Schleiermacher's discussion of conversation and secondary thoughts that arise in conversation and rhapsodic-like texts. For Schleiermacher, in this context, secondary thoughts should not appear "puzzling" to readers: "secondary thoughts are only ever taken from an area shared by the writer and the readers, from an area where the writer can presuppose that it can be made just as easily present to his readers as it is to him." Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 129.
[187] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 131.

throughout the individual's life as a continuous meditation on topics, themes, or concepts of interest (they have a continual influence on the author and appear consistently in multiple works).[188]

From these arguments, the most salient point we take away is that secondary thoughts do not necessarily refer to a concrete concept, but suggest something that the author or composer was thinking about. The influence of secondary thoughts must be great enough for a composer to include certain gestures or components in a work, even if the content remains less pronounced than the principal idea. Due to an economy of thought, and the *boundness* of form, the elements of a composition that suggest a secondary thought or idea should support the claim that secondary ideas do not try to "trick" or "deceive" an audience. The influence of a secondary thought or idea should come through a composition in a specific light, graspable by an audience through the recognition that its meaning is not the principal expression of the work but, nonetheless, it is important for the fabric of the composition.

We can examine this in a parallel phenomenon within sonata form, namely when a composer presents a *cantabile* second theme in the exposition; the audience recognizes this theme not as a foreign entity that threatens the balance of the first theme-second theme dichotomy associated with classical sonata form. A second theme usually presents a new and complementary direction of expression for the sonata as a whole. We can even experience the play between main ideas and secondary ideas within the same musical passage. Let us examine an example from Beethoven's Sonata in C Minor, Op. 13 ("Grande Sonata *Pathétique*").

[188] See citation above, Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 106.

Figure 2.16 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C Minor, Op. 13 ("Grande Sonate *Pathétique*"), mvmt. II, Adagio cantabile, mm. 1-10.[189]



The Adagio cantabile of the "*Pathétique*," is set within a pleasant A-flat major tonality. From this major mode haven, we recognize a characteristic dichotomy between the left hand and the right hand (see Figure 2.16, mm. 1-8), and this dichotomy makes itself heard throughout the entire movement. Beethoven has written a very "singing" or "song-like" melody (especially Figure 2.16, mm. 1-3 and the downbeat of m. 4) that is smooth, simple, and comforting after the final *fortissimo* punches of the sonata's exposition. The reserved joy in these first measures of the Adagio cantabile constitutes a main idea in the movement. The uplifting quality of this theme is expressed literally when Beethoven transposes it one octave higher (see Figure 2.16, mm. 9-10, and this theme continues until m. 16 [not pictured]). The secondary idea of this movement is perceptible to the performer the moment they attempt to play the first measures of the Adagio cantabile – Beethoven has presented us with a strong bass theme that runs the entire length of the soprano voice melody, and it is arguably more beautiful than the soprano melody. (Although it may appear counterintuitive, the bass theme illustrates the beauty of harmony, which is often overlooked and is rarely heard on its own; the performers who play and sing harmony

[189] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

voices recognize the startling and understated elegance of certain harmony parts that usually go unnoticed by a general audience.)

There are two arguments that come readily to the forefront when we consider this passage – the former scratches the surface with respect to the complexity of the passage, and the latter digs deeper into the significance of the voices: (1) it is undeniably a difficult task to achieve a lyrical balance when performing these opposing themes in the soprano and bass voices – not only must the performer strike a balance between these two outer voices, but the sixteenth-note accompaniment figures are played by the thumbs in both hands (this naturally causes the tenor and alto voices to sound louder unless the performer uses a skilled technique to give more weight to the weakest fingers in both hands [see Figure 2.16, mm. 9-10]); (2) the outer voices are exemplary of graceful *cantabile* themes and yet Beethoven clouds our perception of these voices with the metronome-like pounding of the thumbs of both hands. Although the alto voice is sometimes absent from the accompaniment, the tenor voice in this passage is consistent and reliable (see Figure 2.16, mm. 1-8). The tenor voice insists in a way that mirrors the voice in our mind that reminds us of a menial task we must do while we are in the midst of something important (e.g. when we are giving a lecture on a particularly thorny subject and the thought "I have to do laundry" keeps popping into our mind).

The indomitable bass theme challenges the beauty and authority of the soprano melody, which is charming in its own right; for this reason the bass theme expresses the secondary idea of this movement. It proves itself as a secondary idea in accordance with Schleiermacher's theory, as it crops up again in many of Beethoven's works. This is not to say that the actual bass theme from the Adagio cantabile, as a *leitmotif* of sorts, shows up in other compositions as though making a guest appearance. Instead, this passage serves as a model of a compositional effect where Beethoven introduces two opposing and stunning themes concurrently that seem to challenge the importance of one another. Outside of the "*Pathétique,*" we also find this effect in Beethoven's Sonata in C-sharp Minor "Quasi una fantasia," Op. 27, no. 2 ("Moonlight") in the first movement where the bass voice has as much influence on the meaning of the sonata as the soprano melody (see Figure 2.17, m. 5).

Figure 2.17 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp Minor, *Quasi una fantasia*, Op. 27, no. 2 ("Moonlight" [1801]), mvmt. I, Adagio sostenuto, mm. 1-7.[190]



The meaning of thoughts and ideas, according to Schleiermacher's theory, is not meant to "deceive." It is unintuitive for a composer to wish the meaning of their composition to be muddled in its very expression. Secondary thoughts or ideas are tools for judging coherence in a composer's oeuvre by way of tracing the presence of a secondary thought through one or several works. It is in this way that a work of music is able to attain a depth of meaning that transcends normative structure and traditional analysis. The meaning and significance of these ideas is found in each composition respectively. Recourse to biographical information asserts the presence of certain events that had an impact on a composer's life and compositions (as in the cases of the *Lebewohl* sonata and the "Eroica" symphony). We find deeper meaning and significance when we go beyond what a composition may wear on its sleeve or what may be most evident in biographical content. As we explored in the "*Pathétique*" sonata, depth of expression, seen through the lens of Schleiermacher's *secondary ideas,* is most profound in our examination of the material of the composition and what the composition says in its own vocabulary. Our ability to interpret that vocabulary can be articulated in Schleiermacher's method of the grammatical and psychological tasks of hermeneutics. Schleiermacher's hermeneutics helps us determine the way Beethoven's compositions have meaning for us, and thus

[190] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

have significance beyond Beethoven's original audience. By the same token, the meaning in Beethoven's compositions is not limited to a specific period or analytical structure, but can speak to us in terms of the recognition of content that has a timeless quality and touches on certain universal experiences.

Concluding Remarks

After we determine that a thought or idea is present in any number of Beethoven's complex passages, we can go on to form an understanding of what a particular musical work may be about. In this case we may refer to Schleiermacher's *one higher concept*, a notion that offers coherence to all main ideas and subsidiary or secondary ideas.[191] *One higher concept* can guide the grammatical and psychological tasks of hermeneutics, and grant intelligibility to complex as well as more transparent ideas in a work. In Beethoven's case, the *one higher concept* of a work, in addition to methodical, critical activity required to attain this level of understanding, resonates with A. B. Marx's musical *Idee* (A. B. Marx's *Idee* will be discussed in more detail in Part III of this dissertation).

The kind of understanding that deviates from a normative, theoretical structure – an understanding of music that focuses on expression and the expression of ideas through notation, performance, and critical activity – is present throughout Czerny's discussions of Beethoven's works (in *On the Proper Performance of All Beethoven's Works for Piano*) and also in Schnabel's edition of Beethoven's sonatas for piano.[192] We observe this in Czerny and Schnabel's respective descriptions of the expression needed to perform a particular passage: Czerny describes the second theme of the "Appassionata," saying that "the theme may appear as *legato* and *cantabile,* as if … performed by two hands"[193] and Schnabel adds additional expressive word cues for the entrance of the second theme – *pp dolce non espress*;[194] Beethoven, nevertheless, made no mention in the score specifically in the direction these authors have described. Czerny and Schnabel provide performance instructions that reflect an interpretative activity that accounts for both the grammatical and psychological tasks

[191] "One higher concept" appears in Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics,* 69.
[192] Schnabel's edition from Edizioni Curci, S.R.L., Milan, 1949 and reprinted by Alfred.
[193] Czerny, 59. Czerny introduces this sonata as a composition that should be "regarded as the most complete development of a powerful and colossal idea. The same physical and mental powers which the player has had to develop in the performance of most of the Sonatas … must be here displayed in a two-fold degree," Czerny, 58.
[194] See Schnabel, *Beethoven: Complete Piano Sonatas in Two Volumes: Historic Edition with Preface in English, Spanish, Italian, German, and French*, Artur Schnabel, ed., Milan: Edizioni Curci, S.R.L., 1949 [reprinted by Alfred USA – Van Nuys: Alfred Publishing Co, n.d.], volume II, 137. It is curious that in Schnabel's edition, Schnabel does not include the heading "Appassionata" for this work. Although Beethoven did not originally give this title to the work, it is most familiar to audiences by this name.

of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. It is important to note with respect to Czerny and Schnabel's suggestions for performance, they do not advocate that the performer should re-tell an extra-musical narrative in their performance. Their instructional comments suggest a thought that should be recognized within the musical construction of a passage and consequently how the passage should be played.

When we use the notion of thought, rather than narrative, we find that a work can be understood on a conceptual level, as exemplified by the "Eroica" symphony. The sequence of a thought and the expression of this thought equally contribute to the work's meaning and its universal or timeless aspect. When we find a work aims to express truth or ideas,[195] which can be understood beyond a historical period, this renders a sphere of meanings intelligible that can include narrative devices. The truth or idea that the "Eroica" symphony puts forward eventually becomes something that is not particular to Beethoven (although it is represented in his work). But Beethoven touched on something timeless in the process of bringing the symphony into being (in the creative process and especially in Beethoven's decision about the final subtitle of the symphony).

We can turn this same vision toward *secondary ideas* in the context of Beethoven's expressive notation, e.g. Beethoven's use of the term *dolce* in a number of passages. The thought behind these passages is not only Beethoven's innovation to expand the definition of the term *dolce* in musical notation, but these passages also reveal deeper meaning that is contained in their sonorous representations. Beethoven's utilization of expressive word cues in a unique way strives toward illustrating an ideal, and challenges our previous understanding of a set of terms from musical notation and our assumptions about the sonorous quality of expressive passages.

At the same time there is a need for critical discretion with respect to the explication and determination of ideas when we follow Schleiermacher's theory of hermeneutics. In this sense, we return to the notion of the "art" of hermeneutics. The "art" of hermeneutics dictates when too much biographical information is at the heart of our understanding of a particular work, or if one is projecting an overwhelming degree of speculation, which can render the truth of the object mute. We can see this

[195] This is a notion of truth, of content that does not have historical limits imposed on its ability to be understood; it is something we understand only by displacing ourselves from a "historical standpoint" or from a historical reading of a work. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 302-3, and understanding from a perspective of an unclosed horizon.

occur in the *Lebewohl* sonata: Beethoven may have written that sonata about Archduke Rudolph, but the truth and meaning of the work is often quieted, or becomes secondary, to a narrative explanation. The elements that contribute to the work's timeless quality are then welded unrecognizably into a narrative structure in order to support a claim about "Beethoven's genuine sense of loss"[196] rather than constitute a more independent meaning of isolation and alienation that is specific to the composition. In this chapter, we have defended various illustrations in the sonata of a "timeless" feeling of alienation rather than try to describe *Beethoven's* feeling of alienation after the Archduke departed from Vienna in 1809.

When we attempt to understand a composer's thought, and the language or medium used to present that thought (in order to create a level of empathy between ourselves and the work at hand), it is helpful to have an "insider's" understanding of how works in that genre are composed. From this "insider's" perspective, it is generally easier to recognize why certain rules of composition are necessary (understood from practical experience) and when breaking of certain rules determines *genius* rather than error. The similarities between Schleiermacher and A. B. Marx in this respect are strong. A. B. Marx's didactic approach to composition suggests that a good composer is an individual who knows basic rules, but also understands how music has an ability to express ideas and speak in elevated terms with respect to the spirit. It is in this direction that we shall explore A. B. Marx's *Idee* from a background in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics.

[196] See Kagan, *Archduke Rudolph*, 15.

PART III:

A. B. Marx's Idee: *Ideal Content and the Material of Music*

In *Ludwig van Beethoven: Life and Works* (1859), Marx undertakes a lengthy discussion of Beethoven's "Eroica" Symphony (Op. 55) and ideal music. Marx unexpectedly shifts the focus of his study and questions his own theory of musical expression. A pessimistic interlocutor comes to the podium and poses arguments held by many disparagers of musical aesthetics. The interlocutor is clearly exasperated, voicing two objections one after the other:

> Setting aside the program and all peripheral verbiage, where finally are the music's means for determinate expression? Leaving the authority of the artist out of the picture, how should we others understand their expression? [197]

Marx readily dispels these remarks. As though defending the foundation of his texts against incomprehension and future condemnation, the theorist offers an olive branch for critics by telling them *how* they can uncover musical meaning on their own:

> We must respond: direct your search to art—to its material, the sounds, chords, tonal relations…, rhythms! Take to this task all the aids of simile, symbolism, *psychological coherence*, all these spiritual guidelines that no artist and no person can do without![198]

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[197] Adolf Bernhard Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method*, ed. and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178. Original: *Ludwig van Beethoven: Leben und Schaffen*, Erster Band (Berlin: Otto Janke, 1859), 286.

[198] Adolf Bernhard Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method*, 178-179, italics mine, translation slightly modified. The original reads:
"Wo sind aber endlich, das Programm und alle Nebenreden bei Seite gesetzt, die Mittel der Musik für bestimmten Ausdruck? Wie sollen wir Andern, die Autorität der Künstler einmal aus dem Spiel gelassen, ihren Ausdruck verstehn? –

Wir müssen antworten: Forschet in der Kunst! In ihrem Material. den Schallen, Klängen, Tonverhältnissen (ein Paar Buchstaben aus ihrer Sprache sind hier schon zum Vorschein gekommen). Rhythmen! Nehmt dazu die Hülfsmittel des Gleichnisses, der Symbolik, des psychologischen Zusammenhangs, all' die geistigen Lenkfäden, deren kein Künstler, kein Mensch entrathen kann!" *Ludwig van Beethoven: Leben und Schaffen*, Erster Band (Berlin: Otto Janke, 1859), 286. Although, "psychological coherence" [*des psychologischen Zusammenhangs*] in the original appears in the genitive case, it seems Marx is making a list of skills or critical exercises one should undertake. As simile [*des Gleichnisses*] is also written in the genitive, we view psychological coherence also in this same sequence as one of Marx's "aids." The modifications I have made to Burnham's translation are: (1) to use the word "symbolism" instead of "symbol," as this seems to be a more adequate rendering of "*Symbolik*;" (2) I write *psychological coherence* in italics and this term will appear in italics throughout Part III of this dissertation. As this concept is somewhat foreign to current methods of musical

We, the critics and readers, along with Marx, are commanded to interpret musical meaning through this enumeration of critical skills. The activity Marx has elaborated constitutes a *sine qua non* for critical assessments of musical expression and meaning. By the same token, Marx nevertheless refrains from showing exactly how one should apply these tools in a critical exercise. When we make a closer examination of Marx's rebuttal, we are faced with two opposing camps: material explication (which involves normative theories and rules) and psychological, "spiritual guidelines." Following the general argument put forward, we grasp meaning in music through a process of examination and reflection from two different perspectives. Despite divergences, the material component will influence and enlighten the conclusions of the psychological component (and *vice versa*) in a hermeneutic fashion (akin to a similar process in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics). The ultimate meaning we reach for is captured in Marx's concept of *Idee*—ideal content that appeals both to material and psychological content of music and resolves the conflicts we encounter within a work as contributive to a coherent universal notion. In the following, we will explore these "spiritual guidelines" in depth: firstly, we will address simile and symbolism; secondly, we will discuss psychological coherence. Through a thorough investigation into the philosophical dimensions of the spiritual guidelines, we will develop a better picture of how spiritual guidelines inform Marx's concept of an *Idee.*

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interpretation, I feel it is necessary to use italics. Furthermore, *psychological coherence* is a concept that has an elaborate philosophical meaning. See Part III, chapter 2 of this dissertation for more on this theme.

Chapter 1:

Simile and symbolism

Let us reflect once more on the position Marx puts forward for determining meaning in music:

> Setting aside the program and all peripheral verbiage, where finally are the music's means for determinate expression? Leaving the authority of the artist out of the picture, how should we others understand their expression?
>
> Direct your search to art – to its material, the sounds, chords, tonal relations …, rhythms! Take to this task all the aids of simile, symbol, *psychological coherence*, all these spiritual guidelines that no artist and no person can do without![199]

In this passage, Marx presents two sides of interpretation. In a very loose way, we can say it resembles Schleiermacher's hermeneutics where the material of music is described through *grammatical interpretation* and reflection on this material demands *psychological interpretation*. The material of music will not be evaluated alone, nor will *simile*, *symbolism*, or psychological coherence be seen as operating alone without reference to the material of music. Similes and symbolism are familiar in discourse about art and literature, but in music the content of similes and the purpose of symbolism are not as clear-cut. To understand the context of Marx's "spiritual guidelines" we will look to Hegel's determination of similes and symbols as a source for meaning behind "the aids of simile" and symbolism in music. Hegel's *Aesthetics* will help to illuminate Marx's terminology and the applicability of these ideas to musical meaning. We will first explore *simile / comparisons* in Marx's writing on the second movement of the "Eroica" symphony. This will open the discussion to more complex notions of symbols in music; we will then evaluate the "Moonlight" sonata (Op. 27, no. 2) and the "Hammerklavier" sonata (Op. 106) in order to shed light on the usefulness of symbols in descriptions of music. We will also determine a more integrated relation between symbolism and Marx's concept of a musical *Idee*.

[199] A. B. Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method,* ed. and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178-179.

A. Simile – symbolism

It is easier to speak about symbols and signs in linguistic and pictorial arts – and these are where Hegel's initial examples came from in his treatment of symbols in the *Aesthetics*. Hegel describes animals, such as lions, foxes, and eagles, which often have symbolic meaning attached to their image.[200] For example, when we see a fox in a picture we may say the animal represents cunningness. But a fox also has more than one symbolic meaning – it can symbolize wisdom and cleverness. Thus when we see a painting of a fox, we must make a critical decision about whether this is not just a painting of a mammal (as representative of that biological creature), but if a deeper meaning resides in the fox's presence. If we find that it has symbolic meaning (through critical intuition, and the very context of the fox image may push meaning in a symbolic direction), then it follows that we must decide which meaning, among many, does this particular fox picture appeal to.[201] (When Hegel describes a picture of a lion, he does not state that it is a particular picture of a lion such as George Stubbs's "Horse Attacked by a Lion" [1769], or Rembrandt's "Lion Resting, Turned to Left" [1650-52]. This is not to say that Hegel has overlooked the visual import of color, depiction, and style at this point in his treatment of symbols with relation to aesthetic judgment. But Hegel does not mention these aspects from the get-go. Consequently what happens in Hegel's treatise is that the importance of context is distanced from our understanding of the basic principles of symbols and similes.)

Hegel sets out the concept of similes after discussing a basic symbolic picture of an animal. This strategy, in a discussion of symbolic meaning, addresses first what is less ambiguous and builds toward what is more ambiguous. In Hegel's examination of similes, he describes how an image and meaning are presented before our mind in an immediate fashion. To illustrate a simile, as a form of comparison, Hegel chooses an example from Schiller's *The Robbers* [1781]: "For example, Karl Moor cries out at the sight of the setting sun: 'So dies a hero.' Here the meaning is annexed to what is seen."[202] This *comparison* seems to exploit something Hegel has remembered from

[200] See G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,* trans. T. M. Knox, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)*,* 305-6.
[201] See Hegel, *Aesthetics,* 306.
[202] Hegel, *Aesthetics,* 307, translation modified. In Schiller's play, this character is also addressed as "Robber Moor," see Friedrich Schiller, "The Robbers," *The Robbers; Wallenstein*, trans. F. J. Lamport (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 20-160. Lewis Lockwood, in his chapter on Beethoven's First Symphony, writes about the early performances of *The Robbers* in Germany, which includes a mention

Schiller, but it is not the whole story behind what Schiller is saying or what the sunset means in the play. Hegel's reader comes away with understanding from the example that a sun is setting and it is symbolic of a hero dying – thus a clean and effective comparison. In a longer passage on similes, still in the *Aesthetics*, Hegel states:

> In simile . . . both sides, image and meaning are completely severed – if indeed with greater or lesser completeness, now of the image, now of the meaning; each is presented by itself, and only then, in this separation, are they related to one another on account of the similarities in their content. . . . [T]he simile may be called (a) a merely idle *repetition*, in that one and the same matter comes into the representation in a double form… and (b) an often wearisome *superfluity*, since the meaning is explicitly present already.[203]

In this formulation, Hegel shows us how similes are not always the happy pairing of images and meanings – each somehow suffers under the pressure of the other in virtue of their connection. By being connected, through a deeper meaning, each will lose something of their identity when the meaning, or the image, is seen singularly; the connection will render both sides into one entity, and this entity will either be like a *repetition* or *superfluity.* Both parts, the individual things, will annihilate their respective, singular meanings in virtue of a deeper meaning (or at least a different meaning) where image and meaning are roped together.

Let us refer again to Hegel's *The Robbers* example. The sunset and the hero are separate, singular entities. Karl Moor, by voicing the comparison, calls upon their "similarity in content." On one level, the sunset example illustrates a simile, an "idle *repetition.*" The reader does not sense the symbolic meaning in the sunset when it is presented in Hegel's formulation. But on a deeper level, the sunset is also symbolic in a more complex way and proves to be crucial for Schiller's play; Hegel merely paints the image with its legs cut off – there are more things in the scene than just Karl Moor and a sunset.

This leads us to face one of the greatest problems in Hegel's theory: ambiguity as an inherent characteristic of symbols. ("Symbols" here includes symbolic meaning in a global sense: similes, comparisons, and symbols proper.) As Hegel describes, a

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of the performance that took place in Bonn in 1792. As Beethoven had connections with persons involved with this performance, Lockwood speculates that Beethoven's "lifelong admiration for Schiller took root during this time and in this context," see Lewis Lockwood, *Beethoven's Symphonies: An Artistic Vision* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 21. Our reference to *The Robbers* in this chapter, and Lockwood's speculation, is a coincidence. *The Robbers* in our case is integral for our understanding of Hegel's symbolism.

[203] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 411.

symbol would be a conventional sign if all ambiguity of meaning were removed.[204] This ambiguity, nevertheless, can lead us into trouble.[205] This same ambiguity spills into comparisons and similes just the same despite *repetition* or *superfluity*; in virtue of their connection with narrative and context, similes and comparisons are simply not as debilitated from the ambiguity argument.[206]

Let us examine this ambiguity head-on. When we consider how devoid Hegel's sunset example is of dramatic context, the example becomes flimsy and self-serving; it stands to illustrate that our understanding of the death of a hero is attached to Hegel's rendering of the setting sun, as though the sun were the hero, and not much more. We encounter ambiguity in this example because the meaning is not entirely explicit – we can see a sunset in our mind but there are many kinds of sunsets depending on the season, which can have different symbolic meanings (a winter sunset can symbolize age, like a natural death from old age). As a reader of the *Aesthetics*, and not of *The Robbers*, we do not necessarily know that Karl Moor is looking at a radiant, "glorious," late-summer sunset in the context of the narrative.

With relation to music, similes are extremely useful for illustrating musical phenomena in words by borrowing descriptions that are immediately apprehensible; similes are also useful for pedagogical activities, e.g. to explain to a student how to play in a certain way when one particular description does not suffice. The simile or comparison, the "idle *repetition*," we find in prose about music seeks to replicate a musical expression in language. The repetition, as different in kind, somehow gives new life to the original musical expression one wishes to address. Beethoven famously uses the device in a letter to Carl Czerny in order to describe how to play long strings of descending or ascending sixteenth notes. Beethoven writes:

> I should like [my nephew] also to use all his fingers now and then, and in such passages … so that he may slip one finger over another. Admittedly such passages sound, so to speak, as if they were 'played like pearls (i.e. with

[204] Hegel, *Aesthetics,* 305-306.
[205] Paul de Man highlights this point in his critique of Hegel's symbolism, see "Sign and symbol in Hegel's *Aesthetics*" in *Aesthetic Ideology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 91-104, and in de Man's subsequent "Reply to Raymond Geuss" in *Aesthetic Ideology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 185-192, see especially 188.
[206] "In other cases, indeed, this separation and relation [between image and meaning] is not so clearly emphasized in similes; on the contrary, the connection remains more immediate; but in that event it must already be clear from the further connection of the narrative, from the context and other circumstances, that the image is not supposed to suffice on its own account but that there is meant by it this or that specific significance which cannot remain uncertain." Hegel, *Aesthetics,* 307.

only a few fingers) or like a pearl' – but occasionally we like to have a different kind of jewelry.[207]

The execution of this technique, nevertheless, is difficult to master as one must first pin down the relation between this description and a non-*legato* technique. In this case, the playing of the musical phrase is to replicate or *repeat* the image.

In music we can hear and see (in notation) phenomena that can be described with similes. In spite of this, music is heard and thus does not offer the clarity to our perception as a picture of a sunset, nor does musical-meaning seem as clear as a sentence spoken in our mother tongue by a native speaker. We encounter another dimension of complexity with respect to similes in Beethoven's description of performance technique because the way we touch a keyboard to create musical tones is not like seeing or feeling pearls on a necklace. The relation between music and meaning in similes is ambiguous and cannot avoid being so. As we see in Beethoven's letter, the relation between music and similes bears a greater resemblance to Hegel's *The Robbers* sunset comparison (which is loaded with more information than it lets on) than to traditional similes widely used in literature.

B. Nearing symbolism in music

We can find a deeper symbolic meaning within certain comparisons, but this requires that the context points meaning in a symbolic direction. Let us recover Hegel's example – the band of robbers and Karl Moor see the setting sun. The robber Schwarz declares upon seeing this sight: "How glorious the sun goes down." Moor loses himself in the vision of the sunset and exclaims: "So dies a hero!"[208] Soon after saying this, Moor foreshadows his own demise by commenting that he wished, as a child, to live and die like the setting sun.[209] He is granted that wish when he destroys all that he holds dear at the end of the play. When he offers himself up to the law in a selfless act of humility, to help a poor family so that he may be "admired for" the

[207] L. 878, To Carl Czerny, Vienna 1817, 742-742. *The Letters of Beethoven: collected, translated, and edited with an introduction, appendixes, notes and indexes by Emily Anderson,* volume II (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961).

[208] Hegel, 307; Schiller *The Robbers*, act III, scene ii.

Schwarz: Wie herrlich die Sonne dort untergeht!

Karl Moor: (in den Anblick verschwimmt): so stirbt ein Held!

Friedrich Schiller. *Die Räuber. Ein Schauspiel* (Frankfurt: [n.p.], 1781).

[209] Karl Moor: Da ich noch ein Bube war – war's mein Lieblingsgedanke, wie *sie* zu leben, zu sterben wie *sie – (mit verbissenem Schmerz.)* Es war ein Bubengedanke! [*Die Räuber*, III, ii].

act,[210] we experience a conclusion that is as spectacular as a roaring late-summer sunset. It is in cases such as these that a linguistic phrase, "Thus dies a hero," lacks expressive depth and requires the lengthy description of anguish from Robber Moor about what he wishes he could retain from boyhood dreams.

After the sunset reference, Karl Moor descends into a spiral of remorse on his own poor choices in life. In the presence of something that is profoundly beautiful that even a robber takes notice of its glory (this robber has an ironic name for this purpose: *Schwarz* [black]), Moor becomes introspective and melancholy. For Moor the sunset reminds him of his better self in his childhood. It reminds him of the hope he felt in sunsets he saw in his past; for his robber companions, the sunset is much like the objects they seek to steal: a sight overflowing with life and vitality. In light of this dual structure (Moor/Robbers), we realize the depth of symbols when we ask: what does the sunset mean, and why is it important to maintain in the narrative even if symbols are inherently ambiguous and can mean just about anything? What does this sunset symbolize in *The Robbers*, and how deep does it go? One way that symbolism works in descriptions of music is that it takes us out of a narrative and issues a timeless character, much like *The Robbers* sunset has relation to a narrative structure and also to meaning beyond the story that Schiller tells. Arguably we understand the symbol of a sunset as much as a reader in Schiller's time – and this is how the symbol escapes the limitations of a historical narrative that is relevant to only one moment in history.

Hegel's simple illustration from *The Robbers* clearly proves a point about comparisons and serves as a stepping-stone to more complex similes and symbols. With Hegel's similes and comparisons in the background, we will examine some of A. B. Marx's prose where he uses similes and comparisons in his writings on music. For instance, we can find these devices in the narrative Marx devises to describe the second movement (Marcia funebre*,* Adagio assai) of Beethoven's Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, "Eroica." He defends that the Marcia funebre is representative of death on the battlefield and is a natural consequence of the victory of battle portrayed in the first movement. In Marx's opinion, a funeral march does not dominate the meaning of the movement: "the superscript is only an indication,

[210] See *The Robbers,* act V, scene 2.

offering a first clue as to the interpretation."[211] When Marx speaks of the trio "Maggiore" section of the Marcia funebre, we suddenly leave the hero narrative (that is normally imposed on the interpretation of the symphony) behind and we set our sights on deeper meaning; the entrance of the trio in a major mode, within a sequence of a funeral march, inspires us to look for meaning beyond funerals, marches, and mourning.

[211] Marx, *Musical Form*, 171.

Figure 3.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55 ("Eroica"), mvmt. II, Marcia funebre, Adagio assai, trio, mm. 68-76.[212]



Marx describes the trio (Figure 3.1) at mm. 69-105:

> The gentle C major song enters in oboes, then flute, then bassoon, over strings that are now drawing deep breaths of relief and stirring with fresh life – an alternating dialogue is already perceptible in their lower voices. There is

[212] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind permission of Bärenreiter.

> no doubt but that the sweetness of dying for the fatherland and for freedom is being praised here, for the entire army of the orchestra answers with the brightest cry of triumph, bringing on trumpet fanfares for the first time, along with thundering tympani.[213]

The trio, the "C major song," is strange for a number of reasons. First and foremost, our sense of time shifts as the shape of the melody makes the initials bars of the trio (mm. 69-74) until the *fortissimo* sound as though they were in triple meter, like a waltz with a lilt of lightness. Beethoven writes a *dolce* for the flute melody only, which softens the shrill range of the melodic notes and dulls the abrupt shift in mood. Second, the fanfare Marx describes (Figure 3.1, m. 75) brings the trio back into a clear duple meter feel and grants seriousness to the section, as the "C major song" had virtually eliminated the gravity of the earlier section of the Marcia funebre. The fanfare roars in, with the crescendos of the strings and woodwinds, peacocking in a fashion more typical of the first movement of the "Eroica."

When we examine Marx's description of the trio, we find several examples of comparisons. For example: "strings that are now drawing deep breaths of relief and stirring with fresh life – an alternating dialogue is already perceptible in their lower voices." This comparison can be drawn between the major triad arpeggios in the violins, and the exchange between the cellos and basses in concert with the violas. This variation between parts with respect to shape, rhythms, and figures, which counter the melody as though following the lead of a different instrument, does not correspond to anything previous in the movement. To this extent, Marx's comparisons do not contain much ambiguity.

We encounter a more complex image, one with greater symbolic meaning, when Marx writes: "there is no doubt that the sweetness of dying for the fatherland and for freedom is being praised here." He quotes as evidence that the orchestra "answers with the brightest cry of triumph, bringing on trumpet fanfares," and we clearly hear this in (Figure 3.1) m. 76 onward at least in part because fanfares are often used to illustrate triumph. But what part of the music inspires Marx to deduce that the trio section contains a symbolic meaning of *a sweetness of dying for the fatherland and for freedom*? To answer this, it is important to consider the depth of the music and the symbol he describes. Consequently, it is the context of the trio (and a reflection on the "Eroica" symphony as a whole) that will inform the meaning of

[213] Marx, *Musical Form*, 171.

this section. The trio can inspire other kinds of thoughts, images, and symbols; thus, in light of the unexpected major section, we can imagine the trio is like an individual who attends the funeral of a great hero but is dressed in attire more appropriate for a night on the town than mourning. We view a thought of this kind as an immediate response to the trio and its context within the movement. The depth of Beethoven's expression in this section, however, forbids that our conclusions be so shallow and immediate. Marx finds an elegant solution to the cheerful start of the trio, by saying it is praise for the sweetness of dying for the fatherland and for freedom. "Sweetness" describes not only the *dolce* in the flutes (and the waltz-sounding melody in Figure 3.1, mm. 69-75), but is a noun whose definition casts light on the idea of death for a greater purpose. Suddenly the *dolce* has taken on a much deeper level of meaning and drives home the seriousness of the *fortissimo* fanfare in m. 76.

Although embedded in Beethoven's funeral march, the trio C major section is undoubtedly uplifting in its stark contrast to the earlier measures of the movement. We encounter an ambiguity of meaning with relation to this section when we question how the "C major song" fits into a greater aesthetic scheme. Marx finds this section to be symbolic of the sweetness of dying for one's fatherland and freedom. With the juxtaposition of lethargic mourning depicted earlier in the movement and the uplifting melodic strains in the trio (not to mention the arpeggiated major chord in the strings), the trio section does not leave much room for ambiguity regarding the major transition in the movement's demeanor. The shift is drastic and abrupt, but graciously ushered in with the ascending cellos and basses that play a truncated scale leading up to the new tonic. The greater aesthetic scheme, nevertheless, is nothing other than Marx's musical *Idee*. This trio forms one detail of a greater meaning that we find in the symphony. The way musical symbolism can inform a musical *Idee* will be discussed in the following section.

C. More abstract symbols in music

Hegel puts forward a simplified and elegant way to understand symbols by describing the meaning of the Eucharist in Catholic versus Protestant (Calvinist) traditions. He writes:

> In Catholic doctrine, for example, the consecrated bread is the actual flesh, the wine the actual blood of God, and Christ is immediately present in them. . . . In this mystical identity there is nothing purely symbolical; the latter only arises in the Reformed [i.e. Calvinist] doctrine, because here the spiritual is explicitly severed from the sensuous, and the external object is taken in that case as a mere pointing to a meaning differentiated therefrom. In the miracle-working images of the Madonna too the power of the Divine operates by immediate presence in them and is not, as might be thought, only hinted at symbolically through the images.[214]

Hegel puts forward the Reformed doctrine's interpretation of the bread and wine in Communion as examples of symbols. What we take away from this is that, in symbols, deeper meaning is "severed from the sensuous;" an object (consecrated bread) points to a spiritual meaning (more immediately the flesh of Christ and then, through reflection, the recognition of Christ's sacrifice) that is different from the object itself. The object *points* to this other meaning that does not look like the object itself. We are reminded here of Marx's musical *Idee*: it might not be immediately perceptible in the music, but it comes forward in a subtle way as though the music itself were pointing to this meaning. The kind of critical intuition involved in divining this kind of meaning mimics how we arrive at spiritual meaning in Hegel's example (that is through reflection on Communion). Marx's *symbolism* [*Symbolik*] comes into play when we identify symbols in music. We can imagine these symbols as localized versions of Marx's musical *Idee*; when we discover a symbol in music, we presume that its meaning will reflect an aspect of the *Idee* (thereby disclosing elements of the meaning of the whole). Marx offers an example of this when Marx identifies symbolic meaning (e.g. "praise of dying for the fatherland") in the trio of the Marcia funebre in the "Eroica." This symbolic meaning, nevertheless, does not capture the totality of the *Idee* of the symphony.

To look more closely at symbols in music, and their relation to the whole of a work, we will consider an example from the first movement of Beethoven's Sonata *Quasi una Fantasia* in C-sharp minor ("Moonlight"), Op. 27, No. 2 (composed 1801): the *pianissimo* indications.

[214] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 325.

Figure 3.2 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp minor, *Quasi una fantasia*, Op. 27, no. 2 ("Moonlight" [1801]), mvmt. I, Adagio sostenuto, mm. 1-7.[215]



Beethoven provides a lengthy description about the use of pedals in the first movement, and that a specific touch is needed: "Si deve suonare tutto questo pezzo delicatissimamente e senza sordino." These instructions outshine the *pianissimo* indication within the staff of m. 1 (Figure 3.2). Sandra Rosenblum goes on to translate the instructional heading and to describe the complexity of this indication for performance. She writes:

> 'This whole piece ought to be played with utmost delicacy and without damper[s]'. . . . This double instruction to play the entire Adagio sostenuto without dampers is often considered the most puzzling of Beethoven's unusual damper indications. Was it meant to be observed literally or only to indicate that the dampers should be in operation throughout, with deft articulation of the mechanism wherever too much blurring of the harmonies occurred? In 1801, when Op. 27/2 was composed, the damper-raising mechanism on Beethoven's piano was still the knee lever, and his terms for its use were in the Italian words whose bulk may have discouraged frequent repetition. We also know that certain kinds of mixed harmonies were sought-after pianistic effects.[216]

From Rosenblum's descriptions of pedaling, it seems the "mixed harmonies," without too much blurring, is the movement's principal means of expression. Even so, after a

[215] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.
[216] See Sandra P. Rosenblum, *Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 136.

discussion of historical instruments (including some of Beethoven's own), Rosenblum does not reach a satisfactory explanation of Beethoven's indications for dampers. In the context of the "Moonlight" sonata, she writes instead that: "by far the most important interpretative elements are the balancing of the indicated *forte* and *piano* sounds and the occasional adding of discretionary quiet dynamics."[217] Rosenblum's comment suggests that Beethoven's indications about dampers are actually in service of the dynamics (explicit *forte* indications cannot be found in the first movement, so it is difficult to understand which measures she may be referring to). In Beethoven's earlier keyboard sonatas, we do not encounter such detailed instructions in the heading. The instructions at the start of the first movement of the "Moonlight" sonata are curious, moreover, because the piece looks relatively simple on the surface (pictured in Figure 3.2). The information contained in the double description within the staves, "*sempre* ***pianissimo*** *e senza sordino*" appears superfluous because "*senza sordino*" is repeated in the descriptive heading and within the staff of m. 1 (see Figure 3.2). We also associate the word "*delicatissimamente*" with a *piano* dynamic, as it would be difficult to play *forte* in a delicate way. In any event, the Italian instructions in the heading, and within the staff at m. 1, are our first hint that the movement is after a deeper meaning; Beethoven does not leave the performer to their own devices and intuition for playing the work, thus the deeper meaning in the composition will only be grasped through a special execution of the music.

Czerny describes the deeper meaning in this movement when he writes that it "is highly poetical, and therefore perfectly comprehensible to any one. It is a night scene, in which the voice of a complaining spirit is heard at a distance."[218] When Czerny argues that the first movement is "perfectly comprehensible to anyone," we might assume that this is a hyperbolic statement and reflects on the prevalence of this sonata in the repertoire of young piano students across the globe. "Comprehensible to anyone," nevertheless, suggests another level of meaning in the music. This meaning should touch on something fundamental to human experience and it should reside within the expression of the piece. By the same token if the piece is played well, then its meaning should be apprehensible to even those who are uninitiated in musical

[217] Rosenblum,137.
[218] Carl Czerny, *On the Proper Performance of All Beethoven's Works for the Piano*. *CZERNY'S "Reminiscences of Beethoven" and chapters II and III from volume IV of the "Complete Theoretical and Practical Piano Forte School Op. 500"* ed. Paul Badura–Skoda ([Vienna]: Universal edition, 1970), 49.

studies. The complex *senza sordino* indications and *si deve suonare tutto questo pezzo delicatissimamente* address the performer not only with the intent that the piece should sound delicate in virtue of the touch needed to play *delicatissimamente*. In fact, the blending of sonorities will provide a backdrop for the expression to a larger problem of meaning. Consequently, the meaning of the work should be simple enough for everyone to grasp it. We touch on this larger problem in the first movement of the "Moonlight" sonata when we ask questions directed at some of the fundamental aspects of the music, e.g. "what lies within the division between *piano* and *forte*?" and "what does it mean for the movement to be dominated by a *piano* dynamic?" It is in our answers to these questions that we find place for Czerny's description of the "voice of a complaining spirit is heard at a distance" in the deeper space of symbolic meaning.

Let us look at the *sempre pianissimo* indication in Figure 3.2, measure 1, and the *pianissimo* indication listed beside the melody note in the right hand in measure 5. The repetition of indications as to loudness and effect enforces the notion that this movement is to be played very, very quietly. And although commentary generally avoids mentioning this,[219] it is exceedingly difficult to play this movement at a *pianissimo* dynamic – all voices should sound in balance with each other and the slurred melody should be able to glisten in an articulate and graceful way. Although the movement shifts between *piano* and *pianissimo* through crescendos and decrescendos, the variations in volume and touch are so slight that a crescendo in the score threatens to overthrow the delicate footing of the expression.

One particular passage seems to drive home the sense of symbolic meaning in the "Moonlight" sonata (see Figure 3.3, m. 42). This passage is very similar to Figure 3.2, m. 5, although it lacks indications of slurs in the triplet figures. (There are also no rests in the treble staff, which we can locate in m. 5. This most likely has to do with the fact that the melody has reached very low depths in mm. 40-41, and the earlier rests apply more to the accompaniment triplet figure of the right hand that characteristically begins the movement in mm. 1-4.) Importantly, there are two

[219] Rosenblum's highly informed commentary on the use of pedals in this movement, specifically through her own experiments with various keyboard instruments, avoids addressing the difficulty of the varied *piano / pianissimo* touch (a fundamental technique required for performing the piece). In defense of her commentary, her excellent description of the complexity of pedaling in the "Moonlight" sonata is only relative to pedaling and not the varying techniques that are needed for practice of the movement as a whole.

pianissimo indications in m. 42 (see Figure 3.3). The two *pianissimo* indications hint that the deep, chordal foundation in the left hand and the melody in the right hand are distinct in their aesthetic roles; what is played by the left and right hands, respectively, should sound at the same volume and touch: *pianissimo*.

Plate 3. Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp Minor, *Quasi una fantasia,* Op. 27, no. 2 ("Moonlight," [1801]), mvmt. I, Adagio sostenuto, Autograph, BH 60, fol. 3r, with kind permission from Beethoven-Haus Bonn.



Figure 3.3 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp minor, *Quasi una fantasia*, Op. 27, no. 2 ("Moonlight," [1801]), mvmt. I, Adagio sostenuto, mm. 40-3.[220]



These *pianissimo* indications are as innovative and inspiring as the passage is almost impossible to execute. It is also rare to find this kind of offset pairing of dynamics in the same measure, as though the *pianissimo* indications explicitly point to a harmonious interchange between the right and left hands. When we consult Plate 3, in the third system, Beethoven has added the second *pianissimo* indication for the treble staff in a different ink color. It seems that it may be a correction or addition to the original, but it highlights the dichotomy between the triplet figure in the accompaniment and the melody. Although these two entities are marked with *pianissimo* indications, they are differentiated from each other in virtue of the respective locations of the indications in the passage.[221]

To complicate matters, both voices sound as though they are expressing a similar idea that is intimate (this is achieved with a gentle touch, which we remember from the *delicatissimamente* heading at the start of the movement) and distant (as the melodic voice is almost lost in the cavernous chord played by the left hand). First, the performer must restrain their technique unnaturally in this triplet sequence to successfully capture the mirrored *pianissimo* indications. Second, the lack of variety with respect to dynamics alludes to early keyboard instruments that had little to no control over dynamics. One must strain to hear the progression of the melody through the arpeggios. The figurative intimacy this calls for, a listener to be on the edge of

[220] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.
[221] The double *pianissimo* indications, as shown in the autograph, are present in the first edition. See Ludwig van Beethoven, *Piano Sonata in C-sharp minor, op. 27, no. 2, "Moonlight Sonata"*, Part 2: *Facsimile of Original Edition with Sketch Transcriptions and a Commentary by Michael Ladenburger*, Series III, Selected Manuscripts in Facsimile, eds. Sieghard Brandenburg and Michael Ladenburger (Bonn: Verlag Beethoven-Haus Bonn, 2003). This publication reproduces the first edition in facsimile: Ludwig van Beethoven, *Sonata quasi una Fantasia per il Clavicembalo o Piano = forte, composta, e dedicate alla Damiagella Contessa Guilietta Guicciarda… Opera 27, no. 2* (Vienna: Giovanni Cappi, 1802).

their seat as though physically approximating their body to the instrument to hear better, and makes this distance perceptible both physically and mentally. We may hear every note in the sequence, but we are unable make the meaning out. On the one hand, we have a spectator who hears these muffled arpeggios and weak sustained tones with great difficulty and is desperate to figure out if they heard everything there was to hear; on the other hand, we have a performer who makes a great effort not to overcome the *pianissimo* barrier and puts heart-felt expression into a melody that looks more like a pedal tone or a supporting voice in an orchestra. To the performer's disadvantage, they must execute a balance between the luxuriously veiled left hand chord and the hollow pedal-like melody with a nagging triplet accompaniment rhythm that pounds away. The sandwiched accompaniment tightens expression to a strict line, like the ticking of a clock; any *tempo rubato* (that supports expressive depth), when applied to the accompaniment and/or melody, gives the impression that the musical material limps profoundly toward cadential resolution.

Within this sequence, performers find distance between themselves and what they play, as the dynamics hardly allow performers to even hear the expression of the music. We recognize a physical notion of distance (the *sensuous* of Hegel's example) but also a symbol of distance when we reflect on a performance of the "Moonlight" sonata. Throughout the first movement, the spectator struggles to feel that they understand what is being played. The music, despite this, is performed at a volume as though the pianist were practicing alone and not necessarily trying to be understood on a grand, public scale. The pianist, moreover, performs the movement – for its expression to be comprehended by all listeners – in a counterintuitive way by playing muted and fragile tones. In the passage cited above (Figure 3.3, m. 42; Plate 3, third system), the listener grabs on to the sustained melodic notes, which are pinned against a backdrop cast by the chord in the bass. The listener intuits the deeper meaning they feel resides within the sequence that offers the impression of distance.

We are reminded again of Schiller's *The Robbers* at this point, namely of physical - sensuous meaning that, in reflection, has symbolic meaning. Robber [Karl] Moor has arrived at his childhood home as the unrecognizable robber he has become. He confronts his father and is about to show himself to be his father's son, to reveal the truth of who he is. But he cannot bring himself to do this. The father, who believes his son to have been killed on a distant battlefield, does not understand what truth it is that this stranger is grappling with to tell:

ROBBER MOOR [*in the most violent agitation*]:
Now it must be – now – leave me [*to the ROBBERS*]. And yet – Can I give him back his son again? – I can no longer give him back his son – No! I will not do it.
OLD MOOR: What, my friend? What were you saying to yourself?
ROBBER MOOR: Your son – Yes, old man – [*Stammering*]
your son – is – lost for ever.
OLD MOOR: For ever?
ROBBER MOOR [*looking up to heaven in anguish*]:
O but this once– let not my soul be weakened – but this once sustain me!
OLD MOOR: For ever, you say?
ROBBER MOOR: Ask no more. For ever, I said.
OLD MOOR: Stranger! Stranger!
Why did you drag me out of my dungeon?[222]

This sequence of dialogue is intimate in a physical sense: old Moor is close enough to Karl and the band of robbers to overhear the violence and agitation in Karl's words. Karl says the words: "Now it must be," to no particular person. Nevertheless, when he speaks to the band of robbers (in a dialogue that sounds more like a conversation with himself), he discusses the possibility of offering the truth of his identity to his father, thus strengthening their bond, which would result in a physical closeness between father and son. Old Moor insists on asking about the meaning of the words that Robber Moor has said to himself. At this moment, Old Moor is much like spectators of the "Moonlight" sonata's first movement because the spectators are confused by their intuition that they have heard music that contains deeper meaning but are not entirely sure they have heard it at all; this meaning, this *something,* is at such a remove that the dynamic levels become symbolic of distance between composer and listener – namely the distance between musical expression and the truth it puts forward.

Robber Moor merely responds to old Moor with an apparent truism "your son is lost forever" (this son is, of course, Robber Moor himself). It is the apparent simplicity and clarity of this statement that frustrates and confuses old Moor. "For ever [*ewig*]?" he repeats twice, as if this "forever" may mean something beyond the definition of the word, where if forever means "eternity" then it may be beyond the reaches of death itself. The anguish Karl Moor puts himself through – to keep the truth of his earlier statement away from his father – creates a stranger distance

[222] Friedrich Schiller. *The Robbers*, act V, scene ii (152-3).

between the two men, even when they are physically close to one another. They also have an immediate emotional bond with each other, because hours earlier Robber Moor rescued Old Moor from a dungeon. Nevertheless, it is as though old Moor had been a prisoner in Plato's cave, but only awarded a partial-view of truth; Old Moor is angered that he has been taken out of the confines of the darkness of the physical dungeon his other son Franz had put him in. But this is also a figurative dungeon, one that does not allow him to see that Robber Moor is in fact his estranged son Karl. The listener of Beethoven's "Moonlight" sonata may not feel like they have been taken out of a dungeon to have a glimpse of truth through musical expression; there remains, nevertheless, a feeling of frustration and distance that we suffer when we are unable to grasp the meaning Beethoven has illustrated in the composition (a meaning that we feel in the parallel *pianissimo* indications).

In Hegel we find two crucial aspects of symbols and symbolic meaning: (1) a symbol points at meaning and (2) the spiritual is severed from the sensuous. In a study of symbolism and symbols in music, we should reflect on what we hear to derive meaning. It is important to note that symbolic meaning is usually not explicit in our immediate impression (for example, we do not hear a single note and recognize immediately that it is a symbol of death); discourse on the symbolic in music is at variance with the immediate experience because we are not pointing to a word in a poem or to a lion in a painting that can reproduce the immediate experience countless times in a spontaneous way. We have to capture the immediate experience of the music (pointing to the score is one way, but this does not embody the experience entirely) in descriptive words, reflect on that experience in words, and then use these descriptions to highlight symbolism therein. Symbols are a way for us to articulate the strangeness of certain moments in music, where passages call attention to themselves by invoking a characteristic feeling. Other ways of talking about those passages (like using technical vocabulary) do not seem to capture the meaning of those passages. Thus Marx defends that musical meaning is found through both material and "spiritual guidelines." One way that we can illustrate spiritual guidelines is through symbolism, which we explored above in our example from *The Robbers*. Beethoven is not necessarily portraying the scene between Karl Moor and his father. But the symbolic meaning we find of distance in both the play and the "Moonlight" sonata offers insight with respect to the meaning we feel in the "Moonlight" sonata that is difficult to render in a prose description. We can imagine opposition to the claim that

a composition can support, and enhance, the idea that music contains symbolic meaning. A counterargument might follow Hegel's position: the two sides of a comparison can lose their independent meanings by being roped into a comparative relation. We argue here that despite weakened independent meanings, the depth of symbolic meaning in the "Moonlight" sonata becomes stronger precisely through reflection on this scene in *The Robbers.*

To illustrate this, we will look at another example of symbolic meaning from the first movement of Beethoven's *Grand Sonata in B-Flat Major*, Op. 106, "Hammerklavier."

Figure 3.4 Ludwig van Beethoven, Grand Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, "Hammerklavier" [composed 1817–1818], mvmt. I, Allegro, recapitulation, mm. 233-249.[223]



[223] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

In Figure 3.4, mm. 240–244, we encounter a moment that first and foremost feels sublime on the pianist's fingers. The first movement of the "Hammerklavier" is in B-flat major, which is a relatively uncomfortable key because of the location of the black keys in the scale. It is a scale that is crooked, and feels characteristically uneven, which may have to do with the fact that we start the scale with our second finger in the right hand and third finger in the left hand. We find a wholly different position for our hand in mm. 240–244, with all the black keys of G-flat major and D-flat major. The G-flat major scale has a calm quality about it, perhaps because the thumb rests on G-flat, a black key, and almost all fingers are on black keys – it is a restful position that evokes innocence because often when children sit a piano for the first time, they play only black keys. Beyond the feel of the scale in these measures, there is little opposition between the rhythms of both hands. The melody, harmony, and accompaniment glide together across a sheet of ice as though mirroring the movements of the other.

From a performance perspective, the pianist notices the following characteristics in these measures: (1) the feel of the key and (2) the lack of opposition between parts. For the listener, these few measures pass by exceedingly fast. What the spectator hears, whether fully recognizing it or not, is a harmonious instance of joy and rest – we can breathe easily with the calming flow of the melodic tones and the consonance between parts. This moment is sudden and reserved, without much announcement, like sunlight that strikes through a forest canopy. But it is in this passage that we find the measures point to meaning outside of the immediate, sensuous form. Cloaked in *cantabile e legato*, the meaning reaches beyond theoretical commentary and performance practice to gesture toward deeper meaning. The spectator and the performer can usually recognize symbolic meaning equally in music, and thus in most cases it is not strictly necessary to strike a difference between the two experiences of a piece. In this particular case, performers recognize the symbolic meaning first by the feel of the passage under their fingers, like the sensuous jolt in Hegel's example, which issues a secondary and longer lasting invitation for reflection. The tempo is such that it is difficult to grab on to this symbolic meaning through listening alone. The density of the movement and the (arguably more interesting) *cantabile* / *dolce ed espressivo* melody in the exposition (Figure 3.5), which sits more calmly in our musical memory of the movement, all make locating meaning in the work a more difficult task from a listener's perspective.

Figure 3.5 Ludwig van Beethoven, Grand Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, "Hammerklavier" [composed 1817–1818], mvmt. I, Allegro, exposition, mm. 100-107.[224]



All of the movements of the "Hammerklavier" are notoriously difficult. We can find the source of some of the difficulty of the first movement in oppositions: shouts of triumph with fanfare figures, counterpoint, and themes that appear to contradict a holistic meaning in the sonata. This is the case with the melody we encounter in the otherworldly section of the recapitulation we discussed above (see Figure 3.4). This theme from Figure 3.4 is not new to the movement. In fact, we find a very similar-looking theme early in the exposition (Figure 3.6, mm. 8-16).

[224] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

Figure 3.6 Ludwig van Beethoven, Grand Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, "Hammerklavier" [composed 1817-1818], mvmt. I, Allegro, exposition, mm. 1-19.[225]



In the first measures of the exposition (Figure 3.6), we have a glimpse of the whole of the movement: a fanfare juxtaposed with a lyrical melody, and fairly autonomous voices. (In mm. 11-15, the bass clef staff is visually separated from the treble clef staff above it in virtue of a slur that starts in m. 9 [where the music is also marked in the treble clef] until m. 15. The sound creates the illusion that the bass voice is on its own mission to see how far away it can move from the other parts.) When we consider the recapitulation (Figure 3.4, m. 239), the voices in the left hand

[225] Beethoven, *The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward* © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM.

complement the right and function together in light of the *cantabile e legato* indication.

The *cantabile* / *dolce ed espressivo* section from the exposition (shown in Figure 3.5) offers a vision of grace that resembles Charles Rosen's infamous evaluation of the sonata's first movement: "between far-flung dissonance and the impetuous force of the details comes not only the sonority peculiar to the work but also the combination of stern brilliance and transitory pathos."[226] As Rosen argues, the "Hammerklavier" is dominated by the sonority of the interval of a descending third. This is not only because of the melodic harmonization, but also because we find descending thirds in the main theme and in the harmonic movement.[227] At the early stages of the recapitulation, the composer slowly dismantles this sonority (or sounds to be doing so even if analysis shows triads in inversions and descending thirds) only to bring it to the forefront once again (for example, Figure 3.4, mm. 248-249). The *a tempo* section, that precedes the *cantabile e legato* section in Figure 3.4 (mm. 234-238), serves as an introduction to the otherworldly solitude to this sonata by pulling apart the tight seam of the descending thirds sonority.

Measures 240-244 of the recapitulation (Figure 3.4) sound like undeserved bliss and a glimpse of peace in the midst of conflict. These measures challenge Rosen's "transitory pathos" and "stern brilliance." When we do not examine the details of the "Hammerklavier," Rosen's description of the movement as a whole has the ability to undercut the delicate differences between sections as it attempts to unite seemingly disparate parts. This particular moment of sublimity and hope in the recapitulation, contrariwise to the pressures of rigidity and structure of descending thirds, enters the sounding space as though it were from a different musical work. And despite this, it is a theme that is familiar throughout the whole exposition. This theme, with *cantabile e legato*, runs into the recapitulation and is suddenly glamorous in haute couture. With a pedal tone on the dominant, and a joyous G-flat sonority, we

[226] Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style*: *Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), 422. A longer description reads as follows: "Insofar as a musical idea can be circumscribed by words, it should be obvious that even in a purely formal description, the central idea of the opening movement of the *Hammerklavier* is not merely a series of descending thirds, but the relation of the large tonal structure (with its powerfully dissonant long-range clash of B flat major and B major) to the rhythmic and harmonic energy of the sequences formed by the falling thirds. From this relation between far-flung dissonance and the impetuous force of the details comes not only the sonority peculiar to the work but also the combination of stern brilliance and transitory pathos," Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style*, 422.

[227] Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style*, 422. The passage is cited at length in footnote above.

discover a new dimension of this theme; the theme becomes stunning and rare to the extent that it no longer resembles its supposed role in sonata form. The theme, and the movement as a whole, point to meaning outside the score at this moment. This passage glitters and shines; it does not foreshadow what is to come, but is a vision of a singular, precious idea. The movements that follow in the "Hammerklavier," and especially the Adagio, exhibit such a darkness and expressive depth that they are untouched by the ephemeral glory of the recapitulation.

The passage from the recapitulation (Figure 3.4, mm. 240-244) has such a short duration that it gives the impression that it is over before it started, and the fact that this section is comprised of four measures (played at a rapid tempo) is only one aspect of its ephemerality. But we can derive this significant feeling (where it seems the passage almost did not even happen) from the impression that the musical material has no impact on the movement as a whole, namely it does not appear to change or influence the likely series of musical events after we hear it. To examine the depth of symbolic meaning in these measures, we shall make another comparison to *The Robbers*. The relationship between Amalia and Karl Moor that we witness in the action of *The Robbers* is rocky and lived through memories (their few interactions together are almost all under the pretense that Karl is "Count Brand from Mecklenburg"). In the last scene of the play, a most curious chain of events takes place: Amalia knows Robber Moor is her husband (despite that he tries to hide this fact from her), and she forgives him. For one exchange in dialogue, Karl Moor shows a joyful side; he reveals this quality only once and it will not return:

> ROBBER MOOR: She is pretending to weep, pretending there is a soul that weeps for me.
> [AMALIA *throws her arms about his neck*.]
> Ah, what is this? She does not spit at me, she does not thrust me from her – Amalia! Have you forgotten? Do you know who it is you are embracing, Amalia?
> AMALIA: My only one, I shall never leave you!
> ROBBER MOOR [*in ecstatic joy*]: She forgives me, she loves me! I am pure as the heavenly aether, she loves me! Tears of gratitude to you, merciful God in Heaven! [*He falls on his knees, convulsed with weeping.*] Peace has returned to my soul, the raging torment is past, Hell is no more – See, O see, the children of light weep upon the neck of the weeping devil – [*standing up, to the* ROBBERS] Why do you not weep too? Weep, weep, for you are so blessed. Oh, Amalia! Amalia! Amalia! [*He hangs upon her lips, they remain silently embraced.*]
> A ROBBER [*approaching angrily*]: Stop, traitor! – Let go this arm

> straightway, or I shall tell you a word that will make your ears ring and your teeth chatter with horror! [*He parts them with his sword.*][228]

This unnamed Robber ends the moment of redemption between Karl and Amalia. Forgiveness and peace seem incompatible with Karl's life and works as a robber. Additional robbers show up after the unnamed one (quoted above) to remind Karl of the sacrifice they made to follow him as their Robber leader. The feel of this scene returns to that of similar scenes of anguish in the play, but it only becomes much worse. In the dialogue cited above, Karl Moor feels closeness to God, and peace in his soul, which is so fleeting that it is nearly superfluous to the play as a whole. In the end, this moment in the scene makes Amalia's death look all the worse when Amalia and Karl seem to finally be speaking the same language and on the same page. Previously in the play Karl does not believe Amalia forgives him for all of his misdeeds. And even in this very scene, it takes Karl some time to accept that Amalia actually does forgive him.

The sublime moment in the recapitulation of the "Hammerklavier" encapsulates this exchange from *The Robbers*; it illustrates clarity, peace, and redemption. The short sequence in the recapitulation of the "Hammerklavier" is just as fleeting as this brief exchange in *The Robbers*. We are left, as spectators, wondering about what just happened: the melodic and harmonic partnership in the "Hammerklavier" is suddenly consonant with one another and then, just as suddenly, it returns to its previous tone of autonomous musical parts and fanfares.

The symbol we have discussed here in the "Hammerklavier" is small, almost irrelevant to the whole, and on the surface strikes us as having little in common with the musical *Idee* of the work. In this case, the symbol appears like Hegel's comparison example of the sunset: obvious or empty – but upon closer inspection, we see just how deep the meaning goes. This particular symbol, however, does not recur throughout like the idea of distance in the "Moonlight" sonata; we do not feel a nagging disappointment of not reaching the truth or meaning in the music although we seem so close to apprehending it. In the "Hammerklavier" Beethoven creates an oasis that is meaningful, despite its short duration, and is reminiscent of the ephemeral quality of music.

[228] Schiller, *The Robbers*, act V scene ii.

Concluding remarks on the symbolic in music

The way we describe music, offering reflection on its meaning and depth, has recourse to symbols because symbols are generally more complex than similes and give the impression that they address a deeper meaning. When we consider musical meaning beyond material or analytical conclusions, musical meaning becomes difficult to grasp no matter what kind of terminology one uses. We argue that this is one reason why symbolic meaning finds a home in prose about music. The task of writing about music implies reflection on how and why music may mean something beyond the formal rules of composition and practice. In this vein, we wonder how music manages to speak at all beyond the confines of its material.

Furthermore, to understand musical meaning in relation to symbols is not beyond the imaginations of those who are experts in the art of music and music theory. Contrary to Hegel's understanding of instrumental music, we argue that we can decipher certain aspects of musical meaning more easily in a context that is different from normative theory and analysis. Hegel believes that art objects have an inner life (which is not measured exclusively by its material), but he makes a curious exception for music; Hegel contends that music is only truly appreciated (where one experiences *complete satisfaction*) when one makes an assessment of a work using musical *rules* and *laws*:

> The expert who has at his fingers' ends the inner musical relations between notes and instruments, loves instrumental music in its artistic use of harmonies and melodious interactings and changing forms: he is entirely satisfied by the music itself and he has a closer interest of comparing what he has heard with the rules and laws that are familiar to him so that he can fully criticize and enjoy the composition. . . . The mere amateur seldom has the benefit of such complete satisfaction, and at once the desire steals over him to supplement this apparently unsubstantial procession of sounds and to find a more definite meaning for what rings in his soul. In these circumstances music for him becomes symbolical, but with his attempt at snatching a meaning he is confronted by mysterious enigmas which run swiftly past, cannot always be solved, and in general are capable of all sorts of interpretations.[229]

[229] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, Volume II, "3. Relation between Music's Means of Expression and their Content (*b*) Independent Music, (*β*)," 954.

Hegel's evaluation of an amateur's experience of music is strictly at odds with Marx's belief that symbols are important for a critical understanding of musical expression and meaning. Through Marx's writings, we recognize that to enjoy meaning in music does not explicitly require us to compare the sounding quality to rules; importantly, we should engage our imagination and critical faculties to perceive the thought and *Idee* within a composition. The "enigmas… capable of all sorts of interpretations" in Hegel's experience of music are, in fact, the basis of many of Marx's conclusions about musical meaning. How else can Marx construct a heroic narrative in the "Eroica" without imagining the "enigmas which run swiftly past"? But, much to our dismay, the enigmas cannot be solved. They cannot be solved entirely by rules, and they cannot be solved entirely by similes, symbolism, and *psychological coherence* either. This leaves interpretation to be eternally open – a task that is never finished. In a recent essay on Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, Kristin Gjesdal writes: "Interpretation is, by definition, fallible and subject to constant revision. Precisely because interpretation is fallible and subject to constant revision, is it crucial that the interpreter distinguish between the activity of understanding, on the one hand, and the application of the insights she arrives at, on the other."[230] We are always searching for an adequate explanation of meaning (as Gjesdal alludes to when she states that "interpretation is fallible and subject to constant revision"). We seek explanations that are more adapted to our current tastes and understanding of music, trends, and theoretical apparatuses, but in the end musical meaning cannot be solved like a mathematical equation. A passage that strikes us as strange will continue to strike us in this way, despite the number of times we have described how to understand it through hermeneutic interpretation with the application of material and symbolic considerations. In hermeneutic exercises, we get a closer glimpse of meaning in music from the tools of interpretation at our disposal; the result is that we offer insights into the depth of music not through our inability to completely elucidate the meaning of the enigmas running swiftly past, but through the details we successfully trap and illuminate.

[230] Kristin Gjesdal, "Hermeneutics, Individuality, and Tradition, Schleiermacher's Idea of *Bildung* in the Landscape of Hegelian Thought," in *The Relevance of Romanticism*, ed. Dalia Nassar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 92-109, 97.

Chapter 2:

Psychological coherence[231]

For an examination of *psychological coherence*, let us consider Marx's spiritual guidelines once again:

> We must respond: direct your search to art—to its material, the sounds, symbolism, psychological coherence, all these spiritual guidelines that no artist and no person can do without![232]

Unlike symbols and similes, which contribute to the formation of descriptions, deeper meaning, and the vivid portrayal in words of musical gestures, we argue that *psychological coherence* aims to establish integral connections between performance practice, meaningful content in a musical work, form, and the creative process. Marx's determination of *psychological coherence* addresses, in a general way, Hegel's notion that art "should disclose an inner life, feeling, soul, a content and spirit, which is just what we call the significance of a work of art."[233] What we look at in a work of art (or specifically music in this case) for evidence of meaning is the material object; for this reason *psychological coherence*[234] will not rely on the composer's personality as the only source of its meaning. Marx offers *psychological coherence* as a tool for interpretation specifically when we remove the composer's authority to address the content of a work of music. Therefore, the *psychological coherence* of a work of music will not be equivalent to the psychology of the composer where a particular quirk in a composer's personality will speak to the inner life of a composition. The concept of *psychological coherence* is thereby understood beyond a question of emotion. It relates more accurately to the mind and intuition. A study of *psychological coherence*, furthermore, will show us the way a work is able to express thoughts and ideas, Marx's musical *Idee*, and the concomitant assumption of our

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[231] An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Sara Eckerson, "The Material and 'Inner Life' in Music: Beethoven, Psychological Coherence, and Meaning," *Humanities* 4, no. 3 (2015): 418-435, doi:10.3390/h4030418.

[232] A. B. Marx, *Musical Form*, 178-9.

[233] Hegel, *Aesthetics,* 20.

[234] The interpretation of *psychological coherence* put forward here is derived from a Hegelian interpretation of psychology, *i.e*. rational psychology, as described in Hegel's *Encyclopedia – Science of Logic*. Hegel determines rational psychology in the following way: "it sets itself the task of knowing the spirit through thinking and also of proving what is then thought." G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic,* trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §34, addition, 73.

ability to comprehend that content. We will conclude with an example from Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 in D minor, Op. 125, to support the argument that the meaning of a musical work, which harbors contradictory moods or thoughts, is strengthened and clarified through an examination of *psychological coherence.*

A. *Psychological coherence* and thought

In theoretical writings and reviews, Marx pays special attention to the role of performance as an audible reproduction of meaning. This serves to broaden the horizon of meaning, as Marx challenges us to hear meaning just as much as we might glean meaning from analysis. Marx highlights this in a treatise on the proper performance of Beethoven's pianoforte music.[235] We can attribute the urgency in Marx's prose to his identification of the "peculiar nature" of the content of Beethoven's music in comparison to the music of other composers. For Marx, a proper interpretation of Beethoven's sonatas requires the pianist to draw out an underlying meaning or thought from within the music. An accurate performance of meaning in Beethoven's music

> is not reached by a general subjective feeling (*Gefühl*) as would suffice for the pianoforte works of…Haydn, Mozart, Dussek, Hummel, Chopin, Mendelssohn. . . .The peculiar content of Beethoven's style manifests itself in the fact that through his works, instrumental and more particularly pianoforte music, attained to idealism and became the expression of determined ideal content.[236]

In fact, the identification of thought, ideas, and ideal content in Beethoven's music is a recurrent theme in Marx's discussions of music history. For example, Marx writes that Beethoven brought about "the spiritualization of instrumental music by raising it to the sphere of definite conceptions and ideas."[237] Then, in a description of compositional styles in opera, Marx draws another distinction between Mozart and Beethoven that calls attention to difference in content. The music of the former demonstrates a superficial freedom while the latter is preoccupied with the deeper "mysteries" of musical expression. Mart describes "whilst Mozart shows greater freedom and lightness of fancy, Beethoven dives more deeply into the mysteries of

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[235] See A. B. Marx, *Introduction to the Interpretation of Beethoven's Pianoforte Music,* trans. Fannie Louise Gwinner (Chicago: Clayton F. Summy Co., 1895).
[236] Marx, *Introduction to the Interpretation of Beethoven's Pianoforte Music,* 15, translation slightly modified.
[237] A. B. Marx, *The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture: System of Musical Instruction,* trans. August Heinrich Wehrman (London: Robert Cocks and Co., 1895), 84.

his art, losing himself now and then in the dialogue of his orchestra, which not only entwines itself around the dialogue upon the stage, but often threatens to completely overgrow it."[238] In this report, Marx describes how "determined ideal thought" and the "mysteries" of instrumental music become vivid in sound. The effect of Beethoven's orchestra, which climbs rapidly from below like an ivy to suffocate the opera singers on stage, can only truly be appreciated when witnessing a performance of Beethoven's opera *Fidelio* (Op. 72).

Marx addresses a psychological component of ideal content in the essay "Etwas über die Symphonie" (1824).[239] In this text, Marx writes that Beethoven, in Symphony No. 5 in C minor, Op. 67, successfully illustrates "the succession of soul states portrayed with deep psychological truth."[240] We can juxtapose Marx's descriptions of Beethoven's music where we find "ideal thought" and "Deep psychological truth," with Marx's impression of Mozart's music that illustrates "lightness of fancy." *Psychological coherence* offers insight into cases of "deep psychological truth" and "lightness of fancy," but what is more interesting in this case is to see how we arrive at meaning in music through understanding this particular kind of coherence.

Scott Burnham points out a more specific division between Mozart and Beethoven in the vocabulary Marx uses to identify the general aims of musical content. The division is located in the opposition between the terms *Gefühl* [feeling] and *Seelenzustand* [soul state] in Marx's texts. With Beethoven's music, Burnham writes: "Marx feels something more momentous than a pleasing array of feelings; he feels the succession of states of the soul. By using the expression 'soul state' (*Seelenzustand*), Marx implies something deeper than a *Gefühl* or an *Empfindung*, words he uses when describing the content of Mozart's music."[241] *Psychological coherence* is a critical intermediary between the parts of a work and its *Idee* precisely because it speaks to ideal content and the "soul state" found in the material of music. In interpretation, the identification of *psychological coherence* is a task that aims to

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[238] A. B. Marx, *The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture: System of Musical Instruction,* 62.
[239] A. B. Marx, "Etwas über die Symphonie und Beethovens Leistungen in diesem Fache" In *Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung* (Berlin: Im Verlage der Schlesingerschen Buch- und Musikhandlung, 1824); vol. 1, 165-68; 173-76; 181-84.
[240] Scott Burnham, "Criticism, Faith, and the 'Idee': A. B. Marx's Early Reception of Beethoven," *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1990): 183-192, 188.
[241] Burnham, *Idee,* 191.

describe content beyond "feeling" (*Gefühl*) and "sensation" (*Empfindung*) because of the inherent relation *psychological coherence* has with both content and form. In our study, the soul and psychological content (or "psychological truth") in music is comparable to the inner life of an artwork; the musical work ideally expresses thoughts, ideas, and truth in a way that is perceptible through interpretation. This becomes clear when Marx claims that many of Beethoven's works reflect "life." Marx determines this in the interpretation of particular passages and the way in which these portray (psychological) states such as anguish or joy.[242] These passages then feed into the description of ideal content or the *Idee*, where meaning is constructed from the conglomerate of meaning collected from these particular passages.

Psychological coherence helps to resolve complexities of meaning in a musical work even when the content varies from a singular or predominant thought throughout the whole (such as the concept of parting and return in the "Farewell" sonata, Op. 81a), to works that present concurrent ideas that contrast or conflict with each other. The task of *psychological coherence*, which renders conflicting ideas intelligible within the same work in a sense of progress toward the establishment of an *Idee*, mimics an operation in thought (essentially psychological) of dialectic. In contrast to the Hegelian definition of dialectic in understanding, where a thesis and antithesis annihilate each other in the process of sublation, in a movement toward the Absolute, our parts or components in a musical work are not negated in what assumes the appearance of an organic process.[243] We find, nevertheless, a similarity between

[242] This is present in Marx's review of Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 105, (see Marx, "[Beethoven]: The Final Symphony" in *Musical Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. and trans. Ian Bent, volume 2: Hermeneutic Approaches [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 264-288) and also in the Seventh Symphony (see Scott Burnham's description ["Criticism, Faith, 'Idee,'" 191]). Marx alludes to the notion that the illustration of life is fundamental to musical expression when he writes: "Music cannot define in precise terms who and what you are; but it causes all the successive emotions of your heart to pass in review before you; and these enable you to unriddle the enigma of your existence. It is both a monologue and a dialogue, full of dramatic truth and life," Marx, *The Music of the Nineteenth Century*, 46, translation slightly modified.

[243] There is little room in the present argument to offer a lengthy discussion of the notion of *musical dialectic*. Adorno has infamously linked Hegel's dialectics with Beethoven's work by virtue of opposing expressions, forces, or passages, constructing affines between main theme and thesis, second theme and antithesis, *etc.* Adorno expounds on the idea of whole as the strongest entity that illuminates the meaning of parts, where "the unity of the whole is mediated" and "not only is the individual element insignificant, but the individual moments are estranged from each other. . . . The Beethovenian unity is one which moves by means of antitheses; this is to say its moments, taken individually, seem to contradict each other. But therein lies the meaning of Beethovenian form as process, so that although the incessant 'mediation' between individual moments and finally through the consummation of the form as a whole, the seemingly antithetical motifs are grasped in their identity." (Theodor W. Adorno, *Beethoven: the Philosophy of Music,* ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Edmund Jephcott [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998], [Fragment 29], 13) It is difficult to pin down what in music could

our view of the co-existence of conflicting ideas, which are considered in the formation of a higher principle, and Hegel's discussion of the dialectic in the *Encyclopedia* where "even feelings, bodily as well as mental, possess a dialectic of their own. It is well known how the extremes of pain and joy turn into one another…and in some circumstances the most poignant melancholy tends to announce itself with a smile."[244] We encounter a problem of comparison to Hegel's dialectic when we examine the verb *aufheben*, intrinsic to the process of dialectic, that is normally rendered as "to sublate" into English. The German word has several different meanings and Hegel does not explicitly name a specific definition; perhaps the most relevant definition of *aufheben* for our purposes is "to preserve or maintain" at the same time as present notions of annihilation or negation. Even when confronted with components in a musical work that are seemingly contradictory to the *Idee*, we maintain these parts as a way to arrive at the final conclusion of the *Idee*. In this sense, although an *Idee* may unify particular parts and ideal content in a musical work, we will vividly maintain particulars that often oppose the *Idee* as a method to strengthen the coherence and integrity of ideal content. From this perspective, we regard *psychological coherence* as the fundamental driving force of meaning of the whole, which steers attention away from general subjective feeling (*Gefühl*) and in the direction of determinate ideal content.

B. Content and form through the lens of *psychological coherence*

B1. General considerations

To explore *psychological coherence* in content and form, we will look more closely at the notion of a work as a whole and how the *Idee* can apply to the whole even when contrasting parts emerge. For instance, we can consider a work of music as a composite of fragments (a philosophical thought championed by Friedrich

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correspond to an antithetical theme in Hegelian logic and dialectics, in the logical *p* / not-*p* relation; this is a notion that Adorno does not directly address. Counterpoint may present a close solution, where an antithetical theme could be a theme in retrograde. Yet even a theme in retrograde has a specular relation to the main theme; it cannot sustain a *p* / not-*p* relationship because of harmonic implications, such as how to determine the meaning of a cadence in reverse. In Adorno's elaboration on the idea of dialectics in music, *negation* (a crucial component of dialectics) has a more abstract representation in music than in logic. In Fragment 40, Adorno writes that in Beethoven, "the concept of *negation* as that which drives a process forward can be precisely grasped. It involves a *breaking off* of melodic lines before they have evolved into something complete and rounded in order to impel them into the next figure" (Adorno, 19).

[244] Hegel, *Encyclopedia: Science of Logic*, §81 Addition 1, 131.

Schlegel),[245] of movements, moments, or parts: the whole is not bound together coherently but is essentially unfinished or fragmented. Although many musical works appear finished on the page, or sound complete, in many cases we are only analyzing or listening to one movement, overture, or arrangement selected from a larger whole. What complicates the problem of hearing fragments in performance is that many unfinished works are performed with the same integrity as finished ones (Mozart's "Great" Mass in C minor, K.427/417a, and Mozart's Requiem Mass in D minor, K. 626, are examples of this).[246] Even if the program notes for a performance state that the work is unfinished, rarely does the listener distinguish this music as having a weaker aesthetic meaning than a finished work.

On a more elemental level, a musical work can seem fragmented because the first and second themes sound at odds with one another as though belonging to two different works (such as the first and second themes in the first movement of Haydn's Sonata in D Major, Hob. XVI/51). However, the relentless movement forward that is

[245] "Many works that are praised for the beauty of their coherence have less unity than a motley heap of ideas simply animated by the ghost of a spirit and aiming at a single purpose. What really holds the latter together is that free and equal fellowship in which, so the wise men assure us, the citizens of the perfect state will live at some future date; it's that unqualifiedly sociable spirit which, as the beau monde maintains, is now to be found only in what is so strangely and almost childishly called the great world. On the other hand, many a work of art whose coherence is never questioned is, as the artist knows quite well himself, not a complete work but a fragment, or one or more fragments, a mass, a plan. But so powerful is the instinct for unity in mankind that the author himself will often bring something to a kind of completion which simply can't be made a whole or a unit; often quite imaginatively and yet completely unnaturally. The worst thing about it is that whatever is draped about the solid, really existent fragments in the attempt to mug up a semblance of unity consists largely of dyed rags. And if these are touched up cleverly and deceptively, and tastefully displayed, then that's all the worse. For then he deceives even the exceptional reader at first, who has a deep feeling for what little real goodness and beauty is still to be found here and there in life and letters. That reader is then forced to make a critical judgment to get at the right perception of it! And no matter how quickly the dissociation takes place, still the first fresh impression is lost" (Friedrich Schlegel, "Critical Fragments," in *Friedrich Schlegel's* Lucinde *and the Fragments*, §103, 155).

[246] Richard Kramer writes at length about the interpretation of fragmented and unfinished works in light of Schlegel's theory of fragments. We argue that in Schlegel's Fragment 103 of the *Critical Fragments,* Schlegel understands even a finished work to be fragmentary, or unfinished. This can also refer to the creative impulse, where a composer may always see imperfection and room for improvement in a musical work that is "finished." For Richard Kramer's account see Richard Kramer, *Unfinished Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 311-44. One of Kramer's claims is that musical fragments offer a vision of the creative process or a composer's thought. With relation to Mozart's fragment, String Quartet in G minor, K 587a (Anhang 74), Kramer writes on the final, partial phrase found in mm. 24-5: "The inclination to complete this unfinished phrase confronts us with the ultimate riddle of the fragment as a species, for it assumes access to a process of mind that is unfathomable even within itself. It is not the harmonization of the phrase, or even the logical next step in its unfolding, that is at question, but a prior matter having to do with the imponderables of the mind that could give us this phrase with one hand and take it back with the other" (Kramer, *Unfinished Music,* 316).

characteristic of music can overthrow this kind of opposition;[247] this flow of sonorous impressions is like a rigid current that spirals backwards only with predictable repeats (or da capo indications, *etc.*) written into the form. Hermeneutics provides a freedom to compare and contrast nonconsecutive parts, as well as fragments, to illuminate a strong, conceptual meaning. To speak of an *Idee* with relation to this perspective appears unfeasible because one is unable to visualize unity among disjointed parts; when we focus too strongly on fragments, the fragments' individuality and their ability to function independently from the whole will condition our ability to grasp the whole.[248]

Psychological coherence, however, rescues the notion of whole and supports evidence of ideal content within particular parts. We draw opposition to Schlegel's uncompromising view of a fragmentary nature of art through the comparison of part to whole in an example from Hegel's *Encyclopedia*. Hegel illustrates the importance of unity of the whole in a discussion of the body and its relation to its organs. Notwithstanding the body's strong notion of whole, the organs in the body have specific functions and when seen alone they can be self-contained;[249] yet they maintain a relationship to the whole, to the body, namely, these parts (organs) constitute the whole: "The parts are diverse from one another and are what is self-standing. But they are only parts in their identical relation to one another or insofar as, taken together, they make up the whole. But that 'together' is the opposite and negation of the part."[250] This negative relation of whole to part is immediate, and this aspect is crucial for understanding how a whole is perceived: "the members and organs of a living body are not to be considered merely as its parts, since they are what they are only in their unity, and by no means do they behave indifferently towards this unity. These members and organs first become mere parts in the hands of

[247] Janet Schmalfeldt describes the process of becoming, synthesis, and dialectic with relation to Beethoven. She achieves this namely through a presentation of views by Theodor Adorno and Carl Dahlhaus along with her interpretation of their ideas. In one example, she cites Adorno's theory of *multidimensional hearing* that allows us to hear forward and backward at the same time. In spite of this, we find that a composition's form will condition Adorno's progressive view of hearing (see Janet Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming: Analysis and Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-Century Music* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], 23-57, viz. 32).

[248] The individuality of a musical fragment can be observed when opera arias are sung at recitals. In these cases, the performer is able to grant coherence to a particular song through performance interpretation even when the meaning of the aria in the dramatic context of the opera is lost.

[249] See Hegel, *Encyclopedia: Science of Logic.* This is the case, as Hegel describes, from the perspective of an "anatomist who has to deal no longer with living bodies but with cadavers" (Hegel, *Encyclopedia: Science of Logic,* §135, *Addition*, 203).

[250] Hegel, *Encyclopedia: Science of Logic,* §134 (α), 203).

the anatomist."[251] In this construction, Hegel presents us with a "living" or proper whole that is characterized by a harmony between its parts. We contrast this with a "dead" whole that can be taken apart and fragmented because its inner life and identity are no longer relevant. To analyze the difference between fragments and the notion of whole is, nevertheless, not as easy as deciphering between the living and the dead.

Marx's concept of *psychological coherence* shows how musical parts inform and reflect components of an *Idee*, or ideal content, even if they seem to contradict the identity of the *Idee*; *psychological coherence* presents the parts as particular ideas or thoughts, which can then be absorbed into the whole. To add complexity to the part, we establish a foundation in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics and we maintain the integrity of the particular much like Hegel's anatomist. The parts are not annihilated and do not become something else—we can always re-evaluate the *Idee* in light of the parts, and start interpretation again at square one. Also, in the temporary suspension of a notion of whole, we can establish meaning for parts that are generally overlooked when integrated into a larger whole. It is in this hermeneutic approach that we are able to reconcile the dialectic of the whole and analysis of the part in light of *psychological coherence*. The strength of these conclusions resides in the fact that we are not attempting to resolve all inconsistencies of meaning into one organized and neat whole. A diverse whole will emerge from this hermeneutic interpretation and will be demonstrative of the particular unity of the musical work in question. From this perspective, we solidify our notion of whole in music through a peculiar "hanging together" of parts that demonstrates psychological and thoughtful coherence and meaning.

B2. The creative process and "specific materialization"

We can examine *psychological coherence* at a fundamental level of the creative process as what essentially gives shape to unmediated, creative content. From a Hegelian perspective, a work of art is created through, and reflects, the spirit. By "spirit" we understand Hegel also signifies mind or intellect as representative of the subjective inner life that is universal. In a comparison of works of art to objects that occur in nature, Hegel states:

[251] Hegel, *Encyclopedia* §135, Addition, 203.

> Our imaginative mentality has in itself the character of universality, and what it produces acquires already thereby the stamp of universality in contrast to the individual things in nature. In this respect our imagination has the advantage that it is of wider range and therefore is capable of grasping the inner life, stressing it, and making it more visibly explicit. Now the work of art is of course not just a universal idea, but its specific materialization; but since it has been produced by spirit and its imaginative power, it must be permeated by this character of universality, even though this character has a visible liveliness.…Now here it is the task of the work of art to grasp the object in its universality and to let go, in its external appearance, everything that would remain purely external and indifferent for the expression of the content. The artist therefore does not adopt everything in the forms or modes of expression which he finds outside him in the external world and because he finds it there; on the contrary, if he is to create genuine poetry, he grasps only those characteristics which are right and appropriate to the essence of the matter in hand.[252]

In the context of Hegel's conclusion, we find a composition (a particular, artistic, "specific materialization" of a universal idea) by Beethoven can reflect a subjective, interior state (such as unrest, suffering, or strife) particular to Beethoven and Beethoven's life. While a composition can reflect a subjective thought through an expression of unrest, it also simultaneously speaks to a universal aspect – e.g., unrest as common to humanity. In this passage, Hegel shows that a work of art reflects the inner life or mind of the individual who created it at the same time as portray the universality of that content. Hegel closes this thought with a discussion of the form the artist will choose in order to best portray that ideal content. The artist subsequently engages in an activity that transforms a universal idea into a material object. It seems natural, then, that the form the artist selects will reflect content in a complex way, through a dialectical relationship.[253]

We find this spelled out in what Marx writes regarding the Ninth Symphony, where both the form and the material exhibit psychological content. An inner

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[252] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 164.

[253] See Hegel's *Encyclopedia: Science of Logic,* 200. Marx describes how sonata form embodies an aspect of content in the following: "If the artist has experienced a deeper transformation within himself and then turns his gaze from his interior submersion back out into the world, then even the world itself will seem foreign and alienating to him. He knew it before and recognizes it again—and it appears as an Other to him, for he has become other. This schism, softened by the feeling of his own elevation and ascendancy over that which has become alien, finds its expression in the humor of the scherzo (the final movement of a sonata)" (Marx, "Form in Music," in *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven,* trans. Scott Burnham [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 50-90, 87). Marx illustrates an ideal artist in this passage (although not entirely explicit, Marx appears to be thinking of Beethoven), and sonata form is consequently based on the coherence that emerges from *psychological evolution.* The *psychological evolution* we encounter in the changing movements of a sonata will assist in our ability to establish *psychological coherence* of content, even though *psychological evolution* and *psychological coherence* are not identical.

necessity, derived from the symphony's portrayal of a universal, elucidates this and shapes both content and form. The *Idee* will grant coherence to the apparent "total freedom of all parts," and constitute the "sure foundation" that predicates the work's content and form. Marx makes the following comment regarding the conclusion of the first movement, Allegro ma non troppo e un poco maestoso, of Beethoven's Symphony No. 9, in D minor, Op. 125:

> The living world of musical instruments harbours awful secrets within its bosom. What must their creator have had to endure in his fateful solitariness, imprisoned in eternal silence within his own breast! To unlock the enigma of his own interior existence there was only the enigmatic language of music—one mystery as solution to another! But he stood unbowed though profoundly shaken. What control and self-possession does this total freedom of all parts, among other things, bear witness to, each line appearing to exist in its own right alone, while yet he holds them all on course and steers them with a tight rein! What sure foundation does this perfectly stable and lucidly formed structure evince in the depth and richness of its musical ideas! . . . The first movement of each of the symphonies is decisive for the idea (Gedanke) of the work. In the Ninth it is more so than ever. What does it convey to us? This ceaseless complaint of eternal discontent from which he is no longer able to free himself in his kingdom of musical instruments—he who has imbued and inspired this kingdom with his creative spirit. . . . Man is always closest to man; man's voice is the most familiar, the most sympathetic, the most intelligible. That is a general truth. . . . It was here that the outward plan to give the symphony a new shape by incorporating a final chorus must have become an inner necessity. What was a general truth, what was an experience peculiar of Beethoven, became now the Idea of the Ninth Symphony.[254]

In Marx's trenchant remarks, he describes a "living world of musical instruments" where these instruments bear some semblance of complete independence. Yet these parts, despite apparent independence, are bound together with a blind stitch. As a living whole that breathes with vitality, its parts struggle for recognition at the same time as they show their unity in the form of a dynamic whole. To fully comprehend the meaning of the symphony's first movement, Marx must reach beyond the confines of the movement's double bar to reflect on the significance of this part to the symphony's finale. The leap over two intermediary movements (the scherzo, Molto vivace, and the Adagio molto e cantabile) shows us the complexity of the symphony where one must refer to another part in order to make sense of the first. But of even greater importance, Marx demonstrates the universality of the

[254] Marx, "[Beethoven]: The Final Symphony," Ludwig van Beethoven: Life and Creative Output, In *Musical Analysis in the Nineteenth Century,* ed. and trans. Ian Bent, volume 2, 227-28.

symphony's *Idee* and how it serves as a floodlight to illuminate meaning in the darkest and most obscure parts of the music.

Marx recognizes the *Idee* of the Ninth Symphony as a complex entity. The contradictory aspects within its definition are precisely what forge its relationship to diverse parts throughout the work. He addresses the opposition within the *Idee* of the Ninth in the following: "We can detect a particular elemental quality of sound reverberating within the work – one so mighty, so gigantically forceful, and yet so tender and full of sorrow."[255] If we use this statement as a glimpse into the work's *psychological coherence*, we can then apply its insight to both performance and critical interpretation. The "elemental quality of sound" speaks to the proximity of the finished work to the creative impulse embodied in the *Idee*. Beethoven composed the symphony in such a way that a rudimentary quality of sound (that is "gigantically forceful") is perceptible in the same expression of tenderness and sorrow.

C. *Psychological coherence,* the Ninth Symphony, and expressive indications

C1. The Finale

To show the relevance of *psychological coherence* beyond nineteenth century criticism, we will set it in motion in a fresh examination of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. In particular, we will use *psychological coherence* as a device to investigate expressive indications or indications of mood. Notation that involves expressive word cues (*dolce, espressivo, cantabile, etc.*) pose a *sui generis* quandary for performance interpretation. Generally the complexity involved in the interpretation of these indications is overlooked. If doubt arises, one is referred to musical lexicons and contemporary or historical treatises on performance practice. In broad daylight, nonetheless, with great visibility in the score, we encounter expressive indications that are at odds with the musical context we find them in. Conflict suddenly arises between the overall *psychological coherence* of the whole, specific passages, and these descriptive musical instructions.

Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, provides us with a number of examples of this conflict. In accordance with Marx's criticism, the symphony is able to maintain *psychological coherence* that sustains its "elemental

[255] Marx, "[Beethoven]: The Final Symphony," 219.

quality" of a mighty force, juxtaposed with tenderness and sorrow. This same coherence supports an *Idee* of a fundamental sympathy found in humanity that is expressed through the feeling of familiarity and intelligibility when one hears another's voice. The contrasting elements that serve as the foundation for the *Idee* are exemplified in a passage at the *Allegro assai* of the Finale directly following the baritone recitative, "*O Freunde, nicht diese Töne!"* (Figure 3.7). This particular passage presents us with indications of *piano* and *dolce* for oboes, *dolce* for clarinets and bassoons, and *piano* for first and second horns. The oboes have the most complex theme with respect to expression (they must play *dolce* and *piano*) while the vocal parts bellow in a dramatic exchange. The strings' *pizzicati* melt away in the interjections from the bass members of chorus; the strings' lack of dynamic indications only emphasizes their subservience.

Figure 3.7 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, Finale, Allegro assai, mm. 237-241.[256]



The *dolce* parts do not call attention to themselves in the same way as the baritone and basses' "*Freude"–"Freude!*" pairing. (Naturally the basses' *forte* will sound louder because there are more voices singing these notes than the baritone soloist's part.) The woodwinds quietly murmur the first two measures of the "*An die*

[256] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind permission of Bärenreiter.

Freude" melody as many of these same instruments did one hundred sixty measures before, in the thematic parade of the symphony that precedes the baritone recitative. Be that as it may, at measure 237, there is a change in the air – we have entered into the choral part of the Finale.

During the recitative (Figure 3.8), the baritone has essentially told the instruments of the orchestra to go home: "No more of these tones!" This outburst in the Finale has perplexed many critics, music historians, and philosophers. Stephen Hinton presents an argument for how to interpret these words that hinges on the negation embedded in the baritone's words. From our perspective, the baritone does not reject musical (or instrumental) tone insomuch as he rejects the mood of the symphony; we thus arrive at a conclusion that is more literal (the instruments project mood through playing their parts) than rhetorical.[257]

[257] It seems dangerous to bring Friedrich Schlegel's concept of *irony* to bear on the negation expressed in the baritone's recitative (see Stephen Hinton, "Not *which* Tones? The Crux of Beethoven's Ninth," *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 22, No. 1 [Summer, 1998]: 61-77, 75-7). Schlegel's *irony* tends to turn meaning on its head, with arguments rooted in ultimate expressions of Fichtean *ego*, freedom, and subjectivity. Hegel describes the spiral of negation that comes with this *irony*: "The ironical, as the individuality of genius, lies in the self-destruction of the noble, great, and excellent; and so the objective art-formations too will have to display only the principle of absolute subjectivity, by showing forth what has worth and dignity for mankind as null in its self-destruction. This then implies that not only is there to be no seriousness about laws, morals, and truth, but that there is nothing in what is lofty and best, since, in its appearance in individuals, characters, and actions, it contradicts and destroys itself and so is ironical about itself" (Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 67). One way to counter the *irony* argument is to show that despite the symphony's expressions of unrest, which are metaphorically parallel to aspects of Beethoven's life, Marx is able to construct an *Idee* within the Ninth Symphony (and thus assert the presence of universal content). The universality of meaning locked within this symphony, and the diverse interpretations it affords, suggests that subjectivity and *ego* are far from the baritone's words.

Figure 3.8 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, Finale, Recitativo, mm. 216-227.[258]



[258] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind permission of Bärenreiter.

For a material demonstration of a literal interpretation (where the baritone to demands the instrumentalists to desist), we encounter the oboes, clarinets, and bassoons at m. 237 (Figure 3.7) softly persuading the baritone of their necessary presence. It is as though the woodwinds plead "please do not call in an army of singers, the '*Freunde*,' to overpower us with their 'joy!'" The first and second horns, normally a source of strength and valor, are even less conspicuous than the woodwinds: they sound an octave pedal point, at a *piano* dynamic, that seems to disappear into the darkness as the baritone and basses yell across to each other in the open space. The vocal effect is then pulled downward by the basses of the chorus singing "*Freude!"* and the string section's double basses command the tone even lower through their sounding register to a tone two octaves below the notes in the vocal part. The mysterious contour of the sonorous gesture is so great that it hardly seems we are hearing the string section at all. We witness, instead, a superhuman group of voices create a spontaneous black hole into which all the *forte* sound descends. Beethoven allows the vocalists one measure to recover in between the two instances of this curiosity (Figure 3.7, m. 239).

By m. 241, the baritone finally concedes to lower his voice a bit, at least to an *angenehm* or "pleasant" level. This indication directly reflects on the baritone's words from earlier, in the recitative (Figures 3.8 and 3.9) "*Sondern lasst uns angenehmere anstimmen, und freudenvollere*!" (But let us strike up more pleasant/pleasing and joyful [tones]!). The *angenehm* indication in m. 241 (Figure 3.7), as a parenthetical remark, offsets the mood of the previous passages, and demonstrates an adjustment in expression away from the invasive "*Freude*," to the longer phrases that begin the "Ode to Joy." It is an about-face in expression when the baritone soloist chooses to shift gears to a style that mocks the woodwinds *dolce* at mm. 237-240. The *angenehm* baritone at m. 241 marks a significant crux in the symphony, and a point of no return with respect to the timbre of the orchestra.

To fully grasp the instability that the appearance of the vocal parts creates, we refer to the start of the recitative at m. 216 (Figure 3.8). The baritone solo lacks any dynamic indication, but emerges out of what seem to be the longest three beats of silence.[259] The orchestra is suddenly reduced to only the string section. Measure 215

[259] The last beat of measure 215, not shown, is a rest in all instruments. The lack of dynamics is rather unremarkable, as the vocal parts in recitatives generally do not have dynamics written into the part;

finds all sounding instruments at *fortissimo*, thereby suggesting the same for the baritone soloist (who enters the symphonic space with the vigor of a police officer who has burst onto the scene to break up a noisy party). The strings cautiously rejoin the sounding space to support the recitative at a *piano* level (Figure 3.8, m. 221). The baritone resounds triumphantly above their submissive *colla voce*. The *colla voce* concludes with almost all instruments of the orchestra exclaiming a short *forte* motif at mm. 229-230 (Figure 3.9) that modulates the recitative into D major. As this motif accumulates with dramatic changes from *piano* to *forte* (*sforzando* in the strings) and the *forte* interjection once the baritone has concluded the recitative (m. 236). We find at this moment that it as though the members of the orchestra were assuring each other they were still in the room. The recitative has a laborious quality about it, exacerbated in its sustained tones and the relative independence of the vocalist; it seems as if the baritone alone were trying to stop a speeding train.

measure 238 does provide dynamic indications that call attention to the opposition between the voices and the other instrumental parts.

Figure 3.9 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, Finale, Recitativo, mm. 228-236.[260]



Once we reach m. 237 (Figure 3.7), a new instrumental section has entered the symphony: a full chorus and a quartet of vocal soloists. The instrumentalists of the

[260] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind permission of Bärenreiter.

orchestra, with the woodwind section at *dolce*, seem desperate to strike a balance. At m. 241 the baritone sings of joy, apparently renewed, and drastically changes the dynamic and expression of the execution. Measure 241 marks the point of a new stability, as the chorus and soloists will dominate the sonority of the symphony from now on. This *angenehm* passage sets the tone that the singers will have control of the Finale because the baritone soloist no longer needs to sing aggressively at *forte,* which gives the impression that the baritone is interrupting a conversation. (The sentiments the word *angenehm* recalls and the dynamic of *forte* seem to cancel each other out, even if the vocalist sings this section at *forte*; it would appear unnecessary for the baritone to sing at *forte* considering the few supporting orchestral voices are sounding at *piano* or *pianissimo*.) The instrumental sections on the whole, for the rest of the Finale, merely shore up and exalt the expression of the singers' words and passages. In the Finale, once the baritone has relaxed enough to sing at an *angenehm* level, the tables have turned and all of the parts of the orchestra serve the message of "*Freude*" and its vocal representatives.

C2. The timpani, the Finale, and the whole

In this short interpretation of the entrance of the vocal parts, we have explored the contrasting expressions in mm. 216-242 (Figures 3.7-3.9) through a perspective where Marx's *psychological coherence* is a unifying thread. The unity between parts, forged through this method, reflects on the particular nature of the symphony as a whole. Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, nevertheless, continues to challenge critical interpretation that aims to establish coherence. David Benjamin Levy specifically addresses the meaning of the Finale with relation to the whole. Levy writes that the structure of the Finale "is a *microcosm of the entire Ninth Symphony itself.*"[261] The hermeneutic significance Levy draws from an analysis of the symphony's "microcosm," a mini-whole within the whole, shows how the meanings of the symphony's earlier movements are systematically reflected in different sections of the Finale. Levy's argument, nevertheless, is only one component of coherence of the whole that we can locate in the Finale. With relation to ideal content – and this is where Marx's *psychological coherence* facilitates the construction of meaning – we

[261] David Benjamin Levy, *Beethoven: The Ninth Symphony,* revised edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 93.

find the expressive polarization of orchestral sections in other crucial moments of the symphony. For example, the opposition we found in the baritone's exclamation at the beginning of the recitative (Figure 3.8, mm. 216-221) recalls the timpani's paroxysm of assertiveness in the opening of the symphony's second movement (Figure 3.10).

Figure 3.10 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, mvmt. II, Molto vivace, scherzo, mm. 1-12.[262]



[262] Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. *Used with permission of Bärenreiter-Verlag, Kassel.*

The sensation of a loud, intrusive voice in contradistinction to a harmonious orchestral timbre is experienced first at this moment in the symphony (Figure 3.10, m. 5). A spotlight is fixed on the timpani: firstly, it sounds an unanticipated tone;[263] secondly, it has become the most curious object of our attention – through its bold and prominent position in the orchestration, it clearly has something to say. The assuming figure of the timpani throughout the second movement foreshadows the imminent entrance of the baritone in the recitative. We connect the outbursts from this unsettling creature, which has asserted the authority of the percussion section (albeit the timpani's tone integrates into the tonal arrangement of the other parts), to the ruckus of the chorus's "*Freude*!" (see Figure 3.7, m. 238). Richard Taruskin jocosely calls the Ninth Symphony "something of a timpani concerto among symphonies"[264] and focuses on the timpani's rambunctious contribution to the first movement's recapitulation. On the one hand, many scholars interpret the *scherzo* as a joke – Levy suggests humor as a fundamental guide for the interpretation of this movement due to the Italian definition of "*scherzo.*"[265] On the other hand, we find the seriousness of the timpani adds to the general instability of the entire symphony. The timpani attempts to speak the *Idee* of the symphony through a mouthpiece that reproduces only one tone (and this tone reflected in an octave relation) dressed in an ardent sense of rhythm. It is not until we reach the vocal section of the Finale that we can recognize deeper meaning in the timpani's truncated phrases. At first sight, the timpani solos and the baritone recitative seem ironic, comical, and naïve. Upon closer inspection, however, the refractory aspect of their expression instills a strong sense of dialectic between the orchestral sections and the meaning of the whole.

[263] "The kettledrums in m. 5–tuned in a most unorthodox way to octave Fs–leave no doubt that the present movement is in D minor. This tuning–the same Beethoven used in the finale of his Eighth Symphony–is as unexpected as it is audacious," Levy, *Beethoven,* 70.
[264] Richard Taruskin, "Resisting the Ninth," *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Spring, 1989) 241-56, 241.
[265] See Levy, *Beethoven,* 69-70.

Concluding remarks on Marx's psychological coherence

In this study, we have tried to illustrate the relevance of Marx's principles for uncovering musical meaning, specifically *psychological coherence,* in the context of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. The concept of *psychological coherence* takes interpretation in a direction beyond purely formal coherence (derived from normative rules of composition), and toward meaning as ideal content. The musical parts we base our conclusions upon, which when analyzed appear disjointed from the whole, are threaded together in a hermeneutic analysis that highlights the continuity between part and whole. Our activity aims to identify hints of ideal content within the diverse material components of music; the impression of ideal content is like a unique blind stamp that has been worn away on the score and its sounding quality – the vague shadows inspire us to look more closely at these material parts and temporarily separate them from the whole.

In a final move of comprehension of ideal content, or a work's "inner life," we step back and observe the connections between the finely moving parts of a particular and the whole of the work. As we have shown in examples from the Ninth Symphony, the opposition between orchestral sections and expressive notation in the Finale offers insight regarding similar expressions of unrest in earlier movements of the symphony. Beethoven presents polarity between instruments within the same passages, which mirrors Hegel's dialectic in thought, and unveils glimpses of an *Idee*. The form of the symphony, its orchestration, the notation Beethoven has chosen, and the sound of these together as a whole, provide the material foundation for *psychological coherence*. This seems to suggest that ideal content (or a musical *Idee*) is not a psychological immaterial entity independent from musical expression but rather the image of the whole as produced by it. The universal meaning, or ideal content, of the whole appears all the more elegant through the evaluation of conflict and resolution in musical expression.

The chief task of music consists in making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is moved to the depths of its personality and conscious soul. . . . The same is true of the effect of music. What it claims as its own is the depth of a person's inner life as such; it is the art of the soul and is directly addressed to the soul.
G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*

Conclusion:

A. B. Marx and the Musical *Idee*: Are Material Considerations of Music Important for a Principle Derived from Idealist Aesthetics?

In Scott Burnham's seminal article on A. B. Marx's *Idee*, a few characteristic traits of Marx's musical *Idee* emerge: (1) its elusive quality;[266] (2) it speaks to the "spiritual content" of a musical work;[267] and (3) it is "that aspect of a musical work which guarantees the individuality of the work."[268] We are able to overcome this elusiveness in the material of the musical work, as Scott Burnham points out, because the *Idee* is both ideal and material; in the same way that we located symbols and *psychological coherence* in music, we can find instances of the *Idee* in the score. These examples, nevertheless, are primarily derived from our critical reflections that go beyond the confines of the material of music. In the following, we will show how the term "material" in Marx's writings includes the musical score and also the instruments themselves. The concept of "material" ties the musical *Idee* to a notion of truth, and fundamentals in Idealist aesthetics, when we reflect on the content the objective material puts forward. Through considerations of philosophy, we will seek to answer how important the material considerations of music are for Marx's *Idee* from a philosophical perspective with relation to performance practice.

[266] Burnham describes this in Scott Burnham, "Criticism, Faith, and the 'Idee': A. B. Marx's Early Reception of Beethoven," *19th-Century Music,* Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1990): 183-192, see 186-7.
[267] See Burnham, *Idee*, 186.
[268] Burnham, *Idee*, 185.

Burnham writes the *Idee* "must have a palpable connection with sensuous reality in order to be suitable for musical representation."[269] When we consider this comment, we might ask: what kind of content has a "palpable connection with sensuous reality in order to be suitable" for expression in music? Although Hegel and Marx differ in their opinions about the possibilities of musical meaning, the two seem to agree that musical meaning is not simply any idea that might pop into one's mind. In the lectures on aesthetics, although he does not mention it explicitly, Hegel pronounces certain restrictions on the possibilities of content that music can express on its own. Within the realm of *absolute music*, he describes:

> In the series of the developments of the kinds of instrumental music the composer's own caprice becomes the untrammelled master along with, in contrast to the fixed course of melodic expression and the textual content of music as an accompaniment, its fancies, conceits, interruptions, ingenious freaks, deceptive agitations, surprising turns, leaps and flashes, eccentricities, and extraordinary effects.[270]

Hegel's identification of musical meaning in instrumental music initially looks unintelligible, but we can sense a more profound idea behind Hegel's opinion of musical caprice. Furthermore, Hegel does not say that musical meaning in these instances can be anything under the sun, but has something to do with caprice where the composer has the freedom to write music without being bound to an extramusical text. Hegel, moreover, insists on characterizing these odd turns of musical expression. This does the service of showing that music is not about *nothing*; music is almost always about *something*, but Hegel is unable to put his finger on it.[271]

To get to the bottom of a clear understanding of Marx's musical *Idee* – that is musical meaning that seems to escape Hegel's imagination with respect to instrumental music – Scott Burnham pronounces a concept that is a cornerstone in the debate of music and meaning: time. From this basic principle, Burnham offers a broad playing field

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[269] Burnham, *Idee*, 187.
[270] G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,* trans. T. M. Knox, Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 955.
[271] When Isaiah Berlin describes the depth of meaning in Romantic art, Berlin elucidates an aspect of the difficulty involved when rendering musical meaning into prose: "If I am Proust, if I am Tolstoy . . . I might succeed in giving you some kind of version of your actual emotions when listening to a particular piece of music. . . . But in the cases of works that are more profound the more I say, the more remains to be said," Isaiah Berlin, *The Roots of Romanticism,* second edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 119.

for content related to the temporal, forward-moving quality of music.[272] Notwithstanding the far-reaching determinations of time in music, the deeper meaning in a musical work (the *Idee*) must *still* have a "palpable connection with sensuous reality." When we find that a musical *Idee* has a time-progress aspect to it, or even reflects *life*,[273] this sheds light on only certain kinds of musical meaning. Content that has an explicit time-progress component limits other possibilities for meaning, such as a generalized concept of conflict. We often hear conflict in music represented through melodic and harmonic progressions that are not necessarily sequential. (We observed this with relation to Beethoven's Ninth Symphony where we compared the timpani of the scherzo to the baritone of the Finale. The relation of the temporal, forward-moving quality of music becomes a latent component of a larger notion of conflict in the symphony.)

Irrespective of an explicit, or implicit, time relation between a musical *Idee* and the material of music, meaning should be present in a *sensuous reality* – in the listener's ear and experience. Musical meaning is consequently subjective, because it is based in our unique aesthetic experience of the musical work. The aim of a critical approach is to analyze the experience, and the material of music, and ultimately render any conclusions into an objective form where more than one person can grasp the musical *Idee*. Accordingly, a performance is an important tool for the expression of deeper meaning because a performance is the score's mouthpiece and transfers the meaning of the score into an audible experience.

As Marx explains to a skeptical critic, in order to understand musical expression through similes, symbolism, and *psychological coherence*, one must find how the music communicates by means of its material. It seems to follow, then, that the content of this communication (namely the content of performance) will provide us with the work's deeper meaning (the *Idee*), which reflects a universal. We have examined Marx's comments about symphonic scores and meaning in performance through practical exercises of explication (throughout Part III of this dissertation) where we considered how one particular work can impart universal meaning. Marx,

[272] Burnham goes further to define this idea as connected to content that can be "unfolded in time," Burnham, *Idee,* 187.
[273] See Burnham, *Idee,* 187.

however, also finds the material of music, and its ability to express *spiritual content,* is partly correlated with the specific properties of the instruments in the orchestra. A successful composer will draw on knowledge of timbre, tessitura, and the capabilities of orchestral groups in different combinations, to better illustrate the greater meaning of the work itself. This knowledge, which is engaged during the creative process, is an antecedent to the construction of the finished musical work and necessarily informs our understanding of a musical *Idee.*

In this vein, we suggest that Marx defends an argument where musical instruments themselves have something of a Hegelian *inner life*.[274] We observe this in one example of Marx's praise of Beethoven's compositions; the passage we draw from captures Marx as he admonishes critics to challenge their first impressions of Beethoven's music. Marx addresses the following comments to an unnamed philistine who is unable to appreciate meaning in instrumental music:

> If the Pastoral Symphony, the Eroica, the fifth, the seventh, and the ninth, the trio in D major ["Ghost," Op. 70, no. 1], the romantic andante in the grand quartet in C major [Op. 59, no. 3], the sonatas in C# minor ["Moonlight," Op. 27, no. 2] and F minor ["Appassionata," Op. 57] and the one entitled, "Les Adieux" [Op. 81a] – if these and others do not at once convince the hearer that more was felt and meant by Beethoven than a play with lifeless "instruments of music," the hearer has only to read the composer's own superscriptions and annotations in order to learn that it was a world of living and spiritual beings which spoke to him out of the strings, the wood, and the reeds.[275]

Marx is adamant that a musical score will convince skeptics, as though the score were a scientific proof; essentially Marx expresses the same advice to critics that a parent might offer to a child about crossing train tracks: if you don't hear it, look! The superscriptions and annotations Marx mentions are, as he supports elsewhere, "a first clue for interpretation."[276] Even when Marx relegates superscriptions to a position of first impressions or "first clues," these superscriptions are decisive because they will

[274] The interpretation of sounding instruments ultimately has a subjective component, as we will discuss in the following pages. It recalls Hegel's general view on the content of music: "[Music] forms the real centre of that presentation which takes the subjective as such for both form and content, because as art it communicates the inner life and yet even in its objectivity remains subjective," Hegel, *Aesthetics,* 889.
[275] A. B. Marx, *The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture: System of Musical Instruction*, trans. August Heinrich Wehrman (London: Robert Cocks and Co., 1855) 49. Translation slightly modified. For clarity, we have added opus numbers and commonly known titles to the works Marx describes in brackets. These opus numbers and titles are absent from the translation.
[276] Marx, *Musical Form*, 171.

point us in the direction of meaning. If we maintain our analogy between analyzing superscriptions and what to do when crossing train tracks, these superscriptions are like a distant light at the horizon – the more I reflect on this light, the more time I take looking at it, the meaning will become more pronounced in my sight. Superscriptions and annotations, moreover, suggest a source of meaning by shaping our aesthetic appreciation and hinting at what we should pay attention to when listening to the work. Much like our train analogy, however, these superscriptions threaten to overcome us with the weight of their compositional history – for example, they have entries in historical lexicons, which we explored with relation to the terms *dolce* and *cantabile* in the staff. The superscriptions and annotations offer up visible clues of a work's deeper meaning, but this kind of notation does not explicitly divulge meaning. It is the score and the performance of the score that build a greater context and body of work, and are the actual sources of deeper meaning.

Marx describes the instruments of the orchestra as "a world of living and spiritual beings," as instruments that "speak." With this insight, we find instruments impart expression in music that is beyond technical descriptions of how they are made or what constitutes them as material objects. To view the orchestra as "a world of living and spiritual beings" is a clue regarding the foundation of ideal music, the *Idee*, and "spiritual guidelines" in Marx's thought. For example, we cannot point to a cello's f-holes, or the soundboard of a piano, and say it is *here* that we find ideal meaning in music. First, performers revive the inanimate objects – it is their touch, breath, and experience that cause the instruments to produce music and communicate with listeners; second, conclusions about the "spirituality" of instruments is a result of reflection on a performance. The quality of the wood and other materials used in construction, as well as craftsmanship, are important for an individual instrument, and can be cited as part of what gives a musical work a particular tone; these qualities alone, nevertheless, do not offer sufficient information to inform a critic's "spiritual guidelines" to understand musical meaning. An instrument will, without a doubt, have influence on the meaning of the work due to the instrument's specific timbre and clarity of sound. (For example, if we hear Beethoven's Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57, "Appassionata" performed on a new Bösendorfer piano versus Beethoven's own Graf piano [1826], the way we understand different musical passages may vary depending on the instrument.)

To grasp the significance of Marx's claim that the orchestra spoke to Beethoven as "a world of living and spiritual beings," we will take a closer look at how the orchestra can inform Marx's musical *Idee.* To begin, we will start with the premise that the way a work of music is able to portray a spiritual idea, or an *Idee,* is through coherence of expression. Marx's *Idee* has a philosophical look about it, although it is not Hegel's *Idea*.[277] Notwithstanding that the aims of Marx and Hegel's respective projects are different, Marx illustrates that music and its *Idee* reach for deeper meaning much in the same way that philosophical texts try to grasp truth. To comprehend the deeper content of music, which we can place into a larger context of inquiry into the deeper content of the world around us, requires a similar reflection on principles of understanding and what it is to know. For this reason, Marx's theory about musical meaning in a symphonic work sets store by the material of the orchestra itself, the material of its instruments, and the material of its score. (Marx regards this material much like a philosopher observes the materiality of our world, or analyzes specific things that happen in life and the attitudes people have toward those events in order to make claims about the truth or falsity of certain beliefs about the material world. In this way, the material score and observations of this kind inform a critical or "spiritual" pursuit of meaning in music.)

When the orchestra grew to include more instruments under composers such as Giacomo Meyerbeer [1791-1864], Hector Berlioz [1803-1869], and Richard Wagner [1813-1883], this led Marx to question these composers' abilities to express a spiritual *Idee* in comparison with Beethoven and Beethoven's considerably smaller orchestra. Marx's response to larger orchestras is inspired, to a certain degree, by the

[277] Hegel's *Idea* is a more complex entity than Marx's *Idee*, as Hegel's concept is rooted in Hegel's logic. The Hegelian *Idea* is truth in an ultimate, absolute sense. The idea is the true *in and for itself, the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity* (Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic,* trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], §213). With respect to art, Hegel writes of the idea implicitly by describing truth through a *true* artwork: "By truth, one understands at first that I *know* [*wisse*] how something *is*. In contrast to this, truth in the deeper sense consists in this, that objectivity is identical with the concept. It is truth in this deeper sense that is at stake if, for example, one is speaking of a *true* state or a *true* work of art. These objects [*Gegenstände*] are *true* if they are what they *should* be, that is to say, if their reality corresponds to their concept" (Hegel, *Encyclopedia: Science of Logic*, §213, *Addition*). Marx's musical *Idee* may touch upon truth, but that is not necessarily its ultimate goal because part of Marx's project is to describe how we identify the *Idee* in a musical work (which might be almost as important as the meaning of the *Idee* itself). Marx's *Idee* captures an essential dimension of aesthetic experience and musical meaning, where Hegel's *Idea* functions in the context of logic and the natural world.

connotations certain instruments have in historical literature and usages.[278] When we consider the material of orchestration, especially over the course of the nineteenth century, we refer to elements beyond the composition itself. This includes thoughts about why certain instruments are better suited to one genre than another, and the identification of components in a composition that have normative associations with specific ideas.[279] To current sensibilities, Marx's disapproval of the inclusion of the "mellow brass chorus" (cornets, saxophones, tubas, et cetera)[280] into the orchestra and other innovations with respect to instruments (including valves added to trumpets), strikes us as the antiquated taste of a stick-in-the-mud. Marx's oppositions, however, directly relate to what he determines to be the orchestra's ability to express an *Idee*. We can detect this ultimate end in Marx's complaints about modern alterations that were made to the trumpet, French horn, and trombone. Marx determines these instruments have been "emasculated" through the additions of "valves and pistons." Then Marx shifts gears and his discussion about new orchestral timbre suddenly turns into a debate on ethics:

> When we cease to aim at truth, we also cease to discern and appreciate that which is characteristic; for every character is satisfied with, and true to, itself; it tries to be, and to appear, nothing else but what it really is. Now there are in the entire series of tonal personification (*Tonpersonificationen*) no characters of a more decided cast than the heroic trumpet and the enthusiastic horn, as they appear in their natural condition. Even the incompleteness and limited extent of their scales… is necessary to their being and character… neither would the clarinet's multitude of notes be of use to the trumpet, or the pliable serviceableness of the bassoon befit the sylvan horn. The peculiar character of these instruments, and even the very defectiveness of their compass, has never failed to lead the penetrating composer to more or less characteristic turns and combinations, and often rewarded his faithful adherence to nature with deeply interesting results. It was sufficient to drag these children of nature out of their original sphere of sound, and convert them into cosmopolitan creatures by depriving them of all their innocent peculiarities, in order to entangle the perpetrators in a

[278] Emily Dolan describes this with relation to the trombone: "The trombone, likewise, was a functional instrument, but one that came out of a very different context: before becoming a regular member of the orchestra (which it did not, of course, until the nineteenth century), it was used in sacred music, where it served as an intonation aid, helping singers maintain their pitch, without specific emphasis on the particularities of its sonority," Emily Dolan, *The Orchestral Revolution: Haydn and the Technologies of Timbre* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 156.

[279] "The artists employs [rhythm, sound and tone] for certain spiritual and, in his case, artistic purposes. This he could not do, unless these fundamental forms were associated with certain ideas and sensations in his own mind. Moreover, if they had *not* a certain definite meaning, they could not produce upon other persons a certain definite effect" (A. B. Marx, *The Universal School: A Manual for Teachers and Students in Every Branch of Musical Art,* trans. A. H. Wehrhan, [London: Robert Cocks, and Co., 1853], 271).

[280] See Marx, *The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture*, 70.

> maze of half truth and half falsehood. The introduction of valves has, undoubtedly, completed and expanded the scale; but the new notes are mostly impure, the natural notes have lost their characteristic clearness and peculiar coloring and the sonorous power of the instruments is broken.[281]

Although Marx's comment about a trumpet sounding heroic is neither new nor unique to his treatment of the orchestra, his identification of "tonal personification" resides in a sphere where an instrument's *character* is decided upon its timbre, its imperfections, peculiarities, and incompleteness. These tonal personifications give the appearance of truth, or at least guide the construction of musical meaning and critical discernment of an *Idee*. In the course of Marx's discussion, Marx states that instruments have a "natural" state, an "original sphere of sound." When we take a step back from Marx's prose, we find that Marx's affirmation about the "natural state" of musical instruments is actually quite curious. We come to this conclusion namely because instruments are material things, made out of other material objects. Our interpretation of their sound, however, seems to surpass the material itself and touch on something more fundamental – that is, something more "natural" in our perception of music. For this reason, we can fathom that it would seem "unnatural" for a string quartet to play a fanfare. Contrariwise to previously held beliefs about timbre and orchestration, through the modernization of certain instruments, composers began to find new relations between instruments and timbres in the orchestra that were previously unavailable. Modernization in itself is not necessarily unethical in Marx's thought; thus modernization and, by the same token, innovation are not at the heart of Marx's complaint. But what is central to Marx's discussion is that he finds the *truth* of the instruments, and the truth of what they express, has become corrupted through modernization. If the material instrument itself has become physically (i.e. materially) corrupted, then what the instrument communicates will be corrupted as well. We draw from this that in discussions of musical meaning, and the *Idee,* what Marx is really after is truth. And this truth is discovered through "spiritual guidelines" and considerations of the musical material.

In light of this, the "spiritual" element of Marx's *Idee* is the part of the critical investigation into musical meaning that is most like a search for truth. The "spiritual content" of music demands sensitivity with respect to the artist's spiritual exhibition

[281] Marx, *The Music of the Nineteenth Century,* 70.

in the work and one's own spirit.[282] This activity of the spirit resonates with Schleiermacher's concepts of *intuition* or *sympathy* (concepts discussed in Part II of this dissertation). Scott Burnham elaborates on the similarity between truth and Marx's *Idee* in the context of spiritual activity:

> The recognition of an *Idee* is not unlike an act of faith – both require a spiritual surrender, a relinquishing of the normative criteria for judgments of truth. Knowledge of an *Idee* is like knowledge of oneself…or knowledge of God, true in a personal sense but not verifiable by means of human reason. Marx's *Idee* is thus a concept imported from Idealist aesthetics but employed as a symbol of the critic's intuition about the wholeness and spiritual elevation of the musical work.[283]

When Burnham writes that one relinquishes "normative criteria for judgments of truth," we find that to judge meaning or a musical *Idee* is not like evaluating counterpoint or what characteristics make a "good" fugue. The connection of the *Idee* with the material of music binds reflection, at least in part, to the objective world and our subjective perception of music. We can detect an aspect of "spiritual surrender" in Marx's claim that the instruments of Beethoven's orchestra spoke as living and spiritual beings, and this is recognized (at least to some extent) in Beethoven's inscriptions. But these inscriptions, even at their most descriptive, communicate *real* and not spiritual things. Even the word "Le-be-wohl," with each syllable spread over the first three notes of the "Farewell" sonata, Op. 81a, does not speak to a spiritual dimension on the surface of the notation.

At this point, nevertheless, we agree that Marx's *Idee* is "a concept imported from Idealist aesthetics." One of the texts of reference for the study of Idealist aesthetics is an anonymous document entitled, "Earliest Program for a System of German Idealism (1796),"[284] and this text corroborates one of the significant similarities between Marx's *Idee* and Idealist aesthetics with respect to the concept of *freedom*. We can detect the concept of *freedom* in Marx's *Idee* on a rudimentary level through contrast between normative, functional rules of interpretation (both in criticism and

[282] See Burnham, *Idee*, 186.
[283] Burnham, *Idee,* 190.
[284] "The Earliest Program for a System of German Idealism (1796)" in *Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings*, ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse, et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 72-3. There is no agreement as to who was the author of the "Earliest Program." The document is written in Hegel's hand, and most scholars believe the document is Hegel's authorship. However, Schelling and Hölderlin have also been named as possible authors. See editors' note, 146n1.

performance), where one feels mechanically restrained by these rules versus the *freedom* to choose how to interpret a passage in virtue of one's will and deliberation. The "Earliest Program" differentiates between *freedom* as an *idea*[285] – and ultimately an absolute expression of humanity – versus a *machine*,[286] which is mechanical, manipulative, and restrains individuals from recognizing the value of their own intuition and ability to think for themselves ("the absolute freedom of all spirits that carry the intellectual world within themselves and must seek neither God nor immortality *outside of themselves*").[287] When we reflect on the "normative criteria" for judgments about music that we must relinquish in order to grasp the musical *Idee*, we find that analysis, at its worst, is a machine in the way the "Earliest Program" describes; it is a system to find meaning in music that is prescribed by external principles and rules, with little room for one's own interpretation of how one should use those rules. But even on its best days, analysis denies an idea of musical meaning derived from the *freedom* as set out in Idealist aesthetics. This notion of *freedom* corresponds with Hegel's way of hearing instrumental music as symbols and enigmas, where we release interpretation from strictly "normative criteria" and venture out into a highly subjective landscape (that is grounded, nevertheless, in material reflection).

Marx's *Idee* resonates most with the larger notion of an *idea* put forward in the "Earliest Program." We remember Burnham's characterization, where the *Idee* is envisioned "as a symbol of the critic's intuition about the wholeness and spiritual elevation of the musical work,"[288] when we read about the idea that unites all other ideas in the "Earliest Program":

> The idea that unites them all, the idea of *beauty*, taken in the higher Platonic sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of reason is an aesthetic act, in that reason embraces all ideas, and that *in beauty alone* are *truth and goodness joined together*.[289]

The *freedom* we find in Marx's *Idee* is found also in Marx's symbolism [*Symbolik*], which we determine as localized reflections of "spiritual content" that sustain the *Idee*, as free individual ideas (or subsidiary ideas) in themselves. The music is not

[285] "Earliest Program," 72.
[286] "Earliest Program," 72.
[287] "Earliest Program," 72.
[288] Burnham, *Idee*, 190.
[289] "Earliest Program," 72.

mechanical thereby symbols are not mechanical even if located in the *material* of music. The material serves interpretation to the extent that we can point at a score or at a piano's soundboard and state how these things shape our ability to comprehend beauty or an *Idee.* But to point at material things is not the same as to look at truth or beauty itself. This step must be taken in the mind, to find unity in the parts, and understand what grants coherence to seemingly disparate parts.

Scott Burnham argues that Marx describes Beethoven's music by associating it with a "higher reality…with the kind of transcendent human values manifested in the great social conflicts of [Marx's] age, values such as heroism and the courage of the fatefully oppressed individual."[290] From our perspective, the meaning of the value Marx attributes to Beethoven's music in the form of an *Idee* is not limited to only one particular moment in history. Our understanding of those values, and our ability to recognize an *Idee* in musical works (not only Beethoven's music) comes through the universality and truth of those ideas. When we recognize that Marx's notion of an *Idee* speaks to a "higher reality…of transcendent human values," even if Marx uses events of his era to describe their appearance in music for his audience, this kind of critical description does not take away from the truth and eternal nature of those ideas and values.

Beethoven writes in a letter to a young student: "Persevere, do not only practice your art, but endeavor also to fathom its inner meaning; it deserves this effort. For only art and science can raise men to the level of gods."[291] What Beethoven wishes to say with "inner meaning" echoes the ideas of the "Earliest Program" and A. B. Marx's *Idee*. Beethoven's student is asked to fathom the inner meaning of the music she plays – this is not a task only for a serious composer, but for a performer and for critical interpretation. To "fathom inner meaning" in music, to reach the "level of gods," one endeavors to know truth and embrace all ideas in a unity.

[290] Burnham, *Idee*, 191. This statement recalls the concept of mythology described in the "Earliest Program," see "Earliest Program," 73.
[291] Translation of a letter from 1812, "Emilie M. at H., July 17, 1812." See Emily Anderson, *The Letters of Beethoven*, Volume I (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961), L. 376, To Emilie M. at H., 380-381.

Marx's *Idee* is such that it requires us to not only fathom the inner meaning of a musical work, but also to explain this meaning through symbolism, similes, and *psychological coherence*. Although Marx's tone when explaining this task may be matter-of-fact, the task in itself is extraordinary. Isaiah Berlin describes why this trend was common to Idealist aesthetics and why it was that devices like symbolism were important for the writers, philosophers, composers, and artists of the Romantic movement: "The romantic doctrine was that there is an infinite striving forward on the part of reality, of the universe around us, that there is something which is infinite, something which is inexhaustible, of which the finite attempts to be the symbol but of course cannot."[292] To truly capture the desperation of this doctrine, Berlin writes from the first person:

> I wish to convey something immaterial and I have to use material means for it. I have to convey something which is inexpressible and I have to use expression. . . . I know in advance that I shall not succeed and cannot succeed, and therefore all I can do is to get nearer and nearer in some asymptotic approach; I do my best, but it is an agonizing struggle in which, if I am an artist, or indeed for the German Romantics any kind of self-conscious thinker, I am engaged for the whole of my life. [293]

To describe something infinite with the finite, to convey something immaterial with material means, is essentially Marx's itinerary from the get-go, and nevertheless, he finds any opposition to his ability to succeed in this to be ill-founded. Berlin's depiction of the Romantic doctrine reveals why Scott Burnham calls our attention to this peculiarity of Marx's "spiritual" *Idee*.[294] How can the spiritual be in the material when it will continue to elude us precisely in the material? How can Marx be so confident about the existence of an all-embracing, recognizable, transcendent *Idee* in music?

The reason why Marx can be so confident about this idea is quite simple and we find the answer in Beethoven's letter to Emilie M. at H. : *Persevere, do not only practice your art, but endeavor also to fathom its inner meaning*. With "practice" we understand Beethoven to mean: to know how to play, to know the technical aspects of music, and also to *fathom its inner meaning*. This practice, for a performer,

[292] Berlin, 117.
[293] Berlin, 118.
[294] "And what governs the curious contradictions of his notion of the *Idee*, a spiritual essence that seems all too material?" Burnham, *Idee*, 189.

pedagogue, and anyone who teaches music in any form, is precisely what they do. Even analysis requires a certain amount of critical thinking about the inner meaning – for example, to know whether a sequence of measures modulates completely into a new key or not, we should contemplate the meaning of the music and content of the phrase(s) beyond normative criteria (for instance, we may ask ourselves what the phrase is trying to say and our answer to this may have relevance for determining whether the key has modulated or not). For this reason, we do not feel the Romantic doctrine's *agonizing struggle* in Marx's writings about music; the rigorous endeavor to find meaning in music is actually just business as usual. It is business as usual for Marx because this critical and philosophical exercise plays such an integral role in pedagogy and performance, which we easily recognize in Beethoven's own remarks. And so just how important are material considerations for Marx's *Idee*? We find they seem indispensable, because they form, in a general way, the very foundation of our musical experience and practice. Although material considerations may pale beside deeper meaning and ideas about truth, the material of music – its instruments, the orchestra, the score, the sounding music itself – is our recourse and the starting point for practice.

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APPENDIX

LIST OF FIGURES

PART I

PART II

PART III